King as Governor

Authorised to assume office as soon as Hunter could arrange his departure and already irritated by the delays in England, King was anxious to set in motion radical reforms in the colony and worried about his pay. During the transition King’s previously good relationship with Hunter became strained and his correspondence suggests that Hunter thought the King had an ‘unbecoming impatience’ for him to leave.[1] King did not assume command until 28 September 1800[2], but had earlier assured Under-Secretary John King that his taking over was ‘well-liked and anxiously looked for’[3]. King wrote gloomily of existing conditions, insisted that ‘nothing less than a total change in the system of administration’ was necessary, and forecast that ‘discontent will be general’ when this took place.[4] His task would be ‘laborious and highly discouraging’ but he would not be ‘at all intimidated’ and, although he had no formal instructions until raised from the status of lieutenant-governor to governor in 1802,[5] he improvised them for himself from the dispatches to Hunter[6] and elaborated them in the orders he gave to Major Joseph Foveaux whom he appointed to replace himself as lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island in June 1800.[7]   King’s first task was to attack the misconduct of monopolist traders and traffickers in spirits.

Cellars from the better sort of people to the blackest characters among the convicts are full of that fiery poison.[8]

In March 1799, the commander-in-chief had ordered Colonel William Paterson, when he was leaving England to re-join his corps, to inquire into his officers’ trading activities.[9] This gave King the opportunity, even before Hunter had left, to ask Paterson to act.[10] As soon as he assumed command, King issued orders that he had already prepared, including a new set of port and price regulations intended to curb exploitation and the liquor traffic.[11] He felt compelled to allow Surgeons William Balmain[12] and D’Arcy Wentworth[13] to sell 4,359 gallons of spirits which they had on hand[14], but was able to reduce the rate of spirit imports to about a third that of the last months of Hunter’s administration. He tried to persuade the government in Calcutta and British consuls in the United States to discourage the shipping of liquor to NSW and to offer the colonists an alternative beverage, he began the construction of a brewery.[15] It only began production in 1804, and in his efforts to reduce spirit drinking he faced the refusal of most convicts to work ‘in what they emphatically call their own time for any other mode of payment’[16], but he cut spirit consumption per adult male in 1801-1804 to about two and a half bottles a month. Despite this, King found increasing difficulty in suppressing illicit local distillation or sly-grogging, even though he issued repeated orders against it. He imposed a duty of 5 per cent on imports to raise revenue, as Hunter had suggested in 1798, but did not anticipate the later policy of reducing the profits of illegal grog-selling by allowing unrestricted imports of spirits subject to a moderately heavy duty.

Philip Gidley King and Family, 1799, by Robert Dighton

In June 1800, King had protested to Hunter against the ‘exorbitant demands of creditors’ in the colony.[17] He felt that the poorer settlers could best be protected by price control and by the ‘establishment of a public warehouse’[18], such as he had advocated for Norfolk Island in 1796 and Hunter had also referred to but then had not told the authorities in London what goods were needed. King’s detailed requests were at once acted on and merchandise was sold through it at a price only 50 per cent above cost to cover transport and selling charges. The increasing quantities imported commercially weakened the monopolists’ grip on the colony’s economy and improved the colonists’ means of obtaining supplies. King tried to control, not always with success, prices, wages, hours of work, the employment of convicts, baking, butchers, interest rates, weights and measures and the value of all the many kinds of currency circulating in the colony.[19] He sought to reduce forgeries by introducing printed forms for promissory notes, but they were usually ignored. He recalled all the officers’ servants in excess of two each reducing the number provisioned by the Crown from 356 to 94. [20] The position of the Colonial Office was clear

I entirely approve the measures you have taken for reducing the expenses of the settlement, by discharging from the stores all those convicts who are not altogether employed in the service of the Crown, with the exception of two convicts allowed as servants to each civil and military officer; but it should be understood by those officers, that in all cases where they themselves cultivate lands and raise stock that they are to feed all the convicts allowed to them, without any exceptions whatever. The five convicts allowed to each magistrate, appears to me to be too many, but knowing your attention to publick economy, I am willing to leave it to your local experience and discretion to diminish that number in such degrees as you may think proper.[21]

King increased the number of convicts on the public farms from 30 to 324 and had quadrupled their cultivated acreage by 1803. Later he allowed them to decline, following orders from London for an increase in private agriculture.[22] He helped private farmers by land grants, by the issue of seed, tools, sheep and rations and by hiring oxen. Contrary to his instructions, he postponed the purchase of grain by tender and kept its price up to 8s a bushel, by ordering the government stores to buy direct from the grower and by distributing government breeding stock as a reward ‘to those whose exertions...appeared to merit that encouragement’.[23] He also increased the size of land grants and made reservations for pasturage adjacent to them. The result was that only 56 out of 646 farmers were ‘on the stores’ in 1806, compared with 110 out of 401 in 1800. Smallholders had done much better than before, particularly during the first half of his administration and the colony seemed to be self-sufficient in grain though the disastrous Hawkesbury floods in 1801[24] and 1806[25] postponed King’s hopes in this regard.[26]

During King’s administration the government’s flocks and herds quintupled.[27] He bought cattle from India to improve the quality of the government stock[28], and though disavowing the idea of the government concerning itself with ‘fine-woolled sheep’, and mindful of the importance to the small settlers of the ‘weight of Carcase’, he was able by careful breeding to produce ‘a total change in Government Flock from Hair to Wool’[29] and to distribute ewes to settlers in expectation of a general improvement in the flocks of the colony.[30] He began the mining of coal, which he hoped would be a profitable export[31], was interested in timber cutting and encouraged experiments in growing vines, tobacco, cotton, hemp and indigo. Although in the opening sentence of the first journal of his experiences from 1787 to 1790, published with minor revisions as an appendix to Hunter’s Historical Journal of the Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island in 1793, King had affirmed the contemporary opinion that Botany Bay was founded simply as a penal settlement. By 1791, he was expressing great hopes for it as a Pacific base for flax cultivation and for whaling. Flax was not a success but whaling was, and both it and later sealing owed much to King’s encouragement. He was a friend of whale fleet owner Samuel Enderby[32] and advised the British government to allow the whalers to carry merchandise to NSW. He encouraged sealers to go to Bass Strait and whaling ships to visit New Zealand and the Pacific.[33] By 1792, there was a whaling industry off the south coast of New Zealand and by 1800 whaling and sealing had extended into the Bass Strait. [34]

Letter received by Sir Joseph Banks from Philip Gidley King, 5 June 1802

In 1804, King encouraged Robert Campbell[35] to send a shipment of oil and skins from Sydney to London in the Lady Barlow in contravention of the monopoly of the East India Company that he had constantly urged the government to modify. Campbell believed that it was time for a more generous definition of the commercial rights of New South Wales as the colony lacked established staples and was hampered by trade monopolies. Though the Lady Barlow was duly seized for illegal entry to the Port of London, her position was resolved with little commercial loss to Campbell. With the support of Sir Joseph Banks, he secured permission for a second colonial cargo to follow the Lady Barlow. Under this impetus a bill was drawn up to recognise NSW as a regular colony with valuable trade concessions, but the Grenville ministry lost office in March 1807 before it could be passed. King sought permission at the same time to open up trade between NSW and China[36] and decided that VDL was preferable to Port Phillip as a further penal settlement.[37]

King could, of course, never forget that he was in charge of a convict colony. He had to keep the prisoners in subjection, but at the same time he could not ignore the growing number of emancipists, and firmly reminded Major George Johnston that the British government had not intended the prisoners to be consigned ‘to Oblivion and disgrace for ever’.[38] King appointed emancipists to his bodyguard and enrolled them in the Loyal Associations, as had been done in the NSW Corps. Apart from the rather special case of appointing as military engineer, George Bellasis[39], a former officer in the East India Company who had killed an opponent in a duel, he placed men like Richard Fitzgerald[40], James Meehan[41], David Mann[42], Andrew Thompson[43], Rev. Henry Fulton[44] and Father James Dixon[45] in administrative positions. He took firm measures to regulate the position of assigned servants, even if at first they were often disobeyed and laid the foundation of the future ticket-of-leave system by granting ‘annual certificates’ to prisoners deserving indulgence. Though he granted pardons to about 50 per cent more convicts every year than Hunter had done, he had about 30 per cent more to deal with and they included many political prisoners. Of these, especially the Irish, King was at first perhaps unduly alarmed, though he had been in England during the disturbances in Ireland from 1797 to 1799.[46] However, after initial forebodings, in both 1801 and 1802 he was able to report their ‘regular and orderly behaviour’ and to compare their conduct most favourably with that of the military officers. He was again rather over-excited at the time of the Irish conspiracy in 1804, but he seems to have felt more secure after it had been suppressed and he had divided the ring-leaders between the different settlements, including Newcastle, which he re-established in 1804 largely in order to take them. [47] When war with France resumed in 1804, to supplement the battery on Dawes Point King began to build the citadel at Fort Phillip, intending that it would also be a place of refuge in case of an internal rising; but it turned out to be of little strategic value.[48]

King was faced with the British government’s persistent demands to reduce the costs of the colony.[49] The general success of his policies enabled him to cut the proportion of the population drawing government rations from 72 per cent in 1800 to 32 per cent in 1806 and the amount of their indebtedness to the government was reduced. Fortunately trouble with the Treasury over his expenditure when on Norfolk Island made him meticulous in keeping accounts and he drew Treasury bills for stores at a rate about 20 per cent less than Hunter had done in 1796-1798 for only three-quarters the number of people. In June 1802, King imposed a 5 per cent duty on imported spirits and on merchandise brought from east of the Cape and not of British manufacture.[50] King’s decision was not legally authorised but this was not questioned and by using the revenue raised for the gaol and orphan funds he began the appropriation of colonial revenue for local purposes. He was interested in the girls’ Orphan School, and though he regretted that he could not establish a similar institution for boys, he took several day-schools ‘under the protection of Government’ and by apprenticeship taught convict boys to become skilled tradesmen. He asked the British government to send out supplies of smallpox vaccine, and so enabled the surgeons to perform the first successful vaccination in the colony.[51] In March 1803, he permitted the government printer, George Howe[52] to establish the Sydney Gazette, allowing him use of the government press and type.[53] He was sympathetic to the missionaries who visited the colony, welcomed Maori and Tahitian visitors to Sydney and sought to keep peace with Aborigines. These, he told Governor William Bligh, he ‘ever considered the real Proprietors of the Soil’. He refused to allow them to be worked as slaves, tried to protect their persons and their property and to preserve a ‘good understanding’ with them; but he found them ‘very capricious’, often ‘sanguinary and cruel to each other’, and like his contemporaries failed to understand what he called their ‘most ungrateful and treacherous conduct’. [54]

King had always aimed at promoting ‘the prosperity of the colony, and giving a permanent security to the interests of its inhabitants’. He knew he could not satisfy all, and had faced ‘scurrility and abuse, clothed with darkness and assassination’. This abuse has harmed his reputation that is undeservedly lower today. In the end he was defeated by the officers of the NSW Corps. That he would have to confront them he knew when he arrived in Sydney in 1800 and even before he had assumed office he was regretting that Hunter had allowed Captain George Johnston to return to England for his trial on charges of trading in spirits. Johnston soon returned untried, but trials in the colony were not successful and King found the military intransigence that he had faced at Norfolk Island was now exacerbated by his policies that threatened the military elite’s economic position. He badly needed capable law officers and a change in the personnel of the NSW Corps, but the British government ignored his requests. He was faced with frequent disobedience and insolence that early in 1803, immediately after he had refused to allow a cargo of spirits to be landed from the Atlas, culminated in the circulation of libellous ‘pipes’ against him and his officials.[55] The investigations and courts martial that followed revealed the animosity that existed between the governor and the corps. King declared that ‘for the prosperity of His Majesty’s subjects in this territory...some change is absolutely necessary in our criminal courts’. With this Colonel Paterson entirely agreed, asserting that ‘most of the disquiet that has agitated this settlement...is chiefly to be attributed to the unfortunate mixture of civil and military duties’.[56] In November 1801, King had repeated Hunter’s action and sent home an accused officer, John Macarthur, charged with fighting a duel with his commander, Paterson, itself the result of a quarrel with the governor.[57] But in July 1805, Macarthur returned but had not been court-martialled. He had resigned his commission and obtained an order for 5,000 acres of the best land in the colony for his sheep-breeding.[58] Although King recognised the economic importance of Macarthur’s proposals for sheep farming for the colony and supported them, he had received little political support in London. The same occurred when he complained of the proceedings of the local courts martial as vitally affecting the peace of the colony, the judge-advocate in London in January 1804 coldly told him that ‘for the sake of harmony’ he would ‘pass over any seeming irregularity’.[59] Disputes with the NSW Corps and a recurrence of gout led King to ask for leave of absence in May 1803 while an inquiry was held into the state of the colony.[60] In November, the secretary of state received King’s request and immediately accepted what he was quick to interpret as an offer of resignation.[61] After King received Hobart’s reply in June 1804 his activities slowed down. However, he was not relieved until August 1806[62] and in the interval he suspected that other critics especially Maurice Margarot, Henry Hayes, Michael Robinson and William Maum were blackening his reputation in England.[63] This negative view of King remained and Watson concluded on 1915 that

...it is difficult to trace any direct influence of the governor [King] in the improvement of the conditions of life in the colony. The colony made considerable progress, but probably all the development was due to automatic and general causes, unaided by the personality or direction of the administrator.[64]

The problems faced by Hunter and especially by King have tended to be seen in terms of the breakdown in relations between their successor, William Bligh, and the NSW Corps. This judgement is particularly unfair as far as King was concerned since he made a significant contribution to the economic development of the colony especially the move away from a government-led economy to one in which private enterprise played an increasingly important role.

Initially a colony of convicts and guards, under Phillip, Hunter and King NSW was ruled by a military government though there was an element of civilian rule in the person of civil magistrates and, from the outset, an embryonic notion of the rule of law.[65] The persistent problem of a colony faced with endemic shortages and the real threat of periodic starvation was far from resolved by 1806 when the disastrous floods again demonstrated just how precarious survival could be.[66] Successive governors were increasingly faced by the changing nature composition of colonial society as convicts gained their freedom and free settlers began to arrive. This, combined with the growing power of the NSW Corps that exploited the colony in its own economic interests, created growing problems with military rule. Colonists had access to the courts but those courts were dominated by military personnel who often had little sympathy for the plight of either emancipists or free settlers. The need to rein in the power of the NSW Corps and especially its officer elite led to a division within the ruling elite as Hunter and then King sought to assert their gubernatorial authority. Faced by a military elite with sympathetic access to the decision-making process in London and the problem of retaining support from successive secretaries of state whose policies were rarely consistent, neither Hunter, who was recalled or King, who ‘resigned’ made any permanent inroads into the power of the Corps. When Governor William Bligh (1806-1810)[67] vigorously challenged the near-monopoly of trade and land grants being exercised by army officers of the NSW Corps and their associates amongst the leading landowners, he was arrested by the army in 1808 in Australia’s only military coup.[68]

---

[1] See, for example, Hunter to King, 11 July 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 175-176.

[2] King to Portland, 28 September 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 177-195 is his first despatch where he used the title ‘Acting Governor’.

[3] King to Under-Secretary King, 3 May 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 83.

[4] King to Under-Secretary King, 3 May 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 84.

[5] Hunter embarked on board H.M.S. Buffalo on 28 September, 1800 and King assumed the administration on the same day by virtue of a dormant commission issued to him in May 1798. It was not until 20 February 1802 that Hunter’s commission was revoked and King appointed Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief. For King’s Commission and Instructions dated 20 February 1802, see, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 697-711, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 384-398.

[6] Hunter made his commission and instruction available to King on 19 April 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 80 but, according to Hunter to King, 11 July 1800, King did not replicate, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, p. 662.

[7] See, King to Portland, 29 April 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 79 makes clear King’s decision and King to Foveaux, 26 June 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 96-108 details Foveaux’s appointment and instructions.

[8] King to Sir Joseph Banks, 3 May 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 82-83.

[9] The Horse Guards to Lieutenant-Colonel Paterson, 6 March 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 639-640. Paterson arrived in Sydney in November 1799.

[10] King to Paterson, 8 September 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 139-140.

[11] Regulations were issued on 10 September 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 144-146 and in greater detail on 1 October 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 220-222.

[12] Fletcher, B.H., ‘Balmain, William (1762-1803)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 51-52.

[13] Auchmuty, J.J., ‘Wentworth, D’Arcy (1762-1827)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 579-582.

[14] On this decision see the correspondence in September 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 141-143.

[15] King received support from London in the form of hop plants: Hobart to King, 24 February 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 48; Hobart to King, 9 May 1803, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, p. 79 stated that a brewery was being established.

[16] King to Portland, 10 March 1801, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 7-8 for King’s concerns about spirits brought from the United States and, despite instructions from London to the contrary, from India. See also, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 150.

[17] See, King to Hunter, 6 July 1800 and subsequent correspondence, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 170-177.

[18] HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 377.

[19] See, for example, King’s general orders on 2-3 October 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 222-224.

[20] Government and General Order, 11 June 1801, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 402-403 re-established the notion of only two assigned convicts for military officers.

[21] Portland to King, 19 June 1801, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, p. 99. The number of assigned servants (not convicts employed as labourers) for magistrates was reduced to four, Government and General Order, 16 December 1801, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 467-468. Hobart to King, 5 April 1803, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, p. 63 increased the salaries of civil officials (but not military) and removed assigned servants from both: ‘I have received His Majesty's commands to direct you to withdraw from all the officers of the civil and military establishment of the settlement the two convicts who have hitherto been allowed to them by Government. The augmentation of the salaries of the civil officers will enable them to pay for the services of such convicts as they may choose to employ, in lieu of the two hitherto allowed them, and

the military officers can have no claim, in the present advanced state of the colony, to any aid of this kind, beyond what is allowed to military officers serving in other colonies.’

[22] Hobart to King, 24 February 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 45: ‘I observe that the quantity of land cultivated for Government has been of late considerably increased...I am inclined to think it would not be advisable to augment it to any considerable extent beyond that proportion.’

[23] King to Hobart, 14 November 1801, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 324-325 saw prices rise to 15s a bushel though by January 1802 prices had returned to 8s a bushel, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, p. 607. In early 1803, this was further reduced to 7s 6d at Sydney and Parramatta and 7s at Hawkesbury, King to Hobart, 1 March 1804, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, pp. 518-519.

[24] HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 134-136 details a petition from Hawkesbury settlers on 21 August 1801 and King’s response.

[25] The most extensive report was in Sydney Gazette, 30 March, 1806. There had been floods previously in 1799 and 1800 and later in 1809. This led to later Macquerie townships being built on higher land and remained largely dry in the floods in 1816 and 1819. However, the area remains prone to flooding.

[26] On King’s assessment of the state of the colony on 31 December 1801 and 30 October 1802 see HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 651-670, 866-880.

[27] King’s perceptive remarks on Macarthur’s livestock showed his grasp of the need to improve government cattle and sheep, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 114-115.

[28] HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 29-32, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 312-315, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 113-114.

[29] HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 556. See also Macarthur’s comments, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 173-175.

[30] On sheep farming in 1805 see, King to Camden, 2 October 1805, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, pp. 555-568.

[31] King to Portland, 8 July 1801, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, p. 116 stated that coal was already being exported to India at £3 a ton

[32] Dallas, K.M., ‘Enderby, Samuel (1756-1829)’, ADB, Vol. 1, p. 357.

[33] As early as 1792, Sydney Cove was the centre for the profitable whale and seal trade around the southern coasts. Under Governor King, if not necessarily because of him, the colony made great strides. Whaling brought profit to its shores, for the ships came into Sydney to refit. King referred to whaling as the only ‘staple’ and saw visions of secondary profits. The American whalers provided a market for foodstuffs, water and timber. By 1800, London was unloading 300 tons of sperm oil fished off the coast of NSW. The whaling and sealing industry was quite unregulated and King recognised that this uncontrolled slaughter would ruin the industry and on 9 May 1803 he wrote to Nepean, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, p. 249, ‘Although a vast quantity of Sea Elephants and Seals have been taken and still abound about Hunters Island and Kings Island, yet from the different communications I have received I shall find it expedient to restrain individuals from resorting there in too great numbers, and to fix certain times for their visiting these places, to prevent the destruction of that commercial advantage. Since I took command 16,000 gallons of oil and 27,800 seal skins have been imported from thence by individuals, 1,063 tuns of spermaceti oil have also been procured by the south whalers, all which I need not point out as a rising nursery for Seamen.’

[34] On the development of the South Sea whale-fishery, see, minutes of the Board of Trade, 4 December 1801, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 630. See also, Little, B., ‘Sealing and Whaling in Australia Before 1850’, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 9, (1969), pp. 109-127.

[35] King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. 9, 20-22, 53-63. Steven, Margaret, ‘Campbell, Robert (1769-1846)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 202-206 and the more detailed Merchant Campbell 1769-1846, (Melbourne University Press) 1965. King had a high regard for Campbell commenting to Bligh that he had been ‘the greatest services to the inhabitants...that the price of his merchandise was the same in time of scarcity as in abundance, that he had advanced a great sum of money, and protected the poor and distressed settler; and that in fact he was the only private pillar which supported the honest people of the Colony’.

[36] King to Camden, 30 April 1804, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 603, King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. 9. East India Company to Sir Stephen Cottrell, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 644-645 gave its response to King’s proposal.

[37] King to Lieutenant-Governor Collins, 26 November 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 263-268.

[38] HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 28.

[39] ‘Bellasis, George Bridges (- 1825)’, ADB, Vol. 1, p. 83. See also, King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, pp. 173-174.

[40] MacLaurin, E.C.B., ‘Fitzgerald, Richard (1772-1840)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 383-384.

[41] Perry, T.M., ‘Meehan, James (1774-1826)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 219-220.

[42] Parsons, Vivienne, ‘Mann, David Dickenson (1775?-1811?)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 201-202.

[43] Byrnes, J.V., ‘Thompson, Andrew (1773?-1810)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 519-521.

[44] Cable, K.J., ‘Fulton, Henry (1761-1840)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 421-422.

[45] Parsons, Vivienne, ‘Dixon, James (1758-1840)’, ADB, Vol. 1, p. 309.

[46] Hunter to Officers, 4 September 1800, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 119-130 details the inquiry into an Irish plot in 1800 and King to Banks, 8 October 1800 on a threatened rebellion by United Irishmen at Parramatta, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 229 and pp. 235-238

[47] On the ‘Irish rebellion’ of 1804, see below pp. 495-526.

[48] King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. 2. King to Camden, 20 July 1805, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. 529 indicated the state of work on Fort Phillip and its armaments.

[49] This is evident particularly in correspondence between Hobart and King, for example, Hobart to King, 30 November 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 271-272: ‘I approve the exertions you have made to effect this desirable object [reduction of Treasury Bills]....at the same time [I] remark that the supplies of all descriptions which have been sent to the colony...have been extremely liberal...’

[50] Government and General Order, 14 June 1802, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 789-790.

[51] King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 115. Vaccinations occurred at Norfolk Island, in Sydney and on the Derwent in VDL.

[52] Byrnes, J.V., ‘Howe, George (1769-1821)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 557-559. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, p. 85.

[53] King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 118.

[54] King to Bligh, n.d., 1807, Mitchell Library, Philip Gidley King Papers, C189, p. 273 cit, Banner, Stuart, Possessing the Pacific: land, settlers, and indigenous people from Australia to Alaska, (Harvard University Press), 2007, p. 31.

[55] The deteriorating relationship between King and the military in early 1803 is detailed in HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 22-37. Some of these libels are printed in HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp 123-127; see also, King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRA, Series I, Vol. 4, pp. 159-160, 167-173.

[56] Paterson to War Office, 24 August 1801, HRA, Vol. 3, p. 292.

[57] King to Portland, 25 September 1801, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 529-533, 559-582 considers the duel between Paterson and Macarthur; King to Portland, 5 November 1801, HRNSW, Vol. 4, pp. 609-610, HRA, Series I, Vol. 3, pp. 280-286, 296-298 on the duel, its causes and on sending Macarthur to England for trial. However Adjutant-General Calvert to Under-Secretary Sullivan, 31 January 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 11-13 made clear the impossibility of trying Macarthur in England and remitted the trial back to NSW.

[58] Camden to King, 31 October 1804, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, pp. 161-162 detailed the land and convicts Macarthur was to receive. King to Camden, 20 July 1805, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp 660-662, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, pp. 510-512 suggest King and Macarthur were reconciled as King was prepared to give him assistance with his land grant and sheep farming.

[59] Judge-Advocate Morgan to King, 4 January 1804, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 301-302.

[60] King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 130.

[61] Hobart to King, 30 November 1803, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 273-274.

[62] Castlereagh to King, 20 November 1805, HRNSW, Vol. 5, p. 735, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. 489 informed King that Bligh was his replacement.

[63] King’s concerns about Margarot and Hayes were initially expressed in a letter to Under-Secretary Sullivan, 21 August 1804, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 450-451. King to Under-Secretary Cooke, 20 July 1805, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 663-667 detailed his concerns about what he saw as their ‘vile assassinating acts’.

[64] Watson, Frederick, ‘Introduction’, HRA, Series I, Vol. 5, p. xiii.

[65] On this issue, see below, pp. 305-326.

[66] On the Hawkesbury flood, March 1806, see, King to Camden, 7 April 1806, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 59-65. Over 23,000 bushels of wheat and 3,500 livestock plus 7 lives were lost and over 36,000 acres of land inundated.

[67] For Bligh’s commission and instructions, dated 26 May 1804, see, HRNSW, Vol. 5, pp. 628-641.

[68] On Bligh as governor of NSW and the Rum rebellion, see below, pp. 527-564.

Philip Gidley King: the making of a Governor

It was Arthur Phillip who chose King[1] as second lieutenant on HMS Sirius for the expedition to establish a convict settlement in NSW. King had served with Phillip before the First Fleet and was regarded as his protégé. Phillip certainly had a high opinion of King and consciously promoted his interests throughout the late 1780s and 1790s. Despite his lowly rank, soon after the settlement was established at Sydney Cove, King was selected to lead a small party of convicts and guards to set up a settlement at Norfolk Island.[2] On 14 February 1788, King sailed for his new post with a party of twenty-three, including fifteen convicts.[3] On 6 March 1788, King and his party landed with difficulty, owing to the lack of a suitable harbour and set about building huts, clearing the land, planting crops and resisting the ravages of grubs, salt air and hurricanes.[4] More convicts were sent and these proved occasionally troublesome. Early in 1789, King prevented a mutiny when some of the convicts planned to take him and other officers prisoner and escape on the next boat to arrive.[5] Despite the lack of a safe harbour, of lime and timbered land, there was plenty of fish, the stock flourished and the soil was good. It could maintain ‘at least one hundred families’, King told Phillip. Impressed by his work, the governor several times recommended his subordinate for naval promotion, but this would have raised difficulties because of King’s lack of seniority. To solve the problem the secretary of state announced in December 1789 that King would be appointed lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island at a salary of £250.[6]

Following the wreck of Sirius at Norfolk Island in March 1790, King left and returned to England to report on the difficulties facing the settlements in NSW. During his twenty months absence the island had been under the command of Lieutenant-Governor Robert Ross[7] but Ross was not an easy commandant and convicts, settlers, soldiers and officials had become discontented under his rule.[8] King found ‘discord and strife on every person’s countenance’ and was ‘pestered with complaints, bitter revilings, back-biting’.[9] Tools and skilled labour were both very short. Thefts were common and there was still no criminal court on the island, despite the representations he had made in London on the need for better judicial arrangements.[10] However, King’s able and enthusiastic guidance helped to improve conditions. The regulations he issued in 1792 encouraged the settlers, who were drawn from ex-marines and ex-convicts, and he was willing to listen to their advice on fixing wages and prices and other things. By 1794, the island was self-sufficient in grain, and had a surplus of swine that it could send to Sydney. The numbers ‘off the store’ were high and few of the settlers wanted to leave, but unfortunately King had had no success with the growing of flax that so interested the British government.[11] In February 1794, King was faced with unfounded allegations by members of the NSW Corps on the island that he was punishing them too severely and ex-convicts too lightly when disputes arose. As their conduct became for mutinous, he sent twenty of them to Sydney for trial by court-martial.[12] There Lieutenant-Governor Francis Grose censured King’s actions in going to New Zealand without first informing him, something with which Portland the new secretary of state in London later concurred and issued orders that gave the military illegal authority over the civilian population.[13] Grose later apologised, but conflict with the military continued to plague King.

Suffering from gout, King returned to England in October 1796, and after regaining his health, he resumed his naval career.[14] Phillip had wanted King to be appointed governor of New South Wales in 1792 and had continued to advocate King’s cause after Hunter had been preferred in 1794. In January 1798, it was decided that he should return to New South Wales with a dormant commission as Governor-General to succeed Hunter in the event of the latter’s death or absence from the colony, though at that time there was no question of Hunter being recalled.[15] The commission was issued on 1 May.[16] However, King was delayed in England for a further year[17] and when he finally sailed in a whaler, the Speedy on 26 November 1799 the situation had changed and he carried the dispatch recalling Hunter.

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[1] For biographical information, see Shaw, A.G.L., ‘King, Philip Gidley (1758-1808)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 55-61; King, J. and J., Philip Gidley King: a biography of the third governor of New South Wales, (Methuen), 1981.

[2] See, Hoare, Merval, Norfolk Island; an outline of its history 1774-1968, (University of Queensland Press), 1969, Hazzard, Margaret, Punishment Short of Death: A History of the Penal Settlement at Norfolk Island, (Hyland House), 1984 and Treadgold, M.L., Bounteous bestowal: the economic history of Norfolk Island, (Australian National University), 1988.

[3] Crittenden, Victor, King of Norfolk Island: The Story of Philip Gidley King as Commandant and Lieutenant-Governor of Norfolk Island, (Mulini Press), 1993. For King’s appointment and instructions see, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 136-138. Fidlon, P.G. and Ryan, R.J., (eds.), The Journal of Philip Gidley King: Lieutenant, R.N., 1787-1790, (Australian Documents Library), 1980 provides King’s view of his governance of Norfolk Island until 1790.

[4] Phillip to Sydney, 28 September 1788, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 185-187 provides analysis of the resources of Norfolk Island. Ross to Phillip, 11 February 1791 gives a detailed discussion of problems encountered, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 434-450.

[5] Phillip to Sydney, 12 February 1790, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 293-294. Since Phillip had corresponded with Sydney during 1789, it is difficult to explain why he left it a year before informing him of the mutiny.

[6] For King’s commission dated 28 January 1790, see, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 287-288.

[7] For Ross’ instruction dated 2 March 1790, see, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 314-316. See also his observations on the island in December 1790, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 416-420 and the contrast with King’s observations in January 1791 when he was in London, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 428-431.

[8] He had introduced martial law almost as soon as he arrived at Norfolk Island because of the loss of the Sirius; see, Ross to Phillip, 22 March 1790, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 319-320; see also the enclosures pp. 321-323 in which Ross laid down the standards that would now operate on the island. Phillip informed Grenville in a letter dated 14 July 1790, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 357-358. Food shortages on Norfolk Island led Ross to introduce draconian measures in proclamations on 7 August 1790, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 390-393.

[9] King to Under Secretary Nepean, 23 November 1791, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), p. 562; see also King to Phillip, 29 December 1791, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), pp. 572-580.

[10] See Phillip to Dundas, 4 October 1791, HRNSW, Vol. 1, (2), p. 655 on the inconveniences of the lack of a criminal court on Norfolk Island. Legislation was finally passed in London establishing a criminal court on Norfolk Island on 9 May 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 235-236.

[11] King to Dundas, 19 November 1793, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 86-98 details the voyage to New Zealand to obtain Maori help with flax production. This failed and the natives returned to New Zealand, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 174.

[12] King to Grose, 30 January 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 103-110.

[13] Grose to King, 25 February 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 125-131; King to Dundas, 10 March 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp.135-173 detailed the mutiny and Grose’ response. For King’s response to Grose’s reprimand see, King to Grose, 19 March 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 173-192.

[14] King provided a summary of his career in King to Portland, 15 June 1797, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 221-223. In this, he emphasised that he had been commended by Phillip and by Henry Dundas, the previous secretary of state.

[15] This was agreed on 27 January 1798, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 353.

[16] This is printed in HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 381 and HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, p. 605 and announced in The Star, 19 May 1798.

[17] The initial plan was for him to sail on the Porpoise, but initial trials showed the ship to be unseaworthy, see King to Sir Joseph Banks, 6 February 1799 and George Caley to Sir Joseph Banks, 9 February 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 533-538 and King to Sir Andrew Hamond, Comptroller of the Navy Board, 14 February 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 544-546. Once modifications had been made and after a significant delay, the Porpoise sailed in September 1799 but problems with the steering gear led to its return to England: King to Sir Joseph Banks, 17 September 1799 and King to Sir A. Hamond, 18 September 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 718-721. By early October 1799, the Porpoise had been declared unfit for service: Portland to the Admiralty Commissioners, 5 October 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 723.

School sports and the Olympics

Let me start by declaring an interest.  When I was at school I hated PE and competitive sports largely because I was absolutely useless at them all and this was continuously made clear by the sarcastic comments of my teachers and the patronising attitude of my fellow students who were sports-oriented and very good at them.  You remember: let’s pick teams followed by being picked last and having the football or netball passed to you once or twice in the game.  It was only in the sixth form when we were given some choice that I took up badminton and thoroughly enjoyed it but by then the rot had already set in.  I still enjoy walking and gardening and use them to get my weekly dose of exercise but sport, whether competitive or not, never grabbed my interest.  Not surprisingly I have been less than enamoured with the Olympics though I am pleased with the success of Team GB, the enthusiasm of the crowds and the spirit demonstrated by those who volunteered to help. But I can’t say I’ll be sad to see its end.

It’s no surprise that the government (any government in fact) is attempting to jump on the band-waggon of success by trying to revive competitive school sport in primary schools and emphasising the need for two hour a week of sport in secondary schools.  But it does smack of opportunism and one does have to question whether it is sincere in its prognostications on the issue.  Yes there has been significant enthusiasm created by the Olympics and, with growing levels of childhood and adult obesity, there is a need to boost physical activity but there is a serious mismatch between what may be laudable aims and the resources available in schools to achieve them.  Many, probably most primary schools do not have PE specialists or the fields necessary to make competitive sport for all students a reality.  Like constitutional reform, reform school sports cannot be seen as a priority when the economy is at best flat-lining and the euro crisis is far from over. 
Cameron may have said that ‘If we want to have a great sporting legacy for our children - and I do - we have got to have an answer that brings the whole of society together to crack this, more competition, more competitiveness, more getting rid of the idea all-must-win prizes and you can't have competitive sports days.’  But he also admitted that ‘some teachers’ did not want to join in and ‘play their part’, a characteristically patronising comment.  Why should teachers ‘play their part’ anyway especially if they have no interest in sport or in drama or music or dance for that matter?  Many teachers do make a huge contribution to sport in schools and good on them but for others it does not figure in their educational priorities if at all.  Their contribution may be in other areas, running clubs, helping with debating societies or working with Parent Teacher Associations.  Education, despite the quest for uniformity among politicians over the past two decades, has never been a one size fits all activity.  Just as students have a variety of skills and abilities, so do teachers and for some of use sport is not one of them.  Relying on teachers to achieve a cultural breakthrough in sport is doomed to failure...look what happened to school sport during the dispute with the government in the mid-1980s…it virtually disappeared outside school hours.  The Olympics may have been great, the enthusiasm engendered spectacular but I’d rather see kids running around kicking and football or riding their bikes that being enmeshed into a curriculum straight-jacket of government making and anyway it will be another bright idea next week!!!

Rebellion in Canada, 1837-1885 Volume 1: Autocracy, Rebellion and Liberty

JUST PUBLISHED

In less than fifty years Canada experienced six major rebellions: in Lower and Upper Canada in late 1837 and 1838, the Fenian rebellions of 1866 and 1870 and the Pembina affair in 1871 and Louis Riel's resistance at Red River in 1869-1870 and his rebellion fifteen years later in Saskatchewan. Each failed to achieve its aims and, in one sense, the two books in the Canadian Rebellion series are studies of political disappointment. The rebellions revealed the draconian ways in which the state responded to threats to public order and legitimate authority. Yet it is the losers in 1837-1838 and 1885, though this is less the case for those in 1866 and 1870 who are now better and more positively remembered than the victors. These events each represented the beginnings of political change and especially the move towards 'responsive', 'responsible' and 'representative' government as British Government, at least in its imperial manifestation recognised the necessity of rule with the consent of colonists.

 

Autocracy, Rebellion and Liberty examines the way in which the Canadas developed from the 1760s through to Confederation a century later. The opening chapters consider the context for the rebellions in 1837 and 1838. Chapter 1 examines the development of the two Canadas between the end of French Canada in 1760 and the turn of the century. Chapter 2 considers the economic, social, political, ideological and cultural tensions that evolved from the 1790s and the largely unsuccessful attempts by the colonial state and politicians in London to find acceptable and sustainable solutions to populist demands for greater autonomy. Chapter 3 looks in detail at the rebellions in 1837 and 1838 and at their immediate aftermath. Chapter 4 examines the ways in which Canadian politics developed in the newly united Province of Canada in the years between 1841 and the creation of Confederation in 1867.

Contents:

Series Preface
Prologue: Conflicting Liberties
1 Forming the Canadas
2 From discord to rebellion
3 Rebellions and Retribution, 1837-1839
4 From Union to Confederation
Appendices
Further reading
Index

Features:

Comprehensive narrative of the context, causes, course and consequences of the rebellions combining analysis of the constitutional, political, social, economic and cultural features.
Examines the critical role played by Louis-Joseph Papineau, William Mackenzie, Louis LaFontaine and Robert Baldwin in the move from an autocratic to responsive and responsible system of government.
Considers the rebellions in their historiographical context.

Rebellion in Canada

My decision to publish Rebellion in Canada as two print volumes as well as a combined Kindle edition has given me the opportunity to produce the covers for the two books.

Autocracy, Rebellion and Liberty examines the way in which the Canadas developed from the 1760s through to Confederation a century later. The opening chapters consider the context for the rebellions in 1837 and 1838. Chapter 1 examines the development of the two Canadas between the end of French Canada in 1760 and the turn of the century. Chapter 2 considers the economic, social, political, ideological and cultural tensions that evolved from the 1790s and the largely unsuccessful attempts by the colonial state and politicians in London to find acceptable and sustainable solutions to populist demands for greater autonomy. Chapter 3 looks in detail at the rebellions in 1837 and 1838 and at their immediate aftermath. Chapter 4 examines the ways in which Canadian politics developed in the newly united Province of Canada in the years between 1841 and the creation of Confederation in 1867.

The second volume, The Irish, the Fenians and the Metis, considers the impact of the Irish diaspora on the United States and Canada and the rebellions led largely by Irish-American Fenians in the 1860s and 1870s and also the rebellions, led by Louis Riel in 1869-1870 and 1885, by the Metis. Chapter 1 examines the Irish diaspora to North America during the nineteenth century and focuses especially on the impact of the Famine in the 1840s and 1850s. Chapter 2 considers at the ways in which Irish nationalism maintained a strong political presence in the United States and Canada from the beginning of the nineteenth century and the emergence of the Fenian Brotherhood in New York in 1858. The political impact of this movement was both enhanced and restricted by the American Civil War between 1861 and 1865 yet the Fenians emerged in April 1865 as a powerful, if increasingly divided, force with concrete plans for the liberation of Ireland. Chapter 3 explores in detail at the three Irish-American Fenian incursions into Canada in 1866, 1870 and briefly and debatably in 1871, the impact that they had on Canadian and American politics and how this led to changes in Irish nationalism in the 1870s. Chapters 4 and 5 extend the story geographically beyond Quebec and Ontario across the continent to the unchartered and largely unsettled prairies of the North-West. The importance of rebellion in state-building in Canada is considered in the final chapter.

Military and civil tensions under Hunter

The population of NSW in 1795 was 3,211 of whom 1,908 or 59 per cent were convicts. The remainder were largely military and administrative personnel and prisoners whose terms of servitude had ended. These expirees posed a problem for Hunter [1] and in June 1797 there were about 700 men supporting themselves, generally through casual labour, without government aid.[2] There were only a dozen or so free settlers and the settlement was confined to a small region close to the coast, with its economic centre at Parramatta and much of the economic advances in the 1790s came from those expirees who successfully turned to agriculture. Although the colony was almost self-sufficient in grain if the harvest was good, it was dependent on overseas supplies for nearly all other essentials and the need to import cattle and sheep was stressed more strongly in Hunter’s instructions than in Phillip’s. Between the departure of Phillip and the arrival of Hunter, private enterprise had supplanted that by government as the main form of economic activity. In December 1792, the government cultivated by far the larger proportion of land and most people spent their days working under its direction either on the public farm or on the construction of roads and buildings. By late 1795, however, officers and small farmers combined cropped an acreage far exceeding that belonging to the government, produced the greater part of the grain supply and owned most of the livestock in the settlement. Many convicts were privately employed and insufficient were left for limited public works.[3] Hunter claimed that the labour shortage was so acute that at least another thousand workers could be absorbed.[4] NSW was becoming increasingly colonial in character with its penal role one of several often conflicting dimensions.

The problem facing smallholders was that if the government produced on its own lands sufficient food for that section of the population fed from government stores, then the farmers would have no market for their produce and it would be impossible to develop a self-reliant colony.

...if it is the wish or intention of Government to have this colony increase to a state of respectability, some encouragement must be held out to respectable settlers and industrious people of all descriptions. This can never be the case if it be the intention of Government to cultivate land enough for the maintenance of all the convicts sent here. The farmer will be labouring for a mere subsistence; he can never cloath himself and family if he has no market for his surplus corn, and if Government does not become his purchaser he can have no market. What then, my Lord, must be the consequence? A general indolence, a total inattention to farming, dissatisfaction with their situation, and a desire to quit the country by every opportunity which offers...[5]

However, the British government, though anxious to encourage private farming, was firmly determined that the financial burden of the settlement on the Treasury should be limited. Portland insisted that Hunter should pursue a policy that in the long run could only harm local farmers. Hunter’s first action as governor was to disobey his instructions and to continue the practice established by Grose of allowing ten convict servants for agricultural and three for domestic purposes to each officer occupying ground. Other farmers were provided with from one to five assigned convicts. Hunter started from the position that government farming was wasteful and inefficient and was also initially impressed with the success achieved by some of the officers whose efforts he thought might prove the basis for future prosperity. It is easy to blame the governor for disobeying his instructions, and Portland had no difficulty in doing so, but Hunter recognised that the changes envisaged in London could only be effected at the expense of those who potentially were his principal supporters.[6]

The actions of the NSW Corps were not without parallel in other parts of Britain’s colonies. Macarthur’s profits as regimental paymaster were far less than those often accumulated by similar officers in India. The difference between the commercial activities of Macarthur and his fellow officers in NSW and equivalent operations elsewhere was that in NSW they almost achieved a monopoly, whereas in other colonies this was rarely possible. The result was growing tensions between Hunter and the military. Hunter soon ended his association with Macarthur telling Portland that ‘scarcely nothing short of the full power of the Governor’ would satisfy him.[7] It also became obvious that the soldiers of the NSW Corps resented the authority of the civil power.

Continually thwarted and worthless characters encourag’d almost into a state of resistance by those whose schemes might have been in some degree effected by the changes I was about to make, and which in few words may be said to be order and regularity for confusion and licentiousness.[8]

Yet if Hunter failed as a governor, and Portland judged him a failure, the secretary of state was equally culpable. He was slow to answer dispatches and failed to understand Hunter’s position as an increasingly isolated individual with little physical or moral support thousands of miles from his home. Portland severely criticised Hunter for allowing more than two assigned servants to any military officer.[9] He directed that these servants should be fed and clothed by their masters and not from the government store, and particularly required that the officers should cease to trade in spirits. Yet Portland also paid attention to correspondence from Macarthur, a known dealer in spirits, vehemently attacking the governor for refusing him 100 labourers instead of the two allowed by law.

By 1798, Hunter was clearly aware that trading by the officers had to be controlled if the settlers and in March sent a detailed account of the settlers’ grievances about inflated prices.[10] This showed differences of as much as 700 per cent between the landing costs and the price of sale to the public. The problem was that his solutions, though satisfactory in a convict prison, were impractical in a developing free community. As government control of wages, prices and hours of work proved increasingly ineffective, Hunter called on a small group of supporters, Dr Thomas Arndell and the clergymen, Richard Johnson[11] and Samuel Marsden[12], to prove to the British government that the deterioration in the public morals and economic progress of the colony was entirely due to the nature of the military government between 1792 and 1795. Although Hunter’s analysis was correct that a definite change of economic momentum and of political development had taken place in that period, neither the convict records nor the surviving letters from residents in 1793-1795 supported charges of increased crime, especially theft and excessive drunkenness, at that time.[13]

Extensive cultivation and good crops, speaking generally, but not a barn, granary, or storehouse, wherein to preserve those crops even thought of yet. No mechanics in the colony to erect them; most of the convicts out of their time, and discontented at being hinder'd a single day from providing for themselves; in short, I am apprehensive that great part of our bountiful harvest may be lost. Our boats gone to ruin and decay; butts or houses, formerly the property of Government, leas’d away, and continual applications making to me to furnish others for those who are intitled to them. But I will not fatigue you. I only hint those few circumstances to satisfy you that there does exist great ground and cause for vexation.[14]

The era of military rule seemed very profitable for the agricultural community and the majority of contemporaries commented positively on the material progress, something mirrored in Hunter’s early dispatches. Hunter’s first attempt to reduce the military power saw a return to a civil regime. Hunter’s return of the chaplains and the medical men to the bench of magistrates[15], even though they were in a minority, was regarded as a limitation on the military power and, in Hunter’s words led to

...frequent indirect and some direst attempts have been made to annoy the civil officers officiating as magistrates, with a view to the lessening that respect and influence over the minds of the lower orders of the people so highly necessary in our situation.[16]

In the military-civil struggle for power Portland reserved his strongest criticism of Hunter for his behaviour in the case between John Baughan and the NSW Corps. [17] Portland ‘could not well imagine anything like a justifiable excuse for not bringing the four soldiers who were deposed against to a court-martial and punishing them with the utmost severity’.[18] Baughan had been transported in 1787 on the First Fleet and by the early 1790s had established himself as a master carpenter and builder especially of mills. [19] On 4 February 1796, overhearing himself being abused by a sentinel who apparently bore him a grudge, Baughan slipped out of his workshop, collected the soldier’s arms from his deserted post and handed them to the guard. The sentinel was immediately arrested. Next morning, as an act of reprisal, Baughan’s cottage was stormed and extensively damaged by a military rabble. He and his wife ‘suffered much personal outrage’. Hunter expressed himself forcibly about this ‘daring violation of the public peace’. [20] The offenders, through Captain John Macarthur, expressed ‘their sincere concern for what had happened’ and agreed to indemnify the sufferer.[21] That Hunter accepted this showed that he grasped the realities of the situation, whilst his Government and General Order together with his dispatches clearly revealed a full appreciation of the problems created by a disorderly soldiery though he did not include the officers in his sweeping denunciations.[22]

Although Hunter was concerned by the troublesome nature of the Irish[23] sent out as a result of the United Irishmen’s conspiracy and rebellion he showed much sympathy and humanity, by the standards of the day, towards the convicts in general, and especially towards their wives and children. Much of his strong feelings against the rum trade and the prevalence of private stills were based on these humane sentiments. The severe criticism of his failure to control the rum trade, to keep down prices, to lower government expenditure and to control the trading of the military officers was grossly unfair, especially since with the dismissal of Richard Dore[24] in January 1799, Hunter had to act as his own private secretary.[25] In addition, his aide-de-camp, Captain George Johnston, although at one time in temporary command of the NSW Corps, was arrested in 1800 for refusing a general court martial in the colony on a charge of forcing spirits on a sergeant as part of his pay at an improper price. Whilst he was probably no more censurable than any other officer of the corps save Paterson, nevertheless the charge implied habits at Government House similar to those elsewhere in the colony. When Paterson returned from overseas leave in November 1799 he arrived with strict instructions to prevent further trading by the corps, especially in spirits, and he assured the governor that he was being obeyed. It was odd that the opportunity to make an example of one of the officers should be seized at the expense of the governor’s aide-de-camp.

There had been a persistent, often anonymous campaign against Hunter almost from the start of his period as governor. This was evident in Portland’s letter to Hunter in early 1799 stating that certain charges had been made anonymously against Hunter and that he needed to satisfy the government that these were false.[26] The letter reached Hunter in November 1799 and he replied immediately not knowing that the decision had already been made to replace him. His recall was in a stern dispatch from Portland dated 5 November 1799 that he did not receive until 16 April 1800.[27] It was acknowledged by Hunter on 20 April 1800 and he handed over the government to the Lieutenant-Governor Philip Gidley King on 28 September. His final months in the colony were poisoned not only by his feelings of failure and undeserved blame, but also by the obvious eagerness of his successor to assume office. Portland’s actions can hardly be called just in that Hunter was condemned unheard having been given no opportunity to answer the criticisms that had been made of him.

Why Hunter was recalled is not difficult to explain, though whether the reasons were justifiable remains a matter of debate. First, Hunter was regarded as an honest individual, but he was seen, especially by King as lacking in firmness and was too willing to accept the advice of individuals who used their influence for their own advantage. King believed he was ‘sadly duped and deceived’ by his friends.[28] Secondly, and perhaps more damaging, was his unwillingness to implement his Instructions from London where they clashed with the interests of the major colonists, especially the officers of the NSW Corps. While Hunter rightly argued that his decision reflected the particular circumstances in NSW, it led to tensions with Portland that Hunter’s opponents in the colony were able to exploit. It is hardly surprising that Hunter sought to restore his reputation after 1800 and that, to some extent, he was successful. [29]

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[1] This is evident in Hunter’s general orders concerning robberies; see, the order for 26 September 1796, for example, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 139 and Portland to Hunter, 2 March 1797, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 195-196 where Portland asks Hunter to take immediate action against bush-rangers.

[2] Hunter to Portland, 20 June 1797, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 226.

[3] The problem of labour shortages is evident in setting rates of pay for free labourers in general order 14 January 1797, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 189-190. That this proved difficult to enforce is clear from subsequent general orders.

[4] Hunter to Portland, 25 October 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 328.

[5] Hunter to Portland, 28 April 1796, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 559.

[6] Portland was especially critical in a despatch to Hunter, 31 August 1797, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, pp. 108-109.

[7] Hunter to Portland, 14 September 1795, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, pp. 661-663.

[8] Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1796, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 670. See also Hunter to Portland, 25 July 1798, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 160-171 for further criticism of Macarthur.

[9] Government and General Order, 29 June 1796 reduced the number of assigned convicts to two: HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 57.

[10] Settlers’ petition to Hunter, 18 February 1798, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 367-370.

[11] HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 178-183.

[12] HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 185-188.

[13] It was one of Macarthur’s criticisms of Hunter that ‘...the interest of Government is utterly disregarded, its money idly and wantonly squandered, whilst vice and profligacy are openly countenanced.’ Macarthur to Portland, 14 September 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 133.

[14] Hunter to Portland, 20 August 1796, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 589.

[15] Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 171-172 explains Hunter’s change from a military to civil regime.

[16] Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 171.

[17] Hunter to Portland 26 August 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 87: ‘...I strongly suspect there are some person or persons in this colony (whose situations are probably respectable) extremely inimical to the necessary influence and authority of the civil power, and to that respect which is due from the public to the civil magistrates.’

[18] Portland to Hunter 31 August 1797, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 294.

[19] Gray, A.J., ‘Baughan, John (1754? -1797)’, ADB, Vol. 1, p. 74.

[20] The attack on Baughan led to an immediate response in a general order issued on 5 February 1796 and Hunter’s immediate response: HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 15-16. Hunter’s letter to Captain Paterson on 7 February 1796 and his general order a week later illustrated his clear anger at the situation: HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 17, 18-19. Hunter to Portland, 10 April 1796, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, pp. 573-577 includes two enclosures on the Baughan affair.

[21] See undated memorandum written by Hunter, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 19-22. It was written after 7 March 1796.

[22] See Hunter to Portland 28 April 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 41-42 but especially Hunter to Portland, 10 August 1796, pp. 64-67.

[23] See Hunter to Portland, 15 February 1798, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 359-361.

[24] Allars, K.G., ‘Dore, Richard (1749-1800)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 313-314.

[25] On Dore’s dismissal, see Hunter to Portland 21 February 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 547-575, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 244-278.

[26] Portland to Hunter, 26 February 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 636, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 338-340.

[27] Portland to Hunter, 5 November 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 733-738, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 387-392.

[28] King to Under Secretary King, 8 November 1801, HRNSW, Vol. 4, p. 613.

[29] Hunter, John, Governor Hunter’s Remarks on the Causes of the Colonial Expense of the Establishment of New South Wales. Hints for the Reduction of Such Expense and for Reforming the Prevailing Abuses, London, 1802 represented a vindication of his conduct, associated with his consistently useful advice on all that concerned NSW, the realisation that his successors faced equal or greater difficulties and that the government was regularly misinformed of conditions in the colony, led to a reappraisal of his position.

Avoiding tax and morality

Would you like to pay less tax?  Of course, you would.  You can, for instance, avoid paying tax on your savings by investing in tax-free ISAs, a government sponsored form of tax avoidance and there are other perfectly legal ways of paying less tax.  You can employ an accountant, move your money (if you have that much) to an off-shore account or give money to charity.  But at what point does this become morally wrong?  According to Treasury Minister David Gauke offering to pay tradesmen in cash is the wrong side of the moral line.  He, moral paragon that he is, has never, he said on Newsnight, asked whether he could pay for something cash in hand for a discount adding that ‘if people do that they have to do so with the recognition that means taxes will be higher for the rest.’  So if I pay cash in hand it increases the taxes for everybody else…sound logic but he provided no evidence to support the rhetoric. 

The assault on tax avoidance began last month when David Cameron condemned the use in the past by comedian Jimmy Carr of a Jersey-based scheme as ‘morally wrong’ and in his Budget speech Chancellor George Osborne described tax avoidance as ‘morally repugnant’.  Jimmy Carr, well-known for his acerbic attacks on others now found himself the butt of public anger and quickly did the ‘right’ thing accompanied by public mea culpa.  The problem, however, is that tax avoidance is perfectly legal even if some of its more ‘aggressive’ schemes may not be (though most have not been tested by tax tribunals).  Feigning moral outrage has long been a strategy used by government in the hope that ‘shaming’ individuals will make them act morally often when politicians cannot or will not introduce changes to the rules to ensure moral behaviour will occur.  It’s also a convenient smoke-screen to divert attention away from more difficult issues.  We all know someone who has paid cash in hand or have done it ourselves, so it personalises the issue of tax avoidance while few of us have direct contact with bank bosses or the filthy rich.

The difficulty in the past few months is that the government, by evoking morality as a criteria for paying taxes, have not only moved the taxation goalposts but has also confused further what was already a confused situation.  When is avoiding tax morally right or morally wrong?  Tightening the tax avoidance rules might define things more clearly, though I doubt it.  The government’s scatter-gun approach has still failed to address what for many in the public is the crucial issue, the tax avoidance or evasion of big business and the extremely wealthy.  It is clear that, despite the much lauded Tory belief that ‘we’re all in this together’, in terms of taxation this is far from being the case and that making taxation a moral question is unlikely to have any real impact on business or individuals who still use the rules, quite lawfully, to avoid paying taxes.  As Margaret Thatcher found with the community charge, taxation and trying to moralise political issues can be politically toxic.  Political expediency and morality do not make good bed-fellows.

Restoring autocratic rule: Hunter faces new problems

John Hunter faced three major problems in running the colony. [1] First, there was a division of responsibility between different institutions in London. As governor, Hunter was responsible to the King through the Duke of Portland, Secretary of State for the Home Office.[2] Since NSW had no means to express public opinion, Portland was influenced by private correspondence from discontented residents such as Macarthur and the governor was rarely aware of the entire information at the disposal of the government when it made its decisions.[3] Although the Home Office was responsible for the convicts and the colony, it had to rely on the Admiralty for transport to convey prisoners to Sydney Cove. The military were the responsibility of the Secretary at War and the commissariat and the Ordnance Department was responsible for military buildings. The Treasury, the Mint and two audit officers were concerned with the financial interests of the colony and the Post Office had the relatively easy task of dispatching mail whenever opportunity arose. Secondly, within NSW itself, the relationship between the civil and military establishments had been problematic since 1788 and the establishment of the New South Wales Corps and the decision by Grose to grant them land and their monopolistic attitude to the spirit trade made existing tensions even more difficult.[4]

Every day convinces me more and more that many of those people, if they cannot be prevail’d on to make their public office their first consideration, shou’d be remov’d. Their private concerns occupy all their time, and £50 per annum seems to be no object when £300, £400, or £500 is to be gained by trade.[5]

There were also the beginnings of the division between convicts, emancipists (convicts freed on a variety of conditions) and free settlers and between public and private sectors. Finally, the outbreak of war with France in 1793 had exacerbated this situation calling into question excessive government spending in NSW and, although the colony was not forgotten, it inevitably was not viewed as important a priority as had been the case before 1793. The potential for tensions between these different elements had existed from the founding of the colony but grew in significance from the mid-1790s when the survival of the colony was assured and food shortages became less common. Even so, Hunter complained in his first letter of Portland of the scarcity of salt and that the colony was ‘destitute of every kind of tool used in agriculture’.[6] As late as September 1798, Hunter was concerned that the people were ‘literally speaking, nearly naked and a great number without a bed or blanket to lie upon’.[7]

Hunter’s first impressions on his return to NSW, as recorded in his official dispatches[8], were favourable, but as he privately confessed later in a letter to Sir Samuel Bentham that he had little understanding of the nature of his ‘irksome command’ when he solicited the appointment.[9] By October 1795, he had become aware of the enormity of his task commenting to Portland on the extent to which the settlement had expanded and the problems this had created for effectively maintaining its security and administration.[10] This is reflected in the flurry of government and general orders he issued in the remainder of 1795 including one preventing the indiscriminate felling of timber on the Hawkesbury.[11] Hunter had a resident civil establishment of thirty-one including medical staff and superintendents of convicts, master carpenters and the like, but less than a third could be considered serious official advisers.[12] The number of officers on duty with the NSW Corps was seventeen.[13] There was considerable difference in age between the newly arrived governor, approaching 60 and those who might be called on to act as his advisers. Macarthur, as inspector of public works on whom Hunter relied in the early months of his governorship until the Baughan affair, was 28.[14] Captain Paterson, the Corps commandant was 40; Captain Joseph Foveaux was 30[15]; almost everyone else was younger than Paterson. Hunter as an experienced officer was accustomed to naval discipline and expected to see it reflected in NSW. Instead, he faced an entrenched military force and an increasingly dispersed body of settlers largely dependent at the mercy of the monopolistic trading practices of the military hierarchy and other officials. His instructions would have been difficult to implement even if he had a loyal and competent public service with reliable military support.[16]

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[1] Hoyle, Arthur, The Life of John Hunter, Navigator, Governor, Admiral, (Mulini Press), 2001, Auchmuty, J.J., ‘Hunter, John (1737-1821)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 566-572. See also, Wood, G.A., ‘Governor Hunter’, Journal and Proceedings (Royal Australian Historical Society), Vol. 14, (6), (1928), pp. 344-362. For Hunter’s commission and instructions, see HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 110-117, 227-234 and HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, pp. 513-527.

[2] William Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 3^rd Duke of Portland (1738-1809) was a Whig politician for the first thirty years of his political career but as a conservative Whig, Portland was deeply uncomfortable with the French Revolution, and ultimately broke with Fox over this issue, joining Pitt’s government as Home Secretary in 1794, a position he held until 1801. Briefly an MP, Portland succeeded to the title in 1762 but did not make his maiden speech in the House of Lords until 1783; one of his claims to fame is that he rarely spoke in parliament. See, Wilkinson, David, The Duke of Portland: politics and party in the age of George III, (Palgrave), 2003, pp. 108-136 for his period at the Home Office.

[3] Hunter expressed his concern about Macarthur in a letter to Portland on 14 September 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 129-131 in which he made clear that ‘...this officer’s conduct...[was] impertinent, indirect and highly censurable interference in the dutys and department of the Governor of this colony...’

[4] The problem of spirits concerned Hunter from the outset. His general order of 23 January 1796 prohibited the making of spirits in the colony: HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 10; general order 11 July 1796 took action over the unlimited sale of spirits, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 58-59; general order 12 December 1796, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 185-186 on the link between crime and spirits;

[5] Hunter to Portland, 20 June 1797, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, p. 22.

[6] Hunter to Portland, 11 September 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 318.

[7] Hunter to Portland, 25 September 1798, HRNSW, Vol. 3, p. 493.

[8] Hunter to Portland, 11 September 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 318-319 stated that ‘agriculture...far exceeds any expectation...and does great credit to the arrangements made by...Grose and...Paterson’.

[9] Hunter to Bentham, 20 May 1799, HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 673-675.

[10] Hunter to Portland 25 October 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 328-329.

[11] Hunter to King, 5 December 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 341.

[12] The civil establishment is listed in HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 331-332.

[13] They are listed in HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 330.

[14] Initially Hunter retained the services of Macarthur see, Hunter to Portland, 25 October 1795, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 327 but their relationship quickly deteriorated into acrimony, see correspondence between Macarthur and Hunter between 24 and 29 February 1796 printed in HRNSW, Vol. 3, pp. 26-29 that resulted in Macarthur’s resignation as inspector of public works. Macarthur became increasingly critical of Hunter’s administration, see, Macarthur to Portland, 15 September 1796, HRA, Series I, Vol. 2, pp. 89-93.

[15] Fletcher, B.H., ‘Foveaux, Joseph (1767-1846)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 407-409. Promoted to major in 1796, as senior officer in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel William Paterson between August 1796 and November 1799 he controlled the NSW Corps during a period when some of its officers were making their fortunes from trading and extending their landed properties. Whether Foveaux was a trader is unknown but he certainly turned his hand to stock-raising. By 1800, he had 1,027 sheep on the 2,020 acres of land he had been granted, making him the largest landholder and stock-owner in the colony. See also, Whitaker, Ann-Maree, Joseph Foveaux: power and patronage in early New South Wales, (University of New South Wales Press), 2000.

[16] For Hunter’s instructions, see HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 227-234.

Military interlude: Grose and Paterson

Until Captain John Hunter, Phillip’s replacement arrived in NSW in September 1795, the colony was administered first by Major Francis Grose[1] (11 December 1792 to 12 December 1794) and then by Captain William Paterson[2] (12 December 1794 to 11 September 1795). The inhabitants were quick to take advantage of Grose’s unassertive, affable and indolent nature.[3] On assuming command he replaced civil magistrates with military officers, gave the senior officer at Parramatta control over the convicts there when he was not present, and appointed Lieutenant John Macarthur inspector of public works.[4] Some historians argue that the military officers deeply influenced his moves and one has asserted that Macarthur became the real ruler of NSW. Grose showed a greater concern for the welfare of his troops than Phillip had displayed. He increased the weekly ration to give them more food than the convicts and he improved their housing conditions. Without specific instructions and initially without authorisation, he issued land grants of about 100 acres to serving members of the corps who requested them.[5] In accordance with Home Office instructions he provided the officers with farms and, despite orders to the contrary, allowed each the use of ten convicts provisioned at government expense.[6] The civil staff was treated in the same ways as the military hierarchy. Emancipists and the handful of migrants who arrived were encouraged to take up small holdings on less favourable terms than previously laid down by the British government. The opening of the rich Hawkesbury River region, for which Grose must take some of the credit, induced large numbers to settle there.[7]

Sydney Cove, 1845

Behind these moves lay the conviction that the community stood to benefit far more from the exertions of private individuals than from government enterprise. Public farming had failed to produce sufficient for the settlement’s needs and although it was not abandoned, it was reduced. Although unimpressed with the quality of smallholders, Grose placed great trust in the officer farmers whose exertions, he felt, promised quickly to make NSW self-sufficient in foodstuff. This belief, as well as the desire to promote their well-being, disposed him to facilitate their pursuits. Partly through their efforts, partly through a rapid expansion in the number of small settlers, the number of acres farmed and livestock grazed increased during his regime.[8] By December 1794, NSW was still importing essential supplies and the threat of famine still hung over the settlement. The British government disliked the means by which Grose had helped the settlement’s progress. The reduction of public farming forced him to draw on the Treasury to buy food which the convicts might have raised for nothing; his practice of providing maintenance for the officers’ convict servants increased the burden on the stores and perturbed the Home Office who thought that such people should be supported by their employers.

Some of the civil and military staff began to engage in trade, especially in spirits at substantial profit to themselves. Although Grose derived no personal benefit from these practices, he was responsible for failing to curb them. Perhaps his advisers persuaded him to turn a blind eye to abuses that were to their advantage; but, since spirits proved an excellent incentive payment for convict labourers, it was probably for this reason that he allowed the officers to acquire it. Assessments of the other aspects of his rule have been strongly coloured by the writings of contemporaries such as Richard Johnson[9], Samuel Marsden[10] and Thomas Arndell but it is unlikely that New South Wales in this period experienced murder, drunkenness and rapine on the scale they indicated. The charges against Grose of making indiscriminate grants of land to his friends and fellow officers appear without foundation, as the grants made were in accordance with his instructions and to those officers who requested them. Smallholders were not exploited by the officers to the extent often suggested though Grose downsized the size of their land grants and some were better placed in 1794 than is generally realised, but the picture drawn by contemporaries was not entirely untrue.[11] By encouraging the officers’ farming pursuits and allowing them to engage in trade, Grose enabled them to secure a hold over the colony that they were soon to exploit in their own interests. This situation continued under William Paterson who granted 4,965 acres of land and made no attempt, either then or after Hunter assumed office, to check or to control the trading and farming activities of his officers. Unwittingly Grose and Paterson had helped to create problems that their immediate successors were unable to resolve.[12]

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[1] Fletcher, B.H., ‘Grose, Francis (1758?-1814)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 488-489.

[2] Macmillan, David S., ‘Paterson, William (1755-1810)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 317-319.

[3] Dundas to Grose, 30 June 1793, HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 51 expressed concern about the secret sale of spirits.

[4] On Macarthur’s appointment, see HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 14, 226. See also, Grose to Dundas, 16 February 1793, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 416.

[5] HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 438 lists the grants made by 31 May 1793 including four of 100 acres to serving officers.

[6] See, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 209, 302-303, 324, 328.

[7] On developments in the Hawkesbury region, see HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 210, 238, 254, 307, 346. See also, Barkley-Jack, Jan, Hawkesbury Settlement Revealed: A new look at Australia’s third mainland settlement 1793-1802, (Rosenberg), 2009.

[8] On the land under cultivation, see HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 209, 302, 311, 482.

[9] Grose to Dundas, 4 September 1793, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 64-65 described Johnson as ‘a very troublesome, discontented character’. Johnson’s response to Grose’s comments are contained in a letter to Dundas, 8 April 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 201-204 in which he explains the origins of his dispute with Grose.

[10] HRNSW, Vol. 2, p. 209 Grose expressed some concerns over Marsden.

[11] Grose to Dundas, 30 April 1794, HRA, Series I, Vol. 1, p. 474 stated that of the 59 grants made 1793-1794 seven were 25 acres and two 20 acres but the overwheming majority, thirty four, were for 30 acres.

[12] Grose to Dundas, 8 December 1794, HRNSW, Vol. 2, pp. 274-276 indicated his resignation and his decision to appoint Paterson as his replacement until Hunter arrived.

Hubris loses

Whether you agreed with the proposed House of Lords reform or not, one thing that has been outstanding in the past two days of debate has been the standard of the contribution by MPs.  Speeches have been lucid, considered and well-argued received with courtesy by those listening whether supporters or opponents.  In the absence of most of the front-bench ‘big guns’ and more accurately because of their absence, we have had two days of debate in the House of Commons rather than the normal Rottweilers howling at each other across the despatch box.  The result was a climb-down on the programme motion to limit debate to 10 days in the face of a massive Conservative revolt pushing the substantive bill into the autumn….essentially not a crisis averted but a crisis delayed.  The government may have won the second reading but it no longer has control of the timetable and there are obvious parallels with the Lords reform proposed by Harold Wilson in the 1960s that failed as the result of widespread filibustering.

Now the party blame game has begun.  The Labour Party has been ‘ostrich-like’, for instance.  Michael Gove’s defence of the Prime Minister’s authority  on Newsnight was combative but unconvincing.  It was clear that scores of Conservative (and one should add Labour) MPs were prepared to defy the party whip to vote against a measure they view as fundamentally flawed.  This cannot be seen as a victory for the executive however one construes it.  It was a victory for backbench opinion, a triumph of reasoned debate over executive hubris.  So there now are calls for consensus on reform but David Lawes, patronising in his tone, appears unwilling to accept the argument of the need for a referendum (it was included in all three party’s manifestos in 2010 so there’s no need).  This shows contempt for the people, perhaps of reflection of the loss of AV, and is eminently anti-democratic.  Yet again we appear to be in the grip of a political elite that knows what’s right for the people and that’s that. 

Without consensus, there is little chance of the bill passing the Commons without substantial time being expended and then the prospect of having to use of Parliament Act to force it through the Lords.  Now you may argue that there are other priorities than constitutional reform and waiting a few more years is a drop in the ocean given that the process of reform is already over a century old.  It is difficult to know how the issue will progress.  The current bill will encounter widespread opposition and is unlikely to pass the Commons, however long it is debated, in its current form and however poor the bill is now a mangled act will be even worse.  The only way forward is through consensus.  Many of those who opposed the programme motion and the bill did so because of the nature of the bill, the refusal to allow a referendum and the bill’s lamentable lack of clarity not because they opposed House of Lords reform per se.  Unless the government and opposition can agree on a bill including a referendum, then the saga of House of Lords reform could be with us for several more decades.

If Columbus had been a Liberal Democrat, he’d have discovered the mid-Atlantic!

One of the unenviable features of Liberalism has always been its sense of moral righteousness.  It’s the view that we’re right and, even if you don’t realise it, what we’re doing is for your benefit and if that means acting anti-democratically that’s fine…a modern version of Rousseau’s ‘being forced to be free’.  This has been evident in the proposed bill on House of Lords reform and in the lamentably weak speech Nick Clegg, an increasingly bankrupt political leader if ever there was one, yesterday proposing the legislation.  For a committed democrat to turn round and argue that, because all the parties agree about the need for reform, there’s no need for a referendum on a major issue of constitutional reform, is evidence of just how bankrupt he is.  Yes the parties do agree about the need for reform but they don’t agree about what that reform should be. His defence of no-referendum was so weak as to be laughable but then he’s already lost the AV referendum and would probably lose one on the House of Lords so why bother!!!  Well, precisely because he did lose.  The people may not always be right when it comes to referendums but that does not mean they shouldn’t be asked.

This matters because the proposed bill is a bad piece of legislation and should be opposed.  It is poorly drafted, imprecise, ambiguous and creates more problems than it resolves.  It replaces the patronage of the Prime Minister with the patronage of party, fails to define the relationship between Commons and Lords, seeks to introduce a system of PR based on the list system (one of the least democratic versions of PR: you vote for the party and we choose who sits) and is a recipe for constitutional conflict.  It also could well be a very expensive reform, something unwelcome in a period of austerity and for that reason alone logic should have dictated a delay until the economic crisis is resolved.  Constitutional reform, whatever its justification, is a luxury when there are more pressing issues.

 

The parliamentary supremacy of the House of Commons has, since the Parliament Act of 1911, been based on the fact that the Commons is democratically elected while the Lords consisted of hereditaries and latterly appointees who have no democratic mandate.  The proposed reform will establish elected members in both houses with equally democratic mandates.  In fact, you could argue that the Lords elected under a proportional system have a greater claim to represent the people than the Commons only elected under first-past-the-post.  So why should an elected Lords accept the supremacy of an elected Commons?  In additional, though elected through party patronage, because they cannot be re-elected after their 15 year terms, why should the Lords subject themselves to party discipline?  In fact, they could well be even more independent than the existing members (a good thing) but this would undoubtedly create constitutional conflict between the two houses both of which could claim a democratic mandate for their actions.  Prime ministerial patronage will still exist as PMs can appoint ministers to the Lords who would then remain for 15 years even after they lost their ministerial portfolios.  So a bloated Lords with its increasing membership of party hacks! 

The problem with the proposed reform is that it fails to reform the relationship between the two houses.  The Commons can no longer use the democratic mandate argument to justify forcing legislation through the Lords but this appears not to have figured in the thinking behind the legislation.  Yes constitutional crisis may well result on the development of constitutional conventions governing the relationship between the two houses as in the past, but the function of previous constitutional reform has been to enable either the government to act or the people to be represented.  This bill does neither and consequently fails what should always be the basis of constitutional change….clarity.

Sleepwalking to disaster

In the blurb for Christopher Clark’s forthcoming book, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914, (Allen Lane), he suggests

‘Europe was racked by chronic problems: a multipolar, fractured, multicultural world of clashing ideals, terrorism, militancy and instability, which was, fatefully, saddled with a conspicuously ineffectual set of political leaders. He shows how the rulers of Europe, who prided themselves on their modernity and rationalism, behaved like sleepwalkers, stumbling through crisis after crisis…’

Now doesn’t that sound familiar!

Too much communication?

Two dicta of modern politics that have always struck me as pertinent are: ‘the art of the possible’ and ‘ a week is a long time in politics’, ascribed respectively to R. A. B. Butler and Harold Wilson.  If a week was a long time in politics in the 1960s, today in the age of 24/7 media and social networking it is an eternity with the consequence that politics has become increasingly reactive in character.  This means that communication and spin  and the need to always respond has circumvented the development and implementation of considered political judgements.  We all know the dictum ‘decide in haste, repent at leisure’ and this has increasingly become the unintended mantra of many politicians.  The wrong word, the bad interview like Chloe Smith’s with a remarkable sarcastic and arrogant Paxman (even by his often lamentable standards) last week , the unintended, unscripted and unconsidered tantrum (yes I thought the microphone was off!) will all return to bite politicians in their collective backsides.  But the result of all this media attention, especially the reactions of the ‘Westminster village’, is that increasing politics is not the art of the possible but simply the art of getting through the day without media disasters.  Politicians end up speaking to other politicians and to the media forgetting that the public beyond the hallowed halls actually want them to take a lead and make decisions that will benefit society at large.  This navel-gazing, introverted approach within a framework that is ostensibly extrovert is very damaging to people’s perceptions of politics and politicians.

Who knows best in a democracy?

Today, David Cameron said he would consider a referendum on the UK’s EU relationship, when the time was right.  But who decides ‘when the time is right’?  This question has bedevilled the debate (if that is what you can call it) in Britain since the 1980s over the EU.  Party leaders from Blair to Cameron have all, at one point or another and for different reasons, said that they thought a referendum would/might be necessary at some point over relationships with the EU and then have wedeled their ways out of it.  The Lisbon Treaty was not about fundamental constitutional change, so no referendum is necessary, for instance.  Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury Rachel Reeves refused to rule out ‘the possibility’ of her party holding a referendum once the future shape of Europe became clearer, but she said Mr Cameron's position on Europe was ‘a shambles’.  She may be right but then the position of party leaders on Europe has for several decades been a shambles; Cameron is simply one of several leaders who have held out the possibility of a referendum when the time was right.  It is not just cynics like me who suggest that ‘when the time is right’ really means ‘when I can win’. 

As politics appears, in the wake of successive banking and tax avoidance scandals and the bankruptcy of the notion that ‘we’re all in this together’, to be lurching towards a moral imperative, it is important to ask whether this is simply a political ploy to assuage public anger or whether there are moral standards that should be expected even in the essentially amoral world of politics.  There has been a seismic shift in away from a deferential acceptance of the merits of representative democracy towards one in which democracy is increasingly seen as something in which people should actively participate.  This poses a real dilemma for political elites in Britain and the EU.  Should they not act on the admitted short-termism of public opinion and plough on with their elitist pretensions of knowing ‘when the time is right’ or should they embrace it and revitalise what increasingly looks like a tired democracy and give it a fresh legitimacy in which political decisions are not simply what is possible politically but what is morally right?   It is true I think that the moral purpose of democracy has been ignored or mislaid in recent decades by the enormities that governments face and where elitist decision-making has downgraded the institutional basis of democracy.  It is easier for political elites to make decisions (and it is sometimes necessary that they should do this) not taking publically-expressed opinion into account and justifying this by saying that this is what they were elected to do.  But this is increasing regarded as a thread-bare explanation for political decision-making and one that the public recognise as such.  One reason for falling participation in elections, at whatever level, is the view that it doesn’t matter which politicians you elect, you get the same old thing.  Politics has become a process for doing things political elites decide are necessary rather than the expression of deeply held beliefs and moral standards.  It has been ‘de-ideologised’. 

The British political system has been grounded in representative principles for centuries: we elect people to represent us but they are not our delegates mandated to do as we wish but to represent our views and then make decisions based on their own consciences or party dictats.  When there were fundamental ideological differences between political parties, this proved a vibrant democratic structure but those fundamental ideological differences are today less clear as all political parties have moved to the middle ground.  Ideological differences and the political policies that stem from these differences are increasingly a matter of degree, subtle rather than stark, a case of angels on a pin-head.  We have a democracy in which politicians shade into each other, frequently agree that something needs to be done but only disagree about the details not the principles: for instance, austerity or slower austerity.  It is the vision that is lacking, the overarching belief that politics is about producing a better world rather than just tinkering about at the edges.  In that respect, the political elites are no longer in touch with the aspirations of their peoples and in that respect, ‘possibility’ and ‘when the time is right’ represent a bankrupt mantra of an increasingly bankrupt democracy.  Whether you agreed with them or not, politicians such as Margaret Thatcher, Michael Foot, Nye Bevan, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill took a principled moral as well as political stand on issues in which they believed, something that is sadly lacking in many politicians today for whom self-aggrandisement seems to be their sole motivation.  If representative democracy is to survive in Britain, it needs political leaders with principles that people will follow, not out of deference, but out of conviction.