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Friday 11 July 2008

A ‘class’ perspective

An alternative to the vertical relationships of a paternalistic hierarchical society lay in the horizontal solidarities of ‘class’.[1] Richard Dennis, in his study of nineteenth century industrial cities, sums up the problem of class in the following way: ‘Evidently the road to class analysis crosses a minefield with a sniper behind every bush.... it may not be possible to please all the people all of the time...’ What did contemporaries understand by the idea of ‘class’? How many classes were there? What do historians understand by ‘class consciousness’ and how, if at all, does it differ from ‘class perception’? When did a working-class come into existence? Despite all the literature on the subject, the years since the publication of E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working-class in 1963, have done little to clarify the situation. Answers to the central questions of ‘when?’, ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ have been surprisingly inconclusive. [2]

‘Two nations’?

Many contemporaries interpreted early Victorian society in terms of two classes. Disraeli popularised the idea of ‘two nations’, the rich and the poor. Elizabeth Gaskell wrote of Manchester that she had ‘never lived in a place before where there were two sets of people always running each other down.’ Tory Radicals were not alone in using the two-class model. Engels referred to the working-class in the singular and offered a model dominated by two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in which other classes existed but were becoming increasingly less important. Recent Marxist historians, E.P. Thompson and John Foster, have also used this model. For Thompson class experience was largely the result of the productive relations into which people entered. The essence of class lay not in income or work but in class-consciousness, the product of contemporary perceptions of capital and labour, exploiter and exploited.

John Foster, in his study of three industrial towns, found that 12,000 workers sold their labour to 70 capitalist families. There was a middle-class of tradesmen, shopkeepers and small masters but despite deep divisions in their social and political behaviour they aligned with the working-class on most political issues.[3] The working-class, Foster argues, went through three stages of developing consciousness. It was, first, ‘labour conscious’: consumer prices ceased to be a major concern for workers and the focus shifted to the levels of their own wages. Then ‘class conscious’ where attempts to resolve industrial and economic problems became politicised. This can be seen in the 1830s and 1840s in working-class support for the Chartist movement. Political reform was seen as a necessary prerequisite for the resolution of economic problems: only a Parliament elected on the Charter would be prepared to legislate in favour of working-class concerns. Finally ‘liberalised consciousness’ by which the bourgeoisie, aided by growing economic prosperity after 1850, was able to attach important sections of the working population to its consensus ideology grounded in individualism and ‘respectability’.

It is possible to criticise the two-class model in a variety of ways. It assumes a model for change based on antagonism between two competing classes. It recognises, but neglects other social groupings or subsumes them within the two-class perspective. It assumes a significant degree of ideological homogeneity that may have validity in the vibrant social magma of the industrial factory towns but that has little validity in rural areas and the older urban areas. Diversity of experience within the working population led to diversity of responses.

Three classes: the Perkin thesis?

The majority of contemporary and modern analysts have adhered to the three-class model. Harold Perkin argues that, as the result of industrialisation, urbanisation and the midwifery of religion, a class society emerged between 1789 and 1833 or, more precisely between 1815 and 1820. Class was characterised not by class consciousness but ‘by class feeling, that is, by the existence of vertical antagonism between a small number of horizontal groups, each based on a common source of income.’ [4] The paternal view of society was not, however, destroyed by these class antagonisms and the potential conflict of emergent class society was contained by modification of existing institutions. For Perkin, compromise was a central reason for the persistence of older social values and structures and only an ‘immature’ class society was characterised by violence. Each class developed its own ‘ideal’ and, by 1850, he believed, three can be clearly seen: the entrepreneurial ideal of the middle-classes, a working-class ideal and an aristocratic ideal based respectively on profits, wages and rent. The ‘struggle between ideals’ was ‘not so much that the ruling class imposes its ideal upon the rest, but that the class that manages to impose its ideal upon the rest becomes the ruling class.’ [5] In Perkin’s model, the mature class society that emerged by the 1850s was, despite the differences that existed between classes, not marked by overt conflict but by tacit agreement and coexistence under the successful entrepreneurial ideal.

Between 1880 and 1914 class society, according to Perkin, reached its zenith. [6] The rich, both large landowners and capitalists, drew together in a consolidation of that new plutocracy that had already begun to emerge in the 1850s. The middle-classes, ever more graduated in income and status, came to express those finer distinctions in prosperity and social position physically, both in outward appearance, in dress, furnishings and habitations, and even in physique, and in their geographical segregation from one another and the rest of society in carefully differentiated suburbs. So too did the working-classes, in part involuntarily because they could only afford what their social betters left for them, but also, within that constraint, because those working-class families who could chose to differentiate themselves equally, by Sunday if not everyday dress, and by better and better furnished houses in marginally superior areas. Only the very poor, the ‘residuum’ as Charles Booth called them, had no choice at all and were consigned to the slums. They were the most segregated class of all because all the rest shunned them and their homes. Segregation, by income, status, appearance, physical health, speech, education and opportunity in life, as well as by work and residential area, was the symbolic mark of class society at its highest point of development.

Class society in Britain in 1880 already contained the seeds of its own decay. The three classes each had their own powerful ideals of what society should be and how it should be organised to recognise and reward their own unique contribution to the welfare of the community. Each class believed that its contribution was the most vital one and should be rewarded accordingly. The landowners, capitalists and middle-classes saw themselves as providing the resources and organising ability that drove the economic system to provide the goods necessary for the survival and civilised life for the whole community. Those in the working-classes who thought about it saw themselves as providing the labour, the sole source of value, without which the resources and management would be in vain. The increasing class conflict of the late Victorian and Edwardian period was the struggle for income, status and power arising from this clash of incompatible ideals. It was into this tripartite struggle that ‘the professional class’ came contributing both to the struggle and to the means of resolving it.

As long as professional men were few in numbers and depended mainly on the rich and powerful for their incomes, they tended to temper their social ideals to the values of their wealthy clients. With the development of industrial and urban society, however, the professions proliferated, their clients multiplied and, in certain cases, for example in preventive medicine, sanitary engineering and central and local government generally, the client became in effect the whole community. They became much freer to act as critics of society and purveyors of the terminology in which people came to think about the new class society. In a range of ways they attacked the laissez faire individualism of the entrepreneurial ideal. Through social legislation, the development of trade union immunities, the changing attitudes to poverty and the emergence of the welfare state under the Liberals after 1906, they challenged the ‘amateur’ spirit of society and enhanced the position of the professional expert.

Between the constitutional class between the Lords and the Commons between 1909 and 1911 and the General Strike of 1926, class society in Britain underwent a profound crisis. The crisis was essentially to decide whether Britain was to continue along a path of increasing class conflict culminating in social breakdown or revolution or whether there was to be, not merely an accommodation between the classes of the kind that gave mid-Victorian Britain its viable class society. The crisis was largely one between the classes of capital and labour, in which the government became reluctantly involved, by no means wholly on the side of capital. It was complicated by the co-existence of three other crises, any one of which was a potentially violent challenge to the established order. Connected or not, the co-existence of threats of violence from the Suffragettes, from the Irish Nationalists in Ireland were partitioned and from the Ulstermen backed by the Tory leadership and the majority of the Lords if it were not, and from the more aggressive trade unionists, gave colour to the fear of social revolution before 1914 just as the co-existence of revolutions in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey as well as Ireland gave colour to the same fear after 1918. The crisis was also complicated by the intervention of war in 1914. In the short term the war suspended all four crises but it ruthlessly laid bare the shortcomings and deficiencies of society, the economy and the political system. It confirmed the appalling effects of poverty on the mass armies recruited to fight it, the weakness of British industry and management in producing the munitions of modern battle and the incompetence of the minimalist state to conduct modern warfare on the grand scale.

This is a very brief synopsis of an elegant and far more complex argument but does give a favour of Perkin’s position after 1880. Perkin has not been without his critics but his argument, in both books, is ultimately more convincing than the doctrinaire approaches associated with Left and Right.

A class society?

If it is legitimate to speak of a class only when a group is united in every conceivable way then the concept is rendered meaningless. Classes are not and never were monolithic blocks of identical individuals. The critical question is whether working people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries consciously acted as members of a class as well as in other roles. Historians have interpreted class in different ways. At one extreme are those who argue that class and class action were abnormal and that individual interest was more powerful than class loyalty. On the other there are historians who see social developments in terms of a scenario in which class conflict played an integral and inevitable role.

So what conclusions can be reached from this tendentious debate? By 1850 it is possible to identify a middle-class(es) with clearly defined ‘consciousness’ based on notions of respectability and self help and with a strong organisational base. That consciousness had percolated down and reinforced traditional, independent artisan values. There were important distinctions within the working population, for example rural/urban, agricultural/industrial, skilled/unskilled, technologically obsolete/innovative occupations, that helped to determine attitudes and perceptions. It is possible to identify different levels of class-consciousness within the working population that found itself in a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the more homogeneous middle-class ideology. Changes in social attitudes and values were the result of dialogue and conflict between the older notion of paternalism and the newer conceptions of class.

The period between 1832 and 1914 can be viewed in terms of three broad phases of ‘class development’. The first, what Foster calls it the period of ‘class consciousness’ and Perkin ‘an immature class system’, was over by the early 1850s. It was characterised by the confrontational politics of Chartism, a consequence in part of the depressed state of the economy from the mid 1830s through to the late 1840s, and the emergence of middle-class pressure group politics as a means of challenging the aristocratic hold over government and policy-making. The second phase, corresponding to Perkin’s ‘mature class system’ and Foster’s ‘liberalised consciousness’ covers the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s. Confrontational politics became less important though pressure groups, whether in the form of middle-class campaigns or working-class ‘new model unionism’, became increasingly effective. Overall the economy was prosperous, at least until the 1870s, and there was increasing standards of living among all sections of society. ‘Distress’ ceased to be a motive force for working-class action. Individualism and respectability reigned supreme. The third phase began in the 1880s and led to the social ‘crisis’ of the Edwardian era. There were cogent challenges to the existing system from socialism and Marxism and a growing awareness of the failure of the industrial economy to compete effectively against newly industrialised states like Germany and the United States, or to provide the necessary resources to resolve the twin problems of poverty and unemployment. Mass or ‘new’ unionism led to the re-emergence of confrontational politics and to recognition by government, at local and national levels, that the issues raised by the embryonic Labour party could not be addressed successful through existing mechanisms. The Liberal reforms after 1906 can be seen as a belated attempt both to provide support for the existing system and to head off the threat from Labour. In both respects they failed. The 1830s began with the existing social and political system under concerted attack from those who were, by the partial nature of the voting system, excluded from what they saw as their right to participate in the system and benefit from that participation. By 1914 things had gone full circle.


[1] The literature on ‘class’ is immense but theoretical perspectives can be found in P. Calvert The Concept of Class, Hutchinson, 1983, A. Giddens The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Hutchinson, 1973 and R.S. Neale (ed.), History and Class: essential readings in theory and interpretation, Basil Blackwell, 1984.

[2] R.S. Neale Class in British History 1680-1850, Basil Blackwell, 1983 and Class and Ideology in the Nineteenth Century, Routledge, 1972, the useful bibliographical essay by R.J. Morris Class and Class Consciousness in the Industrial Revolution, Macmillan, 1980 and his ‘Class  and Common Interest’, History Today, 1983 are good starting points for the period before 1850.  The review essay by N. McCord ‘Adding a Touch of Class’, History, October 1985 provide ‘state of the art’ analysis. A. Briggs ‘The language of "class" in early nineteenth century England’ printed in M.W. Flinn and T.C. Smout (eds.), Essays in Social History, OUP, 1974 and G. Steadman Jones Languages of Class, CUP, 1983 are useful starting points. Patrick Joyce Visions of the People: Industrial England and the question of class 1840-1914, CUP, 1991 takes the question of language further and questions the veracity of a view of society grounded simply in ‘class’. E.P. Thompson The Making of the English Working-class, Gollancz, 1963, Penguin, 1968 should be read, ideally in full. Other essential studies include H. Perkin op.cit., J. Foster Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: early industrial capitalism in three English towns, Weidenfeld, 1974, I. Prothero Artisans  and  Politics in Early  Nineteenth-Century London, Dawson, 1979, D. Smith Conflict and Compromise: Class Formation in English Society 1830-1914, 1982 and C. Calhoun The Question of Class Struggle, Basil Blackwell, 1982. Alastair J. Reid Social Classes and Social Relations in Britain 1850-1914, Macmillan, 1992 is the best and briefest starting-point for this period. J. Benson The Working-class in Britain 1850-1939, Longman, 1989 is the most recent general survey. R. McKibbin The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950, OUP, 1990 is an excellent collection of articles. H. Perkin The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, Routledge, 1989 extends his earlier work in a masterful study. Stanish Meacham A Life Apart: The English Working-class 1890-1914, 1977 and Joanna Bourne Working-class Cultures in Britain 1890-1960, Routledge, 1994 are excellent. C. Smout (ed), Victorian Values, British Academy, 1993 is a mine of information and ideas.

[3] Foster’s view of the petit bourgeoisie and his attempts to explain it away have been criticized by historians like R.S. Neale who interpose a ‘middling’ class between the middle and working-classes in his ‘five-class model’.

[4] H. Perkin The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880, page 37.

[5] Ibid., pp. 218-270 for discussion on the ‘struggle between ideals’.

[6] H. Perkin The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, Routledge, 1989.

Thursday 10 July 2008

Nineteenth century society: introduction

All societies are, to some degree, stratified or divided into different social groups. These groups may be in competition with each other for social control or wealth. They may be functional, defined by their contribution to society as a whole. They may share common ‘values’, have a common ‘national identity’ or they may form part of a pluralistic society in which different ‘values’ coexist with varying degrees of success or conflict. They have different names like ‘castes’ or ‘ranks’ or ‘classes’. British society in the nineteenth and early twentieth century has been called a ‘class society’ but there are some differences between historians about its precise meaning or whether it is meaningful at all[1]. Were there two classes or three or five or any classes at all? Were there any common values? They do, however, agree that society in 1914 was different from the society that existed in the 1830s. It is important to have some understanding of the ‘wholeness’ of society, whether nationally or within a given locality because it was the overall structure of society that people were reacting against or attempting to preserve.[2] Individuals must be understood, given meaning and significance, not in isolation but within their web of social relationships. Individual biographies can be explained only by reference to the whole of society.

A question of ethics

The underlying basis of the elitism of the aristocracy in the 1830s was one of mutual and reciprocal obligation within a hierarchical framework. Harold Perkin writes that ‘The old society, then was a finely graded hierarchy of great subtlety and discrimination, in which men were acutely aware of their exact relation to those immediately above and below them, but only vaguely conscious except at the very top of their connections with those on their own level .... There was one horizontal cleavage of great import, that between the ‘gentleman’ and the ‘common people’, but it could scarcely be defined in economic terms.’ [3]

This elitist view of society had two important dimensions. First, it was paternalistic. What mattered here was not what was later parodied as ‘forelock tugging’ but sympathetic involvement by the elites in the lives of the rest of society. There was an expectation of reciprocity, a common outlook and identification of interests and, if necessary, sheer coercion to maintain the civil stability of a hierarchical social structure. A Christian faith and moral code was a common possession of all of society and rank, station, duty and decorum were central social values. David Roberts provides a useful model of paternalism in early Victorian society.[4] A paternalist saw society in the following ways. First, it should be authoritarian, though tempered by the common law and ancient ‘liberties’. Secondly, it should be hierarchical. Thirdly, it should be ‘organic’ with people knowing their appointed place. Finally, it should be ‘pluralistic’ consisting of different hierarchical ‘interests’ making up the organic whole. Within this structure paternalists had certain duties and held certain assumptions. First was the duty to rule, a direct result of wealth and power. Parallel to this was the obligation to help the poor, not merely passively but with active assistance. Paternalists also believed in the duty of ‘guidance’, a firm moral superintendence. Paternalism governed relationships at all levels of society. Apprenticeship, for example, was more than induction into particular skills; it was an immersion in the social experience or common wisdom of the community. Practices, norms and attitudes were, as a result, reproduced through successive generations within an accepted framework of traditional customs and rights that have been called ‘the moral economy’.

Secondly, patronage was a key feature. Patronage was central to the paternalist ethic and it retained its importance throughout the nineteenth century. It was characteristic of an unequal face-to-face society, crossing social barriers and bringing together potentially hostile groups. Patronage involved a ‘lopsided’ relationship between individuals, a patron and a client of unequal status, wealth and influence. It could be called a ‘package deal’ of reciprocal advantage to the individuals involved. It is true that by the 1830s much of the ‘politically useful’ forms of patronage like jobs for electors and rewards for supporters had declined but to assume that there was a general decline in patronage is to fundamentally misconceive the issue. Many of the political, social and economic changes of the first half of the nineteenth century greatly increased the amount of patronage that was available. There was a dramatic increase in the number of ‘administratively necessary’ offices. The prison, factory, health and schools Inspectorate were all staffed, at least initially, through patronage. This was paralleled in local government where ‘efficient’ patronage was used by rival elites within communities as an extension of party politics. Finally, offices may have been filled by personal nomination but individuals had to possess some basic competence. This notion of ‘merit’ received a wider and fair application after the Northcote-Trevelyan report of 1854, though patronage comfortably withstood much of the onslaught of merit until the 1870s. Only the urban middle-classes of the north were apathetic towards patronage. The bulk of the middle-classes were located in the genteel world of the professions and of propertyless independent incomes, far less entrepreneurial and competitive than their industrial equivalents. As long as a common area of shared values existed patronage continued to have broad application and utility.

A process of change

For a variety of reasons this paternalist view of society began to break down from the early nineteenth century. Thomas Carlyle, a contemporary social theorist, saw this as ‘the abdication on the part of the governors’. This process had the following features. The changing focus of the economy away from land and towards manufacturing and service industries led to a gradual decline in the economic power of the paternalist elite. Agriculture may have declined relative to other sectors of the economy but the aristocratic tone of British society was still set by the great houses and the large landowners. As J.F.C. Harrison says ‘Landed England did not survive unchanged. Had there not been flexibility in coming to terms with the economic realities of the industry state, and a willingness to retreat gradually and quietly from untenable positions of political privilege, landed society might not have outlived the end of the century. In fact it displayed remarkable powers of tenacity and adaptation: it sought to engulf and change some of the new elements in society, though in the process it was itself changed.’ [5]

Urbanisation occurred broadly outside the paternal net. There is evidence that many people moved to towns because they perceived them as ‘free’ from the social constraints of rural society. In addition as towns and cities burgeoned in size after 1850 they ceased to be face-to-face societies and became places of anonymity. Changing religious observance, especially the declining support for the Church of England and the growth of secularism broke the ‘bond of dependency’ between squire, parson and labourer. Paternalism was grounded in reciprocal obligations, like ‘just wages’ and ‘fair prices’, many of which were given a statutory basis in paternalist Tudor and Stuart legislation. From the 1770s this legislation was either allowed to lapse or deliberately repealed. The principles of ‘the free market’ could not accommodate the protectionism inherent in paternalism. The aristocracy and gentry gradually ‘cut’ their lives off from those of their labouring workers. The layout of country houses and gardens demonstrated a move towards domestic privacy. Client relationships became less important as labour became more mobile and became centred in urban communities.

The economic and political power of the landed elite came from their ownership and control of land. The same applied to the industrial entrepreneur in terms of their ownership and control of manufacturing. For both these elites the nineteenth century saw important changes. First, the emergence of managers as a segment of the economic elite reflected changing rates and channels of social mobility. Education became a more important medium as a channel of recruitment into managerial occupations and consequently the chances of those from working or middle-class backgrounds of moving into the economic elite improved. The emergence of bureaucratisation, with the clerk as a dominant occupation after 1830 reflects this process. Secondly, the emergence of a managerial sector introduced an important source of potential conflict within the economic elite as a whole. The moral solidarity of the old property-owning elite was undermined. The result of the separation of ownership and control in industry produced two sets of roles that increasingly saw the incumbents move apart in their outlook on and attitudes towards society in general and towards enterprise in particular. The ‘individualistic’, profit-seeking entrepreneur is contrasted with the managerial executive, whose values stress efficiency and productivity rather than profits. Such a difference in ideals and values tended to reinforce divergence in styles of life and social contacts. This in turn produced a certain conflict of interests, sometimes leading to open struggles, since the pursuit of maximum returns on capital was not always compatible with safeguarding the productivity and security of the enterprise. Finally, the separation of ownership and control was held to introduce important shifts in the structure of economic power. Within the large joint-stock companies that emerged in the 1850s and 1860s effective power increasingly devolved into the hands of managers and the sanctions held by the ‘owners’ of the enterprise were merely nominal.

This separation of ownership and control is not the only factor that led to the decomposition of the old ruling class. There was a general rise in rates of mobility, particularly intergenerational mobility, into elite positions in many institutional spheres during the late thirty years of the nineteenth century. There was some redistribution of wealth and income after 1850 as levels of ‘real’ wages rose that helped to redress the balance of power in favour of those in the lower social classes. Parliamentary reform in 1832, 1867 and 1884-5 gave initially the middle-classes and latterly the upper working-class a stake in the existing political structure. This needs to be seen in relation to the rights of organisation in the industrial and political sphere for the mass of the population. The growth of trade unions, especially after 1851, the expansion in the range of political pressure groups and the emergence of the Labour Party in the early years of the twentieth century constituted both potential limitations on the power of elite groups as well as perhaps changing the structure of those elite groups themselves.

Harold Perkin characterised the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a ‘one-class society’. Only the aristocratic elite could, he maintained, be seen as a ‘class’. This view of a unitary capitalist ruling class certainly did not exist by 1830. Karl Marx viewed the British ruling class as an ‘antiquated compromise’ in which, while the aristocracy ‘ruled officially’; the bourgeoisie ruled ‘over all the various spheres of civil society in reality’. [6] The aristocracy, that Marx thought had ‘signed its own death warrant’ as a result of the Crimean War (1853-1856), proved to be much more resilient than this in maintaining a strong foothold in the Cabinet, Parliament and the Civil Service. The proprietary fortunes and power of the large landowners remained virtually intact until the end of the century and the relatively amicable inter-penetration of aristocratic landowners and wealthy industrialists remains one of the striking features of British society in the latter half of the century.


[1] On methodology see P. Burke History and Social Theory, Polity, 1992, P. Abrams Historical Sociology, Open Books, 1982 and two books by C. Lloyd Explanation in Social History, Basil Blackwell, 1986 and The Structures of History, Blackwell, 1993.

[2] What follows extends arguments developed initially in Richard Brown Change and Continuity in British Society 1800-1850, CUP, 1987, republished 2008 and Society and Economy in Modern Britain 1700-1850, Routledge 1991, especially pp. 342-367.

[3] H. Perkin The Origins of Modern English Society 1780-1880, Routledge, 1969, page 24.

[4] David Roberts Paternalism in Early Victorian England, Croom Helm, 1979.

[5] J.F.C. Harrison The Early Victorians 1832-1851, page 123.

[6] Karl Marx ‘The Crisis in England and the British Constitution’ in Marx and Engels On Britain, Moscow State Publishing House, 1953, pp. 410-411.