After the defeat of France in
1814 and 1815, Britain played a central role in redrawing the map of Europe at
the Congress of Vienna.
1814-1815
|
Congress of Vienna
|
1818
|
Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle
|
1820
|
Congress at Troppau
|
1821
|
Congress at Laibach
|
1822
|
Castlereagh committed suicide; Canning became Foreign Secretary
|
1823
|
Congress at Verona
Monroe Doctrine
|
1827
|
Battle of Navarino; Canning’s death
|
1830
|
Palmerston became Foreign Secretary
|
1833
|
Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi
|
1839
|
Treaty of London
|
1842
|
Treaty of Nanking
|
Castlereagh, Britain’s Foreign Secretary from 1812 until
his suicide in 1822 wanted stability and peace in Europe leaving Britain free
to pursue its global commercial and imperial interests. The idea
of a ‘balance of power’ between the great powers in Europe--Austria, Russia, France, Britain and Prussia--was at the heart of his thinking. Co-operation between the great powers was
enshrined in the idea of regular congresses to resolve areas of dispute. The problem Castlereagh, and subsequently Canning and
Palmerston, Foreign Secretaries between 1822 and 1827
and 1830 and 1841, respectively faced was that the great powers in Europe meant
that they were prepared to intervene, diplomatically and militarily in support
of their own interests. This meant that
Britain also had to intervene in support of its own European interests. This was especially the case in the Low
Countries (Belgium and
Holland), the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal and
Spain) and in the Near East (the Ottoman Empire) where Britain had either commercial or strategic interests. The continuities in foreign policies between
1815 and 1841 were important but the ways in which those policies operated
depended on the contrasting personalities and styles of Castlereagh, Canning and
Palmerston.
Did Castlereagh secure an effective peace 1814-1822?
Castlereagh was Foreign Secretary from
February 1812 until August 1822.
Napoleon’s failure in Russia in
1812, Wellington’s victories in Spain and
Portugal and
the creation of the Fourth Coalition (Britain, Austria, Prussia and
Russia) in 1813 brought defeat for France.
Napoleon abdicated in 1814 and the Bourbon monarchy was
restored. The ‘Hundred Days’[1] in 1815 culminating in the final French
defeat at Waterloo ended
the threat from Napoleon. The
post-war settlement was the result of the Congress of Vienna.[2]
Britain, Austria, Prussia and
Russia had
fought against France to
ensure their own survival and independence.
As winners, they expected to strengthen their own positions by acquiring
land either in Europe or as colonies.
What they feared was a repeat of French domination of Europe. This provided the impetus for creating a
balance of power between the five great European powers. For Castlereagh, this meant a settlement in which each of
the mainland powers were satisfied and so were unlikely to dispute it in the
future. He believed that, ‘It is not the
business of England to collect trophies, but to restore Europe to peaceful
habits.’ It was in Britain’s interests
to have a peaceful Europe as this secured her defences and to remain free from
European commitments leaving the country free to develop its colonial empire
and increase its wealth through overseas trade.
Britain’s security may have been the major priority of Castlereagh’s policies but he was also concerned to
encourage liberal ideas, something the other great powers viewed
nervously. Economic liberalism through freer trade was seen by the other
great powers as a ploy to help Britain win commercial advantage. Political liberalism and
the creation of constitutional monarchies were even more suspect and
Castlereagh approached them with great care. He was aware that the other great powers saw
great danger in sudden political change.
The French Revolution had clearly shown this. He was ready to see other countries adopt
more liberal constitutions but only where appropriate and in Britain’s interest.
Britain also pressed for the abolition of the slave trade
but Castlereagh was only able to obtain vague
promises of action by the other powers.[3]
Britain did not want any territory on the mainland of Europe. However, it wanted the independence of
Belgium, especially the port of Antwerp to protect
the British coastline and to guarantee access to European markets. Britain also wanted to see Spain and
Portugal free
from French influence. Castlereagh accepted that Italy should
be an area of Austrian influence and that Prussia should
be expanded. They could then guard
against Russia aggression.
Canning’s involvement in Spain and Portugal and
Palmerston’s concerns about the Low Countries and
the Ottoman Empire show
the essential continuity of Britain’s European policies.
The Vienna Settlement brought Britain few territorial gains though
their location emphasised Britain’s major interests. The Cape of Good Hope
(South Africa), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Mauritius were of strategic and
commercial importance in relation to India.
Britain’s special interest in the
Low Countries (modern day Belgium and
the Netherlands) was central to her trade with Europe. Most British exports entered Europe through
the Scheldt estuary. This was
safeguarded by the possession of Heligoland and by Austria’s decision not to take back the old Austrian
Netherlands (later Belgium), which was united with the United Provinces (the
Netherlands). As a result, no great
power controlled the Low Countries. Malta and the Ionian Islands provided bases
in the Mediterranean guarding against the advance of Russia. The
West Indian islands of St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago reinforced Britain’s
commercial control over the Caribbean. The centre of Europe was bolstered against
aggression from east and west by
strengthening the position of Austria in Germany and
Italy and by
guarding against Russian advance into the Balkans. In broad terms, Castlereagh had
secured the settlement he wanted.
The Quadruple
Alliance was
signed by the four victorious great powers.
It was more specific and practical than the rather vague notions of ‘Justice,
Christian Charity and Peace’ of the Holy Alliance.
Article VI was drawn up by Castlereagh and was
a crucial element in organising the congresses: the four victorious powers ‘have
agreed to renew their meetings at fixed periods…for the purpose of consulting
on their common interests.’ The
vagueness was deliberate. Castlereagh recognised the advantage of keeping the allies
together but anything more specific would have been overruled in Cabinet by
colleagues opposed to further involvement on mainland Europe.
In practice, there
was no ‘system’. The congresses met in
different places: Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach and Verona.
There was no permanent staff to support them. Meetings were held at irregular intervals, in
1818, 1820, 1821 and 1822 with the Congresses in 1820 and 1821 almost merging. The
meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle was called to deal with outstanding problems that
arose from the treatment of France.
There was no clear reason for calling any of the other three, other than
considering revolution. There were no
congresses after 1822, though attempts were made to call them. Congresses proved unworkable largely because
the great powers wanted to pursue their own interests and were no prepared to
surrender this except when it was to their advantage to do so. Normal diplomatic channels proved to be a far
more effective way of maintaining the balance of power in Europe.
The second Congress
at Troppau in
1820 was concerned with how the balance of power in Europe should be
maintained. It was unclear whether the
balance of power created at Vienna in 1815 was to be maintained indefinitely or
whether it should be open to limited change.
The Congress was called because the rebellions in Spain, Naples and then Portugal threatened the rulers there. Castlereagh made
his position clear in the State Paper of 5 May 1820:
The Troppau meeting was adjourned to Laibach reassembling in January 1821.
Castlereagh’s brother Lord Stewart the British Ambassador in Vienna represented
Britain. Ferdinand of Naples appealed to
the Congress for help and, though Britain could not object to the dispatch of
an Austrian army in view of Austria’s treaty arrangements with Naples, the
British opposed the use of international force. Suppression of the rebellion
was, according to Castlereagh, an Italian question and that intervention
by the Austrians in their sphere of influence was not an issue as far as
British foreign policy was concerned.
This did little to help Castlereagh’s reputation in Britain where he was seen as
an arch-reactionary. The outbreak of a
revolt in Wallachia and Moldavia was followed by the Greek revolt. This had the effect of uniting British and
Austrian policy, as both were anxious that the Russians should not profit from
the situation the expense of Turkey.
Laibach settled little and a new congress was arranged to meet at Verona in
1822. The threat to British interests in
the Near East obliged Castlereagh to
consider attending in person. However, on 12 August 1822, he killed himself
throwing British policy into some confusion.
Canning, his successor did not go to Verona and
quickly recalled Wellington, who had gone in his place. He
maintained that this ended the Congress System but this overestimated his
achievement. Doubts on the part of the Tsar, reinforced by Metternich’s arguments,
prevented Russia from
intervening in Greece. Wellington’s argument against French intervention in Spain was
also unsuccessful and the Bourbon army found little difficulty in subduing the
country in mid-1823. The Verona Congress maintained the façade of unity but it
was increasingly clear that the interests of the great powers had diverged.
[1] The ‘Hundred
Days’ was a three-month period in 1815 during which Napoleon escaped from his
exile on the Mediterranean island of Elba, returned to
France, took back power for himself and relaunched the
war. He was defeated at Waterloo in June. He was exiled again, this time to the island
of St. Helena in the southern Atlantic where he died in 1821.
[2] The territorial settlement of the Congress of Vienna consisted of three agreements signed in 1814
and 1815. The first Treaty of Paris (30
May 1814) was the peace treaty with France after Napoleon’s abdication.
The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna (9 June 1815) contained most of
the post-war settlement, the result of negotiations in Vienna between October
1814 and June 1815. The second Treaty of
Paris (20 November 1815) revised the peace terms with France making them
slightly harsher after Napoleon’s ‘Hundred Days’.
The Vienna settlement evolved over more than a year.
[3] The abolition
of the British slave trade took place in 1807.
Britain paid off other countries that practiced the trade. Spain was given
£400,000 in 1820 and Portugal followed Spain’s
lead by accepting £300,000. The Dutch
were not paid cash but ended the trade in their colonies in 1815 in return for
keeping most of their colonies in the East Indies, such as Java that Britain
had captured during the war.
[4] The Bourbons
were restored: the Bourbons were the royal family of France. Louis XVI had
been executed in 1793 and in 1814, his brother Louis XVIII was restored. He died in 1824 and was succeeded by Charles
X. Louis Philippe finally replaced the
Bourbons in the Revolution of 1830
[5] Metternich was the Austrian Chancellor and a key
player in European diplomacy from 1815 to 1848.
[6] Alexander I,
tsar of Russia from 1801 to 1825 took a leading
part in the defeat of Napoleon in 1815. His approach to foreign policy after 1815 was
motivated by a belief in Christian brotherhood.
