The Rum Rebellion: Purging Bligh

Those who had taken power were not confined by the effective operation of the rule of law, save insofar as ultimate retribution from London was anticipated.[1] Until a superior officer to Johnston arrived six months after the coup, John Macarthur was effectively in control.  During that period the rudimentary legal system was abused, where not suspended and the courts used as a tool of political revenge.[2] Magistrates loyal to Bligh were dismissed.[3]  Other loyalists were subject to a parody of justice.  Gore and George Crossley[4], the dubious ex-lawyer who had some role in advising Bligh on the rebellion were convicted on bogus charges and transported to the coal mines at Newcastle for seven years.  In March 1809, John Palmer[5], Bligh’s Commissary was charged with sedition for distributing Bligh’s Proclamation that the Corps was it a state of mutiny, denied the competency of the court and refused to plead but was unlawfully gaoled for three months and fined £50.[6] The civil court processes were also abused.[7] However, with the exception of these politically motivated cases, the legal system continued to operate more or less as before. Commerce was adversely affected as it was uncertain whether the negotiable bills payable in sterling that had traditionally been used for transactions with the government, would be honoured in London.[8] No one who lived through these months was in little doubt that the rule of law was severely compromised. 

Atkins was replaced[9] and Johnston initially appointed Charles Grimes[10], the Surveyor-General, as Judge-Advocate and ordered that Macarthur and the six officers be tried; on 2 February, they were found not guilty.[11] By contrast, Bligh supporters were sentenced harshly with Provost-Marshall Gore sentenced to seven years for causing the arrest of Macarthur.[12] On 3 April, Grimes resigned after George Johnston, who was acting as governor, had criticised some extraordinary proceedings in the court over which he presided. Though these were partly due to his ignorance of the law or, as Johnston said, ‘errors of judgment more than of design’, Grimes was regarded as one of the opponents of his administration. Macarthur was then appointed as the so-called ‘Secretary’ and effectively ran the business affairs of the colony.[13] Another prominent opponent of Bligh, Macarthur’s ally Thomas Jamison, was made the colony’s Naval Officer (the equivalent of Collector of Customs and Excise). Jamison was also reinstated as a magistrate, which enabled he and his fellow legal officers to scrutinise Bligh’s personal papers for evidence of wrong-doing by the deposed governor. In June 1809, Jamison sailed to London to bolster his business interests and give evidence against Bligh in any legal prosecutions that might be brought against the mutineers. Jamison died in London at the beginning of 1811 and did not have an opportunity to testify at Johnston’s court martial later in the year. However, the unity of the rebels quickly dissipated. [14] Johnston and Macarthur fell out with Blaxland[15] and Macarthur even managed to alienate the NSW Corps previously his staunchest supporters.[16]

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[1] Johnston did not inform Castlereagh of Bligh’s arrest until 11 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 575-589. For correspondence between Bligh and the rebels see, Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 242-271 and Johnston’s General Orders, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 271-276.

[2] HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 435-453, Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 276-291 print the Colonial Secretary’s Papers of the examination of officers after Bligh’s arrest.

[3] Government and General Order, 27 January 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 453.

[4] Allars, K.G., ‘Crossley, George (1749-1823)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 262-263.

[5] Steven, Margaret, ‘Palmer, John (1760-1833)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 309-311. See also, Palmer to Bligh, 2 March 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 530-531 in which he reaffirmed his support for Bligh.

[6] Palmer was reinstated by Governor Lachlan Macquarie but failed to receive any official compensation for deprivations suffered in the rebellion. Though the secretary of state instructed Macquarie to examine the commissariat accounts and see that the office was placed on a proper footing, he observed that as the complaints against Palmer ‘have been chiefly brought forward since the arrest of Governor Bligh, it is probable they are exaggerated’. Palmer’s examiners at the Comptroller’s Office in London held that the charges ‘seemed to have arisen as much from private pique as from zeal for the public service’ and were too vague to justify a formal inquiry. However, they thought it inexpedient to restore Palmer because of his long tenure in office (since 1791) and recommended the appointment of another commissary. On 25 July 1811, Palmer was demoted to assistant commissary and placed on half-pay and next year the entire commissariat system was reorganised.

[7] Ibid, Kercher, B., Debt, Seduction and Other Disasters:  The Birth of Civil Law in Convict New South Wales, pp. 41-42.

[8] Curry, J.E.B., Reflections on the Colony of New South Wales: George Caley, (Lansdowne), 1966, p. 157.

[9] He was, however, reinstated as Judge-Advocate on 13 December 1808, a decision he accepted despite having played the critical role in the case that precipitated the rebellion. Aitken’s conversion to the rebel cause was motivated largely by financial considerations, the capacity of the Corps to pander to his alcoholic tastes and a free grant of 500 acres in the Minto District.

[10] Dowd, Bernard T., ‘Grimes, Charles (1772-1858)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 487-488 and ‘Charles Grimes: The Second Surveyor-General of New South Wales’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 22, (4), (1936), pp. 247-288.

[11] HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 465-510 and HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 291-352 detail the trial. Johnston then appointed Anthony Fenn Kemp to the post. Aitkens and especially Kemp and Grimes were incompetent but more importantly made judicial decisions unfavourable to Macarthur. Foveaux had little choice but to reinstate Aitkens: Foveaux to Castlereagh, 20 February 1809, HRA, Series I, Vol. 7, p. 2 ‘I had no choice left but to restore Mr. Atkins, or expose the public to the serious inconveniences which must inevitably have followed from leaving so indispensable a department vacated.’

[12] Gore denied the authority of the rebel court that would not give bail and refused to plead; he was kept in gaol without trial for more than two months, and in a letter to Bligh unfavourably compared his treatment by the NSW rebels with that by the Irish rebels ten years before. On 30 May Gore was again brought before a rebel court and again refused to plead. He was sentenced to transportation for seven years and was sent to Coal River (Newcastle) where he laboured with ordinary convicts. See, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 555-563 for a statement of Gore’s refusal to recognise the court, his defence and correspondence with Bligh.

[13] Government and General Order, 12 February 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 519.

[14] Macarthur to Captain Piper, 24 May 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 643-644 indicated that unity was short-lived: ‘...some of our old acquaintances have behaved most scurvily...’

[15] Johnston to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 453-516 provides details for the reasons behind the rift between the Blaxlands and Johnston and Macarthur.

[16] Johnston to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 518-520.

The Rum Rebellion: Bligh’s overthrown

On the morning of 26 January 1808 Bligh ordered Provost-Marshall William Gore[1] to arrest Macarthur and again called for the return of the court papers that were now in the hands of officers of the Corps. At 10 am, the officers responded with a request for a new Judge-Advocate and the release of Macarthur on bail but they had received no reply by 3.00 pm and adjourned the court. In the afternoon, Bligh sent a note to the officers summoning them to Government House at 9 am the following morning, indicating that Atkins had charged them with certain crimes, but not revealing what these were.[2] An hour later, Bligh informed Johnston of his action and additionally told him that the actions of his officers were considered treasonable.[3] As the officers were to appear before Bligh and all the magistrates, this would be a charge under criminal not military law. The charge, if proven, was a capital offence. [4] To make this threat against officers was an intemperate and extreme move. There could be no greater slur on their honour.

Bligh’s charge of treason may have been the turning point. Johnston appears to have felt his relationship with Bligh had broken down so much that there was no point in talking to him. It was unlikely that Bligh would have executed the officers; but very likely they might be sent to gaol pending further advice. If this had happened, there would have only remained, apart from Johnston himself, two other officers in Sydney. One of these, Cadwallader Draffin, was mentally unstable. [5] Johnston later maintained that if the officers had been gaoled, the soldiers would have rioted and perhaps killed Bligh. He arrested Bligh for his own protection. Johnston was not particularly close to Macarthur and had in fact been one of the magistrates who ordered Macarthur arrested over the incident that led to this court case. He was an experienced officer, had been in the Colony since 1788, and was apparently highly regarded by his men. What Macarthur had started, Johnston would finish in a way perhaps Macarthur never imagined, though Macarthur certainly supported it.

At 5.00 pm, Johnston went to the barracks and ordered Macarthur’s release assuming, with no legal authority, the title of Lieutenant-Governor.[6] After discussions with his fellow officers and some wealthy civilians now including Macarthur, decided to depose Bligh. Macarthur then drafted a petition calling for Johnston to arrest Bligh as a tyrant and take charge of the colony.[7] This petition was signed by the officers of the Corps and other prominent citizens but, according to Evatt, most signatures had probably been added only after Bligh was safely under house arrest. Johnston then consulted with the officers and issued an order stating that Bligh was ‘charged by the respectable inhabitants of crimes that render you unfit to exercise the supreme authority another moment in this colony; and in that charge all officers under my command have joined.’ Johnston went on to call for Bligh to resign and submit to arrest.[8]

At 6.00 pm the Corps, with full band and colours, marched to Government House to arrest Bligh. They were hindered by Bligh’s recently widowed daughter and her parasol at the gates but Captain Thomas Laycock finally found Bligh after an extensive search, in full dress uniform, behind his bed where he claimed he was hiding papers. Bligh was painted as a coward for this but Duffy argues that if Bligh was hiding it would have been to escape and thwart the coup.[9] Stephen Dando-Collins suggests that Bligh was attempting to travel to Hawkesbury and lead the garrison there against Johnston. [10] On 27 February, with Bligh confined at Government House, Johnston revoked martial law and dismissed officers of Bligh’s government including Atkins and Provost-Marshall Gore. There were all-night celebrations across Sydney that included drinking and dancing around bonfires, burning of effigies, satirical posters, oil-lamp transparencies in windows and ‘Bligh under the bed’ cartoon displayed in soldiers’ homes. During 1808, Bligh was confined to Government House. He refused to leave for England until lawfully relieved of his duty.[11]

Johnston had no prospect of material advancement from dismissing Bligh; in fact, he was putting his future income as an army officer at grave risk. He was in no way Macarthur’s tool. This has been obscured by the enthusiasm of both Macarthur’s supporters and his detractors to place him more fully in the centre of the rebellion than his actions deserve. Johnston was a competent and independent official, whose motive in removing Bligh was to resolve a crisis in the colony’s administration and preserve public order.[12] This was not a rebellion in the sense of people grabbing power and possessions for themselves. A mutiny is much more restricted with the aim of removing a bad leader. There was a strongly held belief in the early nineteenth century that gentlemen had the right to overthrow leaders who abused their power. In this context, George Johnston’s action becomes much more principled and this was acknowledged during his court martial in 1811 when the leniency of his sentence was justified by reference to Bligh’s ‘impropriety and oppression’ when he was governor.

There is some debate over the nature of the ‘rebellion’ and the degree to which it was planned. Some historians argue that had Johnston been sufficiently well to meet Bligh on 25 January 1808 that the rebellion the following day would perhaps not have occurred. Had he already decided that Bligh would have to be removed and used his illness as an excuse to bring matters to a head? The same question could be asked of Macarthur’s actions on his trial. The problem is that, while both Johnston and Macarthur had grave doubts about Bligh’s method of ruling, there is no evidence to suggest that they colluded in precipitating rebellion, something that would anyway have proved difficult as Macarthur was under arrest for much of 25 and 26 January. The meeting with some of the wealthier citizens of Sydney on 26 January has been suggested as indicating the existence of some sort of conspiracy. However, Sydney was still a small community and calling important citizens together for an emergency meeting would not have proved difficult. The meeting’s importance lay in giving a degree of civilian legitimacy to the actions of the military. In fact, the rebellion did not require a great deal of planning and the NSW Corps was willing to support Johnston’s order to arrest Bligh. For the rebellion to succeed all that was necessary was to apprehend Bligh. [13]

In the days following the 1808 insurrection, Daniel McKay, a gaoler dismissed by Bligh as too brutal, then a pub owner, erected a sign outside his public house. It showed on one side a Highland officer thrusting his sword through a snake while a female figure of liberty presents him with a cap; on the other side, written in large type, was the phrase ‘The Ever Memorable 26th January 1808’.[14]

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[1] King, Hazel, ‘Gore, William (1765-1845)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 459-460.

[2] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433.

[3] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 236.

[4] Ibid, McMahon, John, ‘Not a Rum Rebellion but a military insurrection’, p. 135.

[5] Duffy, Michael, Man of honour: John Macarthur, duellist, rebel, founding father, (Macmillan), 2003, p. 295.

[6] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433.

[7] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 240. Apart from Macarthur and the Blaxland brothers, the petition was signed by James Mileham, James Badgery, Nicholas Bayly and by S. (Simeon) Lord.

[8] Johnston proclaimed martial law, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 240-241 and sent Bligh a letter calling on him to resign, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 241.

[9] Ibid, Duffy, Michael, Man of honour: John Macarthur, duellist, rebel, founding father, pp. 297-298.

[10] Dando-Collins, Stephen, Captain Bligh’s Other Mutiny: the true story of the military coup that turned Australia into a two-year rebel republic, (Random House), 2007.

[11] Alan Atkinson, ‘The British Whigs and the Rum Rebellion’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 66, (2), (1980), pp. 73-90.

[12] Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 208-221 provides Johnston’s justification for rebellion.

[13] Gore to Castlereagh, 26 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 602-606 gives an accout of Bligh’s arrest by a supporter. Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 607-629 gives his first account of the rebellion.

[14]For Bligh’s account of the rebellion, 30 June 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 670. See also, Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 420-440.

The Rum Rebellion: Bligh versus Macarthur

John Macarthur, seen as the creator of the Australian wool industry, although his wife Elizabeth deserves the title more than he, precipitated the crisis.  Macarthur had arrived with the NSW Corps in 1790 as a lieutenant and by 1805 had substantial farming and commercial interests in the colony.[1] He had quarrelled with governors Hunter and King and had fought two duels. Michael Duffy sees his acute sense of the code of honour as the key to his character and actions. He challenged Bligh to what was, in effect, a political duel in defence of both his honour and his money.  Macarthur was as offensive, domineering, short-fused and arrogant as Bligh, but had an unscrupulous shrewdness, indeed subtlety that Bligh both lacked and could not discern in others.  Clearly, from the beginning of Bligh’s rule, Macarthur saw him as a powerful obstacle to the realisation of his ambitions. Bligh and Macarthur’s interests clashed in a number of ways.

John Macarthur

Macarthur’s wealth was regarded by Bligh as the most offensive example of private profit at public expense.  He was determined to confine and reduce it. Bligh refused to make a major land grant that Macarthur thought he had negotiated in London.  His tone was dismissive: ‘Are you to have such flocks of sheep and such herds of cattle as no man ever heard before.  No sir!’[2]  Macarthur was right to stress the shortage of herdsmen. Convict labour was scarce. No prisoners had arrived in 1805 and only about 550 males in 1806 and 1807, fewer than those freed by effluxion of time; but the shortage never affected the farm which Bligh himself had bought on the Hawkesbury. Bligh stopped Macarthur from cheaply distributing large quantities of wine to the Corps. He also halted Macarthur’s allegedly illegal importation of brewing stills. In March 1807, a still for Macarthur arrived in Sydney, sent unannounced by his London agent. Bligh impounded it as illegal. Macarthur successfully argued to have the copper body, with goods inside, sent to his private store. [3] In October 1807, Naval Officer Robert Campbell sent his nephew to retrieve the still from Macarthur’s store for return to England under Bligh’s order. However, his nephew had no official status and Macarthur successfully sued for wrongful seizure. Macarthur was less successful in a case of debt. Andrew Thompson, a pardoned convict who became Chief Constable under Hunter and a successful farmer, businessman, builder and trustee for Hawkesbury settlers, was manager of Bligh’s farms and received land grants from him. Before the 1806 floods, Macarthur bought a debt owed by Thompson, made out in bushels of wheat. After floods, price of wheat increased tenfold and Macarthur tried to enforce payment in wheat that was now ten times the price when debt was made. The court determined that the debt was for original value, not amount, of wheat. Macarthur appealed but in July 1807 Bligh intervened, dismissing the appeal.

Macarthur’s interest in an area of land granted to him by Governor King conflicted with Bligh’s town-planning interests. In December 1807, Bligh challenged Macarthur’s lease on Church Hill, given by governor King despite Phillip’s order of no private leases in Sydney town and on 20 January 1808 ordered the demolition of the fence on the lease Macarthur had begun six days earlier.[4] Macarthur and Bligh were also engaged in other disagreements, including a conflict over landing regulations. In June 1807, John Hoare a convict had stowed away and escaped in the Pacific Islands on the Parramatta one of Macarthur’s vessels.[5] In December 1807, when that vessel returned to Sydney, the £900 bond to the NSW government for assisting escape was deemed to be forfeited. The ship was consequently impounded. Macarthur now refused to pay or victual the crew, forcing them on 14 December to come ashore illegally breaching the landing regulations. In effect, he abandoned a ship worth £10,000 rather than pay a fine of £900.

Joseph Lycett, Residence of John Macarthur near Parramatta

Bligh had the Judge-Advocate, Richard Atkins, issue an order for John Macarthur to appear on the matter of the bond on the 15 December 1807.[6] Outraged, Macarthur sent an angry reply declaring his contempt for Atkins and the government. The following day, Atkins issued warrant for Macarthur’s arrest. Macarthur demanded to be brought before bench of magistrates. They granted him bail on condition he appeared again the following day where magistrates, including George Johnston, commit Macarthur to criminal trial and he was bailed to appear for trial at the next sitting of the Sydney Criminal Court on 25 January 1808. However, the Court did not define the charges.[7] The court was constituted of Atkins and six officers of the NSW Corps: Anthony Fenn Kemp, John Brabyn, William Moore, Thomas Laycock, William Minchin and William Lawson. Macarthur objected to Atkins sitting in judgement of him because he was his debtor[8] and inveterate enemy and read from a lengthy document declaiming towards the conclusion

You will now decide, gentlemen, whether law and justice shall finally prevail...You have the eyes of an anxious public upon you, trembling for the safety of their property, their liberty, and their lives. To you has fallen the lot of deciding a point which perhaps involves the happiness or misery of millions yet unborn. I conjure you in the name of Almighty God, in whose presence you stand, to consider the inestimable value of the precious deposit with which you are entrusted.[9]

This was grossly exaggerated. He then gave the Corps its rallying call:

It is to the Officers of the New South Wales Corps that the administration of Justice is committed; and who that is just has anything to dread? [10]

Macarthur’s ranting about the defence of liberty and property that were never in danger, gave Johnston excuse to claim that ‘insurrection and massacre’ were imminent because Bligh was planning ‘to subvert the laws of the country’ and ‘to terrify and influence the Courts of Justice’. [11]

Atkins rejected this, but ‘Macarthur’s protest had the support of the other six members of the court, all officers of the Corps. Atkins threatened to gaol Macarthur. Kemp retaliated by threatening to gaol Atkins who left for Government House, declaring that there was no court without him. In 1803, a similar manoeuvre had been tried. Kemp was defendant in a court case and this time Johnston, the acting commanding officer of the Corps, demanded that the Governor, King, replace the Judge-Advocate, John Harris. King buckled and replaced Harris. Bligh, however, stood firm. During the day, messages went backwards and forwards between the court and Government House over the position of Atkins. Around 12.30 pm, Bligh made it clear that he had no power to remove Atkins and without Atkins there was no validly constituted court but the officers refused to serve with Atkins. At 3.30 pm, Macarthur sought military protection due to unspecified threats. At 5.30 pm Bligh wrote to George Johnston, asking him to come to Government House.[12] It is noteworthy that Bligh wrote to Johnston in order to attempt to resolve this impasse rather than immediately resorting to action. Johnston sent a message to say he was too ill, as he had wrecked his gig on the evening of the 24 January on his way back home to Annandale after dining with officers of the Corps. It was increasingly clear that an impasse had been reached.

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[1] Craig, R.J. and Jenkins, S.A., ‘The Cox and Greenwood ledger of the New South Wales Corps 1801-1805: the account of Captain John Macarthur’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 82, (2), (1996), pp. 138-152.

[2] Ibid, Duffy, Michael, Man of Honour: John Macarthur-Duellist, Rebel, Founding Father, p. 255, n 10.

[3] Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 160, 164-178 details the question of Macarthur’s still.

[4] Surveyor-General Grimes to Macarthur, 13 January 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 413-414 ordered Macarthur not to build on the lease on Church Hill with Macarthur’s response reluctantly resigning the land to please Bligh if Bligh allocated him as alternative lease. The matter escalated the following day with correspondence between Grimes and Macarthur in which Grimes made it clear that Macarthur’s proposal was unacceptable and that he was unwilling to receive further correspondence on the issue: HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 416-417.

[5] Macarthur’s ship and the Runaway, 27 June 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 270.

[6] Bennett, J.M., ‘Atkins, Richard (1745-1820)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 38-40.

[7] See Macarthur to Atkins, 20 January 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 418 and subsequent correspondence on the imprecise nature of the charge, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 418-420.

[8] During January 1808, Macarthur had tried to recall debt he held against Atkins but Bligh refused Macarthur’s requests to assist his recovery of debt. See Macarthur to Bligh, 29 December 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 395-396 and Macarthur to Bligh, 1, 12 January 1808, HRNSW, vol 6, pp. 411-412, 413. On Macarthur’s ‘trial’, see the succinct discussion in Woods, Gregory D., A history of criminal law in New South Wales: the colonial period 1788-1900, pp. 33-34.

[9]Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 227.

[10] Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 227.

[11] For Macarthur’s trial on 25-26 January 1808 see, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 422-433 and Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 221-234.

[12] Secretary Griffin to Johnston, 25 January 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 234.

The Rum Rebellion: Bligh and the New South Wales Corps

By 1808, the New South Wakes Corps was a powerful Sydney institution. Its members comprised 10 per cent of the white population of 4,000 that included their families and a large number of former soldiers. The Corps owned a great deal of property and ran many businesses in Sydney, including one-third of the town’s pubs. The numbers of Corps and ex-Corps members, therefore, formed a substantial and influential group, exhibiting what Governor King had called ‘the jealousy but too often attendant on professional esprit de corps’.[1] The rank-and-file members of the Corps were not recruited from the dregs of society as has often been claimed. Over a third were skilled men. [2] Their life in NSW was a vast improvement on what they would have had in Britain and they would fight to retain it. They were used to power and influence. But Bligh did not treat them with respect. In October 1807, Major George Johnston wrote a formal letter of complaint to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, stating that Bligh was abusive and interfering with the troops of the NSW Corps. Before the rebellion, this was the only official complaint sent to London. However, the burden of his letter was that Bligh did not treat the Corps with the dignity it deserved. He spoke roughly to it, criticised it and insulted it: ‘his abusing and confining the soldiers without the smallest provocation’, ‘his casting the most undeserved and opprobrious censure on the Corps’.[3]

Watercolour portrait by R. Dighton: Major George Johnston, 1810

Some officers had built up capital during the 1790s and early 1800s when profits were high and through their preferential access to land grants, cheap labour by assignment of convicts and supply of provisions, livestock and equipment delivered for government purposes at the cost of the British taxpayer.  In 1808, many officers retained an interest in trade, which had become more diverse and much more competitive, but their principal economic interests now lay agricultural grants and in urban leaseholds in Sydney, where one sub-divided block changed hands for £900 just before Bligh’s arrival. Although those adversely affected by Bligh’s policies included many with no association with the NSW Corps, no coup could have occurred without the united resolve of the current officers.  Bligh had stirred the acute status anxieties of the officers by challenging their individual and collective reputation.  This was a serious affront under the code of honour that they regarded as the most important social bond of their lives.[4] He also offended members of this caste by his conduct, by his bearing and perhaps most of all, by his language. Bligh proved incapable of treating other gentlemen in the language or with the respect that the code of honour required.  Devoid of tact, quick tempered, infuriated by insubordination or incompetence, incapable of compromise, prone to indulge in mockery and abuse, he failed to respect the boundary between criticism and derision.[5] Manning Clark described him in the following terms

If anyone dared to object or remonstrate with him, he lost his senses and his speech, his features became distorted, he foamed at the mouth, stamped on the ground, shook his fist in the face of the person so presuming, and uttered a torrent of abuse in language disgraceful to him as a governor, an officer and a man.[6]

The officers of the NSW Corps, as well as most free settlers, were attracted to the colony precisely because their family background did not enable them to live as a gentleman should at home.  Commissions in the army were then bought and those who signed up for the NSW Corps could not afford to buy a commission in one of the more fashionable regiments.  The economic and, therefore, the social status of the officers were never secure. Bligh not only attacked their commercial and agricultural interests, he challenged the core of their personal identity.

Whatever his formal powers may have been, Bligh undermined what the local elite regarded as property rights, especially with respect to the urban leases.  This was fundamentally inconsistent with contemporary understanding of the rights of free Englishmen. Bligh, of course, relied on his formal authority and had the personal strength to exercise powers that his two predecessors, Hunter and King, had compromised.  They, Bligh believed, had permitted private men to grow wealthy at the expense of the Crown.  He was determined to reassert the public interest as he saw it and to act strictly in accordance with his instructions.  In most respects, his approach to governing was disciplined and purposeful.  However, even in a small settlement like Sydney, effective government required an understanding of communal expectations and an element of consent.  Bligh proved as oblivious to the fears and aspirations of the Sydney elite as he had earlier been to the delights that the crew of The Bounty had experienced in Tahiti. The scene was set for a conflict of institutional cultures between that of the navy, where authority was typically exercised in the confined autocracy of a ship and that of the army, where the exercise of authority often required interaction with a broader community.

Although Bligh had returned to England a hero in 1790 after the mutiny on the Bounty, he was on his second breadfruit voyage on HMS Providence between 1791 and 1793, when some of the mutineers captured at Tahiti were placed on trial in September 1792 and could not defend himself. As a result of the campaigns launched by Fletcher Christian’s brother and others to justify the actions of the mutineers, the view took hold in certain quarters that it was Bligh’s tyranny that had caused the mutiny. In NSW, those who wished to be rid of him realised that his reputation made him vulnerable. According to Surgeon Edward Luttrell before

Governor Bligh [came] into the colony a clamour [had] been raised against him, and an opposition formed to counteract his government’.[7]

The old rhetoric about tyranny, used against King, could be revived and intensified against Bligh, a known tyrant. The accusations, though, were long on rhetoric but short on actual examples. As early as January 1807, Elizabeth Macarthur had written to her friend at home, Miss Kingdon

The Governor has already shewn the inhabitants of Sydney that he is violent — rash — tyrannical. No very pleasing prospect at the beginning of his reign. [8]

Lieutenant William Minchin commented

...a deluge worse than that of the Hawkesbury has since swept off every path to...industry and happiness...if a Military Officer might be allowed to use the words Tyranny and oppression, I would inform you that until now I never experienced their weight. [9]

John Harris, the Corps’ surgeon, who had been dismissed from his positions of naval officer and magistrate, reported

...it is completely the reign of Robertspere [sic], or that of Terror...I have heard much said of Bounty Bligh before I saw him, but no person could conceive that he could be such a fellow...Caligula himself never reigned with more despotic sway than he does. [10]

In October 1807, a verse with direct reference to the Bounty mutiny was circulating in Sydney:

Oh tempora! Oh Mores! Is there no Christian in New South Wales to put a stop to the Tyranny of the Governor.[11]

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[1] King to Under-Secretary Cooke, 18 June 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 656.

[2] McAskill, Tracey, ‘An asset to the Colony: The social and economic

contribution of Corpsmen to early New South Wales’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 82, (1), 1996.

[3] Johnston to Sir James Gordon, military secretary to the Duke of York, 8 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 652.

[4] The emphasis on the code of honour as a critical factor in the coup was first put forward by Parsons, George, ‘The Commercialisation of Honour: Early Australian Capitalism 1788-1809’, in ibid, Aplin, Graeme, (ed.), A Difficult Infant: Sydney Before Macquarie, pp. 18-41.  The theme was developed by ibid, Duffy, Michael, Man of Honour: John Macarthur, Duellist, Rebel, Founding Father.

[5] See, Denning, Greg, Mr Bligh’s Bad Language: Passion, Power and Theatre on the Bounty, (Cambridge University Press), 1992.

[6] Clark, C.M.H., A History of Australia, Vol. 1, (Melbourne University Press), 1962, p. 216.

[7] Surgeon Luttrell to Under-Secretary Sullivan, 8 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 296.

[8] See, Elizabeth Macarthur to Miss Kingdon, 29 January 1807, ML A2908, Vol. 2.

[9] William Minchin to Philip Gidley King, 20 October 1807, ML MSS 681/2, pp. 397-399.

[10] John Harris to Anna Josepha King, 25 October 1807, ML A1980, pp. 237-248.

[11] John Harris to Philip Gidley King, 25 October 1807, ML MSS 681/2, pp. 401-408.

The morning after!

Well has there been a political earthquake?  UKIP would certainly want you to think so and now with representation in Scotland and Wales as well as England it can certainly claim to be a ‘national’ party.  It’s the first time in a century that both the Conservatives and Labour have been defeated by another party.  Labour did well in London but its performance beyond the capital was lack-lustre and does not suggest that Miliband will be prime minister in 2015.  The Conservatives did quite well given that euro-elections are generally seen as a time to give the governing party a good kicking.  The Lib-Dems were annihilated with only one MEP and an election strategy that was, however principled it was, proved disastrous.  Saying that you’re the only party to take on UKIP may be true but it demonstrates political naivety when it was clear from the outset of their campaign that the electorate had no sympathy with what you were saying.  Nick Clegg will continue to lead the party—who would want to pick up his poisoned chalice anyway—into the valley of death in 2015, something that all Paddy Ashdown’s bluster will do little to prevent.  The explanation for the strong showing of euro-sceptic parties on the continent—it’s all to do with the recession silly—won’t do in Britain where our economy is reviving and, if the figures are right, reviving strongly.  

The message from the main parties seems to be: it’s not the general election and people may have given their vote in UKIP in 2014 but they’ll see sense and come back for the election next year.  This may have been the case in the past and UKIP will undoubtedly lose ground in 2015 but such is people’s disillusion with Europe that a focused electoral strategy could well see UKIP MPs being elected…and don’t forget we have the Newark by-election imminent.  This poses a major dilemma for all the parties.  For the Lib-Dems it must now be clear that its pro-European policy is no longer tenable in its current form—yes, argue for Europe but argue for Europe from a position of strength by agreeing to a referendum on the issue and stop treating the electorate as if we’re idiots, something the other parties need to stop doing as well.  The, were the politicians and we know what’s best for you no longer holds water…the essence of democratic politics is the art of persuasion and the three parties aren’t persuading anyone.  There’s nothing new about this but for the first time that I can remember the people have, in significant numbers, had enough of the patronising, posturing of Westminster’s elite.  Despite all the weasel word statements by mainstream politicians that they are listening and about letting the people decide, many appear still to believe that they have the only solution to the country’s problems and will push ahead whatever the consequences…something that the elite in Brussels will almost certainly do as well.  Politicians in Britain have yet to learn that they were elected to do a job on our behalf and it’s a temp job at that.

Political earthquakes come and go and few are in retrospect little more than slight tremors but on this occasion, at this time that is not the case.  The future direction of the EU is something that is too important to be left in the hands of self-serving politicos.  I was one of those who campaigned for the EU in the 1975 referendum and would campaign in favour of a reformed and smaller EU in 2017 if I get the opportunity.  The essence of this earthquake is that it may lead to the reversal of EU policy on closer integration—something that as far as I can see few outside Brussels actually want—and the restoration of the EU to its founding economic principles on which most people still agree.

We’ve got it! No you haven’t

Having  watched The Andrew Marr Show this morning, a pervading liet-motif from the three mainstream political parties all said, with varying degrees of confidence, that they are listening to what the local election results are telling them about people’s attitudes to the political elite and to the continued rise of UKIP.  In essence, they saying ‘we’ve got it!’.  The reality is very different.  The mainstream political parties say, as they always do when faced with anything that challenges their hegemony, we’re listening and will take your concerns into account…no you haven’t!  The local government elections on Thursday and the probable outcome of the European election demonstrates clearly that UKIP is taking votes from all the political parties.  Labour may have gained the most council seats—no surprise for the opposition mid-term—but their results do not presage well for the General Election next year. 

No opposition has won a General Election when they did not have a majority in local government and Labour do not.  Their leader is hardly elector-friendly, his policies on, for instance, the cost of living crisis, are unravelling and although some polls give the party a lead over the Conservatives, at this stage of the electoral cycle it should be doing considerably better.  The Lib-Dems suffered most in the elections and although it is unlikely that Nick Clegg will be removed as leader, his poll ratings are appallingly low and his credibility as party leader is shot—he may have acted in the public interest in joining the coalition but this will, I suspect, have a debilitating effect in the elections next year.  The Conservatives also lost council seats but not enough to give Labour the majority in local government that it needs but the fissures in the party—evident since the 1980s—over Europe are damaging—the electorate generally punishes divided parties.  So where does that leave UKIP?  Well in a first-past-the post system, nowhere at all.  More councillors but no council and, though it looks like it will focus on 20 seats in 2015, it’s improbable that it will make the breakthrough into parliamentary politics.  This may explain the double-talk from the three main parties—yes we’re listening and will take your concerns into account…but no we’re not going to change our political directions.

Is it any surprise that there is a disconnect between the public and politicians?  Miliband is still saying Labour can—please note not will—win the General Election in 2015; Clegg, I won’t quit despite defeats; and Cameron, well actually saying very little leaving all the flak to his ministers and supporters.  Yesterday’s Times had an article by Matthew Parris in which he says that people don’t really care about the EU as an electoral issue and that in 2015 people will vote over largely domestic issues.  He may be right—past experience suggests that it is domestic issues not foreign or European affairs that determine how people vote—but in today’s circumstances, he just might be wrong.  UKIP’s popularity lies in being ‘none of the above’ and although its focus has long been on immigration and membership of the EU, these are now real issues for many people beyond the Westminster ‘bubble’.  There may be some UKIP supporters who want to stop all immigration, but most don’t.  What they want is for Britain to have greater control over who can come to this country and, because we have no control over labour movement from the EU, that tends to be the focus of their thinking.  If we leave the EU we can again control immigration—whether this is true or not matters less than how the issue is perceived. 

Chartism: Rise and Demise

Just Published

 

Chartism was the largest working-class political movement in modern British history. Its branches ranged from the Scottish Highlands to northern France and from Dublin to Colchester. Its meetings drew massive crowds: 300,000 at Kersal Moor and perhaps as many as half a million at Hartshead Moor in 1839. The National Petition in 1842 claimed 3.3 million signatures, a third of the adult population of Britain. At its peak, the Northern Star sold around 50,000 copies a week, more than The Times. This was a national mass movement of unprecedented scale and intensity that was more than simply a political campaign but the expression of a new and dynamic form of working-class culture. Across Britain, there were Chartist concerts, amateur dramatics and dances, Chartist schools and cooperatives and Chartist churches that assaulted the political hegemony of the wealthy, the conservative and the liberal. For over a decade, Chartists led a campaign for the franchise with a mass enthusiasm that has never been imitated. Chartism: Rise and Demise provides the analytical narrative for the series. The causes of Chartism and how they have been interpreted is the focus of the opening chapter. The remainder of the book explores the development of Chartism chronologically from its beginnings in the mid-1830s to its demise in the 1850s and divides this into four phases. The first phase covers the years between 1838 and 1841 and revolves round the critical events of 1839, the first Convention, the First Petition and the Newport Rising. The second phase lasts from 1841 to 1843 and focuses on the emergence of the so-called Chartist ‘new move’, the creation of the National Charter Association, the relationship between Chartists and the middle-classes and the strikes of 1842. The third phase covers the years between 1843 and 1850 during which there were attempts to reposition the movement, the Land Plan and the seminal events of 1848. The final phase considers the ways in which the movement developed during the 1850s when leadership moved away from Feargus O’Connor to Ernest Jones.

 

Chartism: Rise and Demise---the video

The Rum Rebellion: Bligh in Sydney

Soon after his arrival at Sydney, on 13 August 1806, Bligh was given an address of welcome signed by Major Johnston for the military, by Richard Atkins for the civilian officers and by John Macarthur  for the free settlers.[1] However, not long after, he also received addresses from the free and freed settlers of Sydney and the Hawkesbury River  region[2], with a total of 369 signatures, many made only with a cross, complaining that Macarthur did not represent them.

...We beg to observe that had we deputed anyone, John Macarthur would not have been chosen by us, we considering him an unfit person to step forward upon such an occasion, as we may chiefly attribute the rise in the price of mutton to his withholding the large flock of wethers he now has to make such price as he may choose to demand.[3]

This only confirmed what Bligh would have been told about Macarthur by Banks.

A View of Sydney Cove—Port Jackson 7 March 1792

One of Bligh’s first actions[4] was to use the colony’s stores and herds to provide relief to farmers who had been severely affected by flooding on the Hawkesbury River, a situation which had disrupted the barter economy in the colony.[5] Supplies were divided up according to those most in need and provisions were made for loans to be drawn from the store based on capacity to repay. Bligh offered to take wheat from the next crop into the Government stores at 15s per bushel.[6] This delighted the settlers, resulting in strong loyalty to Bligh even after the events of 1808 but it earned the enmity of traders in the Corps who had been profiting greatly from the situation.[7] This was evident in an address to Bligh on 17 February 1809

The memorial of the undersigned, who came free into the colony, - Most respectfully showeth: - That your memorialists had no hand, act, or part in the rebellion that now exists in this colony.

That they do abhor and detest the said act, its aiders, and abettors, and were every way fully satisfied and content under His Excellency’s administration. His Excellency was doing all that public virtue or private worth could accomplish to correct abuses, re-establish discipline, protect and encourage sobriety and industry.

That your memorialists believe the following causes principally led to the rebellion; - That the officers had been (and still continue) merchants, traders, a dealers, which was carried on by employing convicts as their agents in different parts of the colony, by which means a great number of the inhabitants are in debt to them or their agents, which gave them a dangerous influence; and they had entered upon expensive establishments, which nothing but a continuance of abuse could support. That there is no nutritious liquor produced in the colony, either as a restorative to the sick or laborious. That our present rulers monopolised the whole of the spirits brought into the colony at about ten shillings per gallon, which they retail at from two to six pounds per gallon. They had for years commenced land-jobbing. This went so far as the selling of land before the grant was obtained, and was declared a legal transaction by two civil Courts....The officers were interested in impeding agriculture: the more settlers were ruined the cheaper they could purchase estates; the less grain grown by the settlers, the better prices they had for their own.....[8]

View of Sydney, 1804

Bligh was under instructions from the Colonial Office to normalise trading conditions in the colony by prohibiting the use of spirits as payment for commodities. Bligh was determined to stamp out the barter of spirits for goods or labour, commenting on 7 February, 1807

It is absolutely necessary to be done to bring labour to a true value and support the farming interest... In addition to the reasons already given to prohibit the barter of spirits, is the strong temptation it holds out to the settlers and other inhabitants to erect private stills, which tend to destroy not only the grain but the industry and morals of the people. The practice of distillation has been so general that the late Governor found it necessary to prohibit it under certain fines and penalties, and to offer emancipations, free pardons, and pecuniary remunerations to those who would give information of persons employed in this ruinous work; but the effect has not yet been produced, as this practice still continues in violation of every order and vigilance of the police.[9]

This was followed on 14 February 1807 by the following proclamation

His Excellency the Governor laments at finding, by his late visits through the colony, that the most calamitous evils have been produced by persons bartering or paying in spirits for grain of all kinds, the necessaries of life, and the labourers for their hire, such precedings depressing the industrious and depriving the settlers of their comforts and wants. In order to remedy these grievous complaints, and to relieve the inhabitants who have suffered by this traffic, he feels it his duty to put a total stop to this barter in future, and to prohibit the exchange of spirits or other liquors as payment for grain, animal food, labour, wearing apparel, or any other commodity whatever, to all descriptions of persons in the colony and its dependencies.[10]

Between October 1806 and February 1807, he introduced further measures to carry out his instructions. On 4 October 1806, Bligh banned departing ships from leaving crew members behind[11] and issued new port regulations securing government control of ships and boat building and on 28 February 1807 declared that all goods shipped to NSW should only be unloaded at Port Jackson.[12] On 1 November, he issued general orders forbidding barter in goods. [13] On 3 January 1807, he proclaimed all promissory notes should be payable only in sterling, not kind[14] and the following month on 14 February he outlawed the importation of stills for alcohol production and bartering with spirits.[15] Bligh communicated his policy to the Colonial Office in 1807, advising that his policy would be met with resistance. Castlereagh, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies wrote back to Bligh, his instructions being received on 31 December 1807. The instructions were to stop the barter of spirits and H.V. Evatt concluded in his history of the Rebellion that

...Bligh was authorised to prevent free importation, to preserve the trade under his entire control, to enforce all penalties against illegal import, and to establish regulations at his discretion for the sale of spirits.[16]

Bligh had come to administer a penal settlement not facilitate private enterprise. Evatt argues that the enmity of the monopolists within the colony stemmed from this and other policies that counteracted the power of the rich and promoted the welfare of the poor settlers. Free settlers such as John and Gregory

Blaxland claimed that Bligh had no interest in supporting their enterprises and did not give them the assistance which the British Government had promised.[17] People came to NSW to make money and Bligh seemed oblivious to this. Bligh ceased the practice of handing out large land grants to the powerful in the colony; during his term he granted just over 2,180 acres of land, half of it to his daughter and himself. One thousand acres were at the Hawkesbury that he farmed as a ‘model farm’ for private gain. He allocated himself publicly victualled convicts and animals from the public herds and erected buildings at government expense. This was, to say the least, insensitive, but Bligh was never known for his tact. He was ‘making hay while the sun shines as fast as he can’, as Surgeon John Harris wrote.[18]

Bligh also upset some people by allowing a group of Irish convicts to be tried for revolt by a court that included their accusers and then when six out of the eight were acquitted, he kept them in custody. Soon after his arrival he replaced most of the officials, many of them from the military, with his own appointments. This did not play well in a small community and did not endear him to the Corps. [19] He dismissed D’Arcy Wentworth[20] from his position of Assistant Surgeon to the Colony and sentenced three merchants to a month’s imprisonment and a fine for writing a letter that he considered offensive. Bligh also dismissed Thomas Jamison[21] from the magistracy, describing him in 1807 as being ‘inimical’ to good government.[22] Jamison was the highly capable (if crafty) Surgeon-General of NSW, had accumulated significant personal wealth as a maritime trader and was a friend and business partner of Macarthur’s. Jamison never forgave Bligh for sacking him as a magistrate and interfering with his private business activities and supported Bligh’s later deposition.

Governor Phillip intended to reserve the land between, roughly, Hunter Street and the water for public purposes.  Cutting into this reserved area, during Phillip’s time, was a track formed by the passage of traffic behind the row of tents that the officers of the First Fleet had pitched on arrival, soon replaced by rudimentary huts, on the western bank of the Tank Stream that flowed into Sydney Cove, now Circular Quay.[23] That track became George Street and this, rather than Phillip’s conception, proved to be the model for the grand Sydney tradition of urban planning.  Phillip’s successors gradually abandoned his plan.  Leases were granted, at first only for short periods. However, the third Governor, Phillip King, attempted to regularise the haphazard system and to establish clearly defined property rights:  creating a register of dealings, quadrupling the rent and granting a large number of leases, many for periods of 14 years.[24] Bligh, wanted to return to critical aspects of Phillip’s original plan by clearing grand spaces around Government House and the church but King’s leases stood in the way. Bligh used his wide discretionary powers to achieve his objective refusing to issue further leases, announcing that he would not approve building on existing leases, ordering residents to surrender possession of homes, demolishing structures built without approval and threatening to demolish others. Intending to revoke the leases, but unsure of his power to do so, he sought instructions from London.[25]

The wife of a commercially successful emancipist wrote complaining:

From some he took good houses and gave them bad ones.  From others he took their houses and turned them into the street and made them no recompense whatever.  Some he stopped building.  Others he made make improvements against their inclinations and on the whole endeavoured to crush every person as much as possible.[26]

When one occupant of a leasehold residence in the environs of Government House objected to Bligh’s order to remove it, asserting that he could not be forced to do so by the laws of England, Bligh allegedly exploded:

Damn your laws of England! Don’t talk to me of your laws of England.  I will make laws for this colony, and every wretch of you, son of a bitch, shall be governed by them.  Or there (pointing over to the gaol) is your habitation! [27]

It is clear that Bligh had made enemies of some of the most influential people in the colony. He also antagonised some of the less wealthy when he ordered those who had leases on government land within Sydney to remove their houses. Even if these measures affected relatively few, this assault on private property was unsettling.

---

[1] Address to Governor Bligh, 14 August 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 165-166.

[2] Sydney Settlers’ Address to Governor Bligh, 22 September 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 189-189; see also, Hawkesbury Settlers’ Address, undated, 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 190-192.

[3] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 189.

[4] Government and General Order, 23 August, 30 August 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 173-174, 176.

[5] Samuel Marsden to King, 28 March 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 53-54 provides valuable details about the flood while King to Camden, 7 April 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 59-61 considers its effects. See also, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 176, 186, 237, 823-831. Newspaper coverage of the floods can be found in Sydney Gazette, 30 March and 6 April 1806.

[6] Sydney Gazette, 21 December 1806.

[7] See, Fletcher, Brian H., ‘The Hawkesbury settlers and the Rum Rebellion’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 54, (3), (1968), pp. 217-237 for a detailed discussion of the relationship between Bligh and the Hawkesbury settlers.

[8] Hawkesbury Settlers’ Address to Bligh, 17 March 1809, HRNSW, Vol. 7, pp. 78-80.

[9] Bligh to Marsden, 7 February 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 246-252.

[10] Government and General Order, 14 February 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 253-254.

[11] Regulations respecting Vessels: Foreign and English, 4 October 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 193-197.

[12] Government and General Order, 28 February 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 258.

[13] Government and General Order, 1 November 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 198.

[14] Proclamation, 3 January 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 236.

[15] Government and General Order, 14 February 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 253-254.

[16] Evatt, H.V., Rum Rebellion:  A Study of the Overthrow of Governor Bligh by John Macarthur and the New South Wales Corps, (Angus & Robertson), 1938, p. 72.

[17] This is evident in Gregory Blaxland to Under-Secretary Chapman, 15 October 1807 and John Blaxland to ?, 16 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 301-304, 308-313. See also, Castlereagh to King, 13 July 1805, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, pp. 490-491 on what the Blaxlands were promised.

[18] Harris to Anna Josepha King, 25 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 347. Bligh has earlier dismissed Harris from the magistracy: Government and General Order, 2 May 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 266.

[19] On Bligh’s early appointments, see Government and General Orders, 15, 16 August 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 167-169.

[20] Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 188-190 stated the Bligh suspended Wentworth on 25 July for ‘extreme misconduct’: ‘it has been a practice to allow them [sick men] to remain victualled as Hospital Patients requiring care, applying their use to private advantage.’ D’Arcy Wentworth to Castlereagh, 17 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 313-328 gives Wentworth’s response.

[21] Parsons, Vivienne, ‘Jamison, Thomas (1753?-1811)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 12-13.

[22] Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 355; see also, Nicholas Bayly to Jamison, 12 February 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 518-519 indicates the cause of his dismissal.

[23] Ibid, Atkinson, Alan, The Europeans in Australia, Vol. 1, p. 273. Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 155-156 lists the leases under question.

[24] See generally Atkinson, Alan, ‘Taking Possession:  Sydney’s First Householders’, in Aplin, Graeme, (ed.), A Difficult Infant: Sydney Before Macquarie, (University of NSW Press), 1988, especially pp. 76, 79-82, 83-84.

[25] Ibid, Atkinson, Alan, ‘Taking Possession:  Sydney’s First Householders’, pp. 84-87; HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 155-156,714-715. See also, Government and General Order, 23 July 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 275-276.

[26] Ibid, Atkinson, Alan, The Europeans in Australia, Vol. 1, p. 273.

[27] Ritchie, John, A Charge of Mutiny: The Court Martial of Lieutenant Colonel George Johnston for Deposing Governor William Bligh in the Rebellion of 26 January 1808, (National Library of Australia), 1988, p. 365.

Ukraine and taxation: two disconnected stories

I must admit I felt quite sorry when the Russian duo in Eurovision on Saturday were booed and that whenever Russia was mentioned in the scoring, the same happened.  Whoever said Eurovision had nothing to do with politics.  It was as predictable as the outcome of the referendum in the eastern part of Ukraine—for the government in Kiev it was illegal and a ‘farce’ while the Russian Foreign Minister said Russia would respect the ‘will of the people’ in the eastern provinces.  It may have been illegal and expressed the ‘will of the people’—though precisely what this means is unclear—but it does little to resolve the on-going tension in Ukraine and the potential for direct Russian intervention.  The problem in Ukraine is that, whatever the nature of provincial government, it remains a largely centralised system of government based in Kiev.  It is hardly surprising that Russia is concerned about the westward looking agenda of Ukrainian politicians—Kiev was where the Rus state had its origins--and there was always little chance that it would accept a further EU country on its doorstep.  Whatever the aspirations of Euro-politicians, it was diplomatically and politically inept to encourage Ukraine to believe that it could become a member of the EU, an unlikely eventuality anyway given the parlous state of its economy.

The relationship and respective power of the different nationalities within Russia  had long been a divisive issue that the break-up of the Soviet Union simply exacerbated.  What do areas with Russian-speaking majorities do when they are no longer part of the Russian state?  As Ukraine clearly shows you can force those groups to remain within the state but at a huge cost in terms of political stability and political violence.  But is this the answer…well clearly not if the resistance of pro-Russian militias is any indication.  Whether the Ukrainian government agreed with the referendum or not, it is an expression of how a significant number of people feel about their position within that state.  The attitude of the Putin government is far from obvious—despite what the West feels—and may have more to do with assuaging internal critics rather than a reversion to the ‘salami tactics’—taking a piece at a time—of its Soviet past.  Annexing Crimea was undoubtedly an expression of Russian imperialism reversing what was an almost inexplicable decision in 1954 but whether this extends to the eastern provinces of Ukraine is far less clear.  There has been ample ‘provocation’ in the past week to ‘justify’ Russian intervention but its troops have remained firmly on the Russian side of the frontier.  Ukraine faces three equally unpalatable options.  It could cut the eastern provinces free allowing them to join with Russia; it could deal with pro-Russian feeling by giving those provinces autonomy within the Ukrainian state; or, it could imposed a military solution or at least try to. 

Yet another tax avoidance scandal has hit the headlines with the predictable moral outrage from politicians, a bit like the moral outrage of global politicians to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  The difference is that the tax avoidance is not illegal.  Whatever you may think is the moral imperative, there is nothing legally wrong with individuals seeking to avoid paying some of their taxation.  If you don’t like this then make all tax avoidance schemes illegal: that would leave no wriggle room for those seeking to avoid paying their full tax bills.  This would mean, for instance, that you could not offset your tax bill against charitable donations or against personal losses in business.  But I hear you say that would be unfair on charities and , of course, you’d be right.  The problem is that as soon as you allow exemptions from paying taxes because of X, then people will try to exploit that legal loophole. If you give people allowances, they will apply those allowances within the rules even if you might think they are morally wrong to do so.   As soon as you say, you will pay £X in tax but…you’re into tax avoidance.  The solution is that we should tax all income—whatever its source—with no exceptions; so if you earn £200,000 or £20,000 a year, you pay all your standard and/or higher tax. 

Sir Benjamin Stone 1838-1914

Sir Benjamin Stone 1838-1914: Photographer, Traveller and Politician, 107pp., 20 photographs, ISBN 13: 978-1499265521, ISBN 10: 149926552, £7.99, paperback. Published by the Author under his imprint Birmingham Biographies, this volume is available from Amazon and from other booksellers.

 

Includes twenty rarely-seen or previously unpublished photographs by Sir Benjamin Stone.

Sir Benjamin Stone lived a full life, and was certainly a more contented man than his restless Birmingham contemporary Joseph Chamberlain. Elected to Parliament in 1895, Stone would have been an undistinguished backbencher had it not been for his camera. On the terrace of the House of Commons he lined up his fellow-MPs and various interesting visitors to have their pictures taken. Dubbed ‘Sir Snapshot’ by the press, he became in these years the most well-known amateur photographer in the country. Stone was an intrepid traveller too, embarking – equipped, of course, with his camera – on a voyage around the world in 1891 and a journey of almost one thousand miles up the Amazon in 1893. He was also an insatiable collector, particularly of botanical and geological specimens and a shrewd businessman, with investments in glass and paper manufacture and house-building and quarrying. Stone was also a Tory politician. He doggedly promoted the Tory cause in Liberal-dominated Birmingham in the 1870s and early 1880s, and, after the Liberal rupture over Irish Home Rule in 1886, became an equally-determined supporter of the new Unionist alliance.

Drawing on newspapers and his own extensive personal papers, this is the first biography of Sir Benjamin Stone to be written. It is published to mark the centenary of his death.

Stephen Roberts is Visiting Research Fellow in Victorian History at Newman University, Birmingham.  His published work focuses on Chartism and the political history of Victorian Birmingham.

Fallacies: some thoughts on two recent education stories

Over the May Day weekend two educational stories have come to light.  The NAHT union conference has decided to investigate the benefits of scrapping the six-week summer holidays and University fellows with a PhD in maths or physics are being urged to become school teachers in England to inspire youngsters to study the subjects.  I’m getting a strong sense of deja vu…I’ve been hearing both of these points ever since I became a teacher and, as far as I can see there is little in what is being proposed that is different from the arguments that were deployed in the 1970s.

Is the current system of school holidays fit for purpose?  Of course it isn’t.  No one would designing a school holiday regime from scratch would have terms and half-terms of uneven length.  Higher education generally operates ten week terms though from what ex-students have said, given the paltry amount of teaching they got, it could have been accomplished in two.  Yes I know higher education is about more than teaching and learning—as should all education—but this is hardly value for money…but that’s a different issue.  Would it be better say to divide the school year into six terms of six or seven weeks?  Would it improve student learning and teacher sanity?  Well certainly the latter but as far as learning is concerned the jury appears still to be out.  We already have a varied system of school terms with often neighbouring areas having slightly different term and particularly half-term dates and government gave academies and free schools in England permission to vary term times earlier this academic year.  But the main concern for the National Association of Head Teachers appears to be the burgeoning cost of holidays during school breaks—they can easily be double those in term time—and its solution according to Russell Hobby is:

‘We would like to see local or regional co-ordination, but at that point you could also have the opportunity to have a staggering of holidays around the country.  So if different parts of the country within local authority boundaries or regional boundaries had slightly different holiday times I think that would ease the pressure on the prices of holidays as well.’

He said the change would take away some of the excuses that both parents and teachers made about missing school days.  I’m afraid I don’t see the economic logic in his argument.  Even if you staggered school holidays—and there is a case for secondary schools breaking up for the summer in late-June or early-July and coming back mid-August to fit in with the examination cycle—that would not prevent an increase in the cost of a holiday but will simply lengthen the time that leisure companies can charge a holiday premium.  It is, as the companies continually say, a matter of supply and demand. 

In my experience, there have always been staff shortages in one area or another in schools.  This has been the case particularly and persistently in Mathematics and Physics.  Why would you want to teach if you have a degree in these subjects when your skills earn better pay and conditions by working in other areas of the economy?  The government’s solution—yes yet another initiative in this area all of which have previously largely failed—is to pay ‘experts’ £40,000 a year as research fellows to conduct master classes for pupils in networks of schools, set up free online maths and physics resources for schools to use, and teach lessons that stretch more advanced students.  Usual response from the teaching unions with the Association of Teachers and Lecturers saying that the experts should be trained as teachers before being allowed to educate children.  Well that probably will guarantee that the scheme never gets off the ground!!  The response to the story on the BBC website is equally negative…experts won’t be able to communicate with students and so on. 

We spend an inordinate amount of time and money teaching teachers to teach and a lot of it is wasted.  To teach effectively you need to know your subject and be able to communicate it interestingly to students in ways they can understand…you can improve a teacher’s ability to do this but if they can’t communicate effectively in the first place it really is a waste of time.  The best teachers I know are great communicators and who make learning interesting and fun for the students and they get great results.  They may or may not be experts in their fields but they have the confidence and communication skills to get the subject across.  Now you can’t teach that.

The Rum Rebellion: Appointing William Bligh as governor

In the early years of the settlement, particularly during the three years between Governor Phillip’s retirement in December 1792 and the arrival of Hunter his successor in mid-1795, when Grose and then Paterson administered the colony, alcohol, generically referred to as rum, was a readily tradable item in the barter-based, economy operating beyond the bureaucratic, requisition system at the government store.  Rum became a substitute for currency.  The shortage of currency in the colony was aggravated by the fact that William Bassett Chinnery[1], the agent appointed by the British Government to operate the colony’s accounts from London was in the process of embezzling some £80,000.[2] The NSW Corps officers’ early trading success was based on the fact that were paid in London and could draw bills that would be honoured there. They alone had access to sterling for purposes of trade and a trading cabal that operated as an extension of the officers’ mess was able profitably to exploit a monopoly position in rum and other goods and they vigorously defended this under both Hunter and King. This was no longer the case in 1808 as competition now ensured that monopoly profits were substantially reduced, although high prices were retained by the penumbra of illegality that surrounded the trade. 

It is likely that William Bligh was selected by the British Government as governor because of his reputation as a strict but fair disciplinarian though in the public and subsequent historical consciousness he will forever be remembered for the infamous ‘Mutiny on the Bounty’. The critical figure in his appointment was Sir Joseph Banks who had accompanied Captain James Cook on his first voyage and was the government’s unofficial adviser on matters relating to Australia. Banks had formed an intense dislike of John Macarthur. This occurred in 1801 when Macarthur, already one of the wealthiest men in the colony, applied for permission to export some of the king’s merino sheep to NSW and for an enormous land grant to help establish a wool industry. Banks did not favour a large land grant to one person but thought the wool industry should be developed by an English company. He also knew that Macarthur, due to a thrusting desire for personal enrichment, was a disruptive force in the colony. When Macarthur’s requests for sheep and land were granted, Banks was upset and recommended Bligh for the job of governor because he though he could deal with Macarthur. On 15 March 1805, he wrote to Bligh requesting him to consider the post. He wrote that King’s successor must have the following qualities:

…one who had integrity unimpeached, a mind capable of providing its own resources in difficulties without leening on others for advice, firm in discipline, civil in deportment and not subject to whimper and whine when severity of discipline is wanted to meet emergencies.[3]

Sir Joseph Banks

Banks proceeded to offer a number of inducements for Bligh to accept. The Governor’s salary would be doubled from £1,000 to £2,000 and, in addition, Banks believed Bligh need spend less than half of this because he would have ‘the whole of the Government power and stores’ at his disposal. His seniority and pension rights would continue. Banks even added that there would be better marriage prospects for his six daughters in NSW. He was not simply using his influence to help Bligh; he was exerting pressure on Bligh to accept the governorship. He was not ignorant of Bligh’s reputation as a disciplinarian: he chose him for that reason. Bligh, Banks believed stood a good chance of standing up to and reining in the maverick NSW Corps, something that his predecessors had been unable to do. So did Earl Camden, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, who wrote to Banks that he was recommending Bligh for appointment because of Bligh’s ‘merit & ability & of the character he bears, for firmness & Integrity’.[4] Bligh was persuaded and left for Sydney with his daughter, Mary Putland, and her husband who died on 4 January 1808 of tuberculosis. Bligh’s wife remained in England.[5]

Even before his arrival, Bligh’s style of governance led to problems with his subordinates. The Admiralty gave command of the Porpoise and the convoy to the lower ranked Captain Joseph Short and Bligh took command of a transport ship.[6] This led to quarrels which eventually resulted in Captain Short firing across Bligh’s bow in order to force Bligh to obey his signals. When this failed, Short tried to give an order to Lieutenant Putland, Bligh’s son-in-law to stand by to fire on Bligh’s ship. Bligh boarded the Porpoise and seized control of the convoy. When they arrived in Sydney, Bligh, backed up by statements from two of Short’s officers,[7] had Short stripped of the captaincy of the Porpoise that he gave to his son-in-law.[8] He also cancelled the land grant Short had been promised as payment for the voyage[9] and shipped him back to England for court martial, at which he was acquitted.[10] The president of the court, Sir Isaac Coffin, wrote to the Admiralty and made several serious accusations against Bligh, including that he had influenced the officers to testify against Short. Bligh’s wife obtained a statement from one of the officers denying this and Banks and other supporters of Bligh lobbied successfully against his recall. The secretary of state thought the dispute arose from ‘very trivial causes’ and ‘proceeded to a length to which it could not possibly have advanced had you both been impressed with a just sense...of the propriety...of preserving a good understanding with each other.[11]

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[1] William Bassett Chinnery, who was appointed Agent for New South Wales on 1 May 1787, was enabled to embezzle more than £80,000 of Treasury funds prior to his dismissal on 17 March 1812. For Chinnery’s private life and his love of music, see, Yim, Denise, Viotti and the Chinnerys: a relationship charted through letters, (Ashgate), 2004. Chinnery was able to avoid detection for a long time because the accounting and control systems used at the British Treasury and the function and operation of the Audit Office established in 1785 were inadequate.

[2] See Scorgie, Michel E., Wilkinson David J. and Rowe, Julie D., ‘The Rise and Fall of a Treasury Clerk:  William Bassett Chinnery’, paper presented to the Conference of the British Accounting Association, April 1998; compare with Scorgie, Michel E., ‘The rise and fall of William Bassett Chinnery’, Abacus, Vol. 43, (2007), pp. 76-93.  See also ibid, Whitaker, Anne-Maree, Joseph Foveaux: Power and Patronage in Early New South Wales, pp.155-156.

[3] This crucial letter was first quoted, in full, in the HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. xxxv–xxxvi. The editor gave no specific location for this letter, but stated that he had had access to manuscripts in the possession of W.R. Bligh of Sydney, William Bligh’s grandson. Bligh presented some of these to the Public (now State) Library of New South Wales in 1902 and they were transferred to the Mitchell Library in 1910. This letter was not amongst the collection and its present location is unknown.

[4] Camden to Bligh, 18 April 1805, ML Banks Papers, Series 59.01.

[5] Bligh’s commission, instructions and additional instructions are in HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 1-19.

[6] Short to Secretary Marsden, 12 March 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 31-34, Bligh to Secretary Marsden, 30 May 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 81-84 and Bligh to Castlereagh, 1 April 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 55-57 provide the protagonists’ stances. Short to Bligh, 15 May 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 74-75 explains Short’s position and his offer of an apology.

[7] Lieutenant Tetley to Bligh, 15 November 1806, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 40 and Daniel Lye to Bligh, 22 November 1806, 9 December 1806, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 41-42.

[8] Bligh to Secretary Marsden, 12 December 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 208-221 details the enquiry.

[9] Bligh to Windham, 5 November 1806, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 30.

[10] Rear-Admiral Isaac Coffin to W.W. Pole, 13 December 1807, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 388.

[11] Windham to Bligh, 31 October 1807, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 80.