The comté of Deux-Montagnes was created in 1830 with the division of the comté d’York into three parts: Ottawa, Vaudreuil and Deux-Montagnes. Deux-Montagnes is bordered in the east by the comté de Terrebonne, to the south by the Rivière des Outaouais and the Lac des Deux-Montagnes, to the west by the parishes of Saint-Benoît, Sainte-Scholastique and Saint-Colomban and finally to the north by the boundaries of the township of Gore. It included the parishes of Saint-Benoît, Sainte-Scholastique, Saint-Colomban, Saint-Augustin, Saint-Eustache, the mission of the Lac des Deux-Montagnes, part of the parish of Saint-Jérôme and also part of the Township de Morin.[1] The comté was made up of three main seigneuries: seigneurie du Lac des Deux-Montagnes[2], seigneurie de la Rivière-du-Chêne[3], seigneurie de Blainville et d’Argenteuil[4] and also the cantons de Gore, Chatham and Glengarry.[5]
In the seigneuries, settlement initially took place slowly. After 1755, settlement accelerated and was concentrated especially on the mouths of the various rivers. By 1830, the seigneuries of Blainville and Rivière-du-Chêne had reached their full capacity. New arrivals were therefore directed towards the seigneurie of the Lac des Deux-Montagnes. The Sulpiciens, who had begun the process of colonisation in the Deux-Montagnes, had land at Oka for an Amerindian mission. [6] Between 1779 and 1790, population began to settle on both side of the rivière au Prince and the rivière du Chêne and from Saint-Jean to Saint-Benoît because of the fertility of the soil. There was also a concentration of population from Saint-Étienne and Saint-Vincent to Saint-Placide and Saint-Joseph to Saint-Joseph-du-Lac.
The Lac des Deux-Montagnes, the Grande and petite rivière-du-Chêne, the rivière du Nord, the rivière au Prince, the Belle rivière and the rivière Saint-Jean provided water for irrigation and flooding replenished the fertile soil that allowed the cultivation of different kinds of grain and other agricultural products. [7] The most important economic activity was the growing of wheat that made up about eighty% of all production. The comté was particularly affected by the agricultural crisis of 1830. Obsolete farming techniques, scarcity of land and the rapid increase in population all helped increase the difficulties of the farmers. [8] Gradually, wheat production was replaced by oats and potatoes. Exploiting the resources in the forests was second in importance in the comté. According the Bouchette, the main trees present in the comté were ash, maple, beech, oak and birch. Logging sites were found on the edges of the rivière du Nord providing work in the winter months. This explains the presence of five saw-mills in the seigneurie de la rivière-du-Chêne and six in Blainville that served regional demand. [9]
The comté de Deux-Montagnes was the most effected area on the north bank of the St Lawrence in 1837. The comté contained anglophobes and francophobes in more equal numbers than in Acadie and there were 435 loyalists who were active in combating 213 Patriotes. In Saint-Eustache and Saint-Scholastique, there were families who had contempt for those of French origin and members of the Protestant Orange Order lived in Saint-Hermas and Saint-Scholastique. There were also American loyalists in Saint-André, Carillon and in the cantons of Gore, Chatham and Glengarry.[10] This distribution of loyalists was the result of the division of comtés carried out by the colonial government in the late 1820s and early 1830s to strengthen the anglophone position. The seigneurie du Lac des Deux-Montagnes, seigneurie de la Rivière-du-Chêne and the seigneurie d’Argenteuil as well as the cantons of Gore and Chatham were settled by immigrants of British origin. It is not surprising political tensions emerged between loyalists and Patriotes in the Deux-Montagnes in the late 1820s.
The division of British and French Canadians in the Deux-Montagnes was slow to develop and, as in the Richelieu was never complete. In June 1827, the residents of the comté de Deux-Montagnes held an assembly at Saint-Eustache. The purpose of this assembly was to express their attachment to the British Crown but in a text of seventeen resolutions, the residents including William H. Scott[11], Jacques Labrie[12] who, until his death in 1831 was the leading French Canadian reformer in the region, Jean-Joseph Girouard [13] and Jean-Baptiste Dumouchel[14] denounced the attacks on the French Canadian deputies. It was this assembly that established the first comité de correspondance. The committee was not radical in its attitudes but Nicolas-Eustache Dumont, a co-seigneur of Mille-Îles denounced its members to Lord Dalhousie. In July, several militia officers including Scott and Dumouchel were dismissed for having taken part in Parti Patriote meetings during the election campaign that year and as a protest Girouard resigned his commission as a militia captain in January 1828. On 10 July, the loyalists (Globensky, Dumont, de Bellefeuille and Dorion) held an assembly to protest about the Patriote assembly and respond to its resolutions. This marked the creation of two groups who confronted each other in the Deux-Montagnes in the succeeding decade.
In 1832, an assembly was held to protest against the abuse and favouritism in the granting of land establishing a committee of 34 members to protect French Canadian interests. In the 1834 general election, Girouard and Scott stood as candidates for the Parti Patriote against Brown and Globensky. The main areas of debate in the election were the question of subsidies and custom duties. The election was fought with some violence but despite attempts to intimidate French Canadian voters by Scots and Irish Orangemen from the neighbouring townships,[15] Scott and Girouard held the Deux-Montagnes for the Patriotes. [16] However, the election reinforced the ‘hatred that had already developed in the comté against the British officials.’[17] In the aftermath of Gosford’s proclamation banning assemblies in 1837, the Patriotes in the Deux-Montagnes decided to attack the properties of officials and the British loyalists in the area: ‘À bas les résolutions Russell, à bas la proclamation!’ [18]
Opposition to colonial government grew especially over favouritism in granting administrative posts and land and the arbitrary decisions of the Executive Council. The Patriote assembly at Saint-Benoît in 1836 decided to boycott the purchase of British manufactures as a way of putting economic and financial pressure on the government. Reaction to Russell’s Ten Resolution was especially strong in the Deux-Montagnes strengthening support for the Patriote movement. Saint-Eustache (Jean-Olivier Chénier and William Henry Scott) and Saint-Benoît (Jean-Joseph Girouard) were now the major centres of Patriote resistance. Papineau visited Saint-Eustache and Saint-Benôit before moving on to the meeting at Saint-Scholastique on 1 June[19] arranged by Scott and Girouard. Girouard was a thinker rather than a man of action and although Scott had used violent rhetoric against the authorities, he was also firmly against the use of force. There were growing political divisions between inhabitants punctuated by charivaris against loyal French Canadians and British settlers. The Comité permanent des Deux-Montagnes, which had become particularly effective after the meetings in June, began organising volunteer companies of militia under the command of elected officers. In early October, Patriotes in the Deux-Montagnes began to elect magistrates [20] to replace those appointed by the government, an initiative praised at the St-Charles meeting. [21] Yet, their major weakness was the proximity of troops stationed at Carillon and St Andrews and the Highland Scot settlements in Glengarry, very different to the Richelieu valley where Patriotes were stronger and less threatened by Loyalist volunteers or regular troops.
Patriote military mobilisation began in early October 1837 but made little progress largely because Scott and Girouard were hesitant to take command. Both men now found themselves caught up in the growing militancy of Patriote leaders, Jean-Olivier Chénier [22] and Luc-Hyacinthe Masson.[23] Scott attempted, with the support of Jacques Paquin, Saint-Eustache’s parish priest, to moderate the actions of the more militant and on 12 November hurried to Montreal to urge Papineau to restrain the protest but without success. Perhaps it was a justifiable fear that Scott and Girouard might waver that led Montreal Patriote leaders to go to help with military preparations in the Deux-Montagnes. Francois-Marie-Thomas, Chevalier De Lorimier, [24] joint corresponding secretary of the Comité central et permanent de Montréal arrived at Saint-Eustache on 15 November and Amury Girod, who said he had fought in South America the following day and immediately took the lead in military preparation. Girod had been at the assembly at Saint-Charles and following a meeting with Papineau, O’Callaghan and Nelson offered to go to the north to help organise armed resistance. [25] Chénier called a meeting on 18 November to decide what to do if warrants were brought to Saint-Eustache for the arrest of the Patriote leaders. Scott believed that they should protect themselves and was immediately elected lieutenant-colonel of the Patriote forces; Chénier was named a major with seven captains including De Lorimier. This was followed by a council of war that decided, after lengthy debate, not to destroy the bridge at Saint-Rose to delay the approach of regular troops as Girod argued. Girod was further angered by Scott’s ambivalence to armed action: the Patriotes did not have the arms or ammunition and delaying tactics should be used. Girod failed to persuade Scott of the need for immediate action and Scott persuaded Chénier to support him. The result, Girod wrote, was ‘deadly inactivity’. [26]
By late November, Girod had moved his headquarters from Saint-Eustache, which he saw a largely loyalist community, to the more conducive Saint-Benôit. Here he not only found Girouard but Etienne Chartier, [27] the local priest and a militant Patriote who was ready to gird his sword and preach direct action if not take part in it. Chartier raged against the colonial regime in his sermons unlike other priests in the Deux-Montagnes who condemned the rebellion and eagerly defended obedience to the civil authority. [28] At meeting at Saint-Benôit on 23 November, Girod was elected as General of the Army of the North and Chénier lieutenant-colonel to replace Scott who had temporarily left Saint-Eustache for Saint-Thérèse. Girouard remained in Saint-Benôit with a reward of £500 on his head and was regarded by the authorities as the Patriote leader in the Deux-Montagnes. The attack against Saint-Benôit was expected to come from the loyalist Carillon-St Andrews area and Patriotes barricaded the roads leading to the north-west of the village.
News of the Patriote victory at Saint-Denis arrived on Friday 24 November with an urgent message from Robert Nelson for the Army of the North to attack Montreal while its garrison was occupied in the Richelieu. Girod urged the local chiefs to storm the city the next day but was rebuffed by Girouard, Chénier and Chartier who decided to remain on the defensive. Instead of storming Montreal, the Army of the North moved from Saint-Benôit on 29 November and established its main armed camp at Saint-Eustache hoping to anticipate Colborne’s next move. Just how important this decision was to the eventual outcome of the rebellion is difficult to estimate. Girod was right that the opportunity of attacking Montreal while its garrison was absent was lost. Had Montreal fallen, it would have brought the Patriotes further support and given Papineau leverage in any future negotiations with Gosford and Colborne. However, movement of Patriotes south towards Montreal would have left the Deux-Montagnes exposed to attacks by loyalists, and in that context, the decision was understandable.
The major problem facing Girod was the lack of arms, ammunition and ordnance. Some was obtained from Scott and commandeered from loyalist stores. Girod had been told by Scott that there were four cannons, 150 stands of arms and 60 barrels of powder in the Iroquois village of Kanesatake (Oka). [29] He left Saint-Benôit with 240 men at night on 30 November, arrived at the village the following day and was joined by Chénier with 100 men from Saint-Eustache. On their arrival, they pillaged a Hudson’s Bay Company storehouse and took eight muskets, three barrels of musket balls and one cannon and also plundered stores belonging to the priest securing a barrel of pork and ammunition. In Kanesatake, Girod obtained permission to speak with an Iroquois chief. The unnamed chief expressed his wish to remain neutral and refused to lend or sell his guns and cannons to the Patriotes concluding by stating:
Brother, I will not interfere in this dispute between you and Your Father, defend your rights, and when I hear the thunder of your arms, I will consider in my breast whether I am not obliged to assist you.[30]
François Bertrand, a habitant from Côte Saint-Joseph who acted as Girod’s interpreter provided a different version of events. [31] According to Bertrand, the chief reminded Girod that he was satisfied with his British father although the recent quantity of presents had been disappointing. In addition, Girod made a relatively empty promise that he would give more territory to the Indians if they actively joined the rebels. The Kanesateke chiefs may have rebuffed Girod but the following day gave their cannon to the St. Andrew’s Loyalist Volunteers.
The raid on Oka and the armed camp at Saint-Eustache, especially the military use made of the convent confirmed Scott’s opposition to the rebellion. Scott was caught between the actions of militant Patriotes that he found increasingly unacceptable and the government. Gosford put a price on his head on 1 December but the Patriotes also threatened him with proceedings for treason. [32] Despite this, Scott refused to assume the military leadership of the village. On 3 December, he sought to disperse the armed men in Saint-Eustache and spoke with such authority that by the evening the camp was deserted. Yet, this was a short-lived victory and Chénier soon regained the initiative sending messengers to neighbouring Patriote centres urging them to reinforce Saint-Eustache although when Girod reached the village from Saint-Benôit on the evening of 5 December there were only 28 men in the camp. The following day, Patriote volunteers arrived from the north: 114 from Saint-Joachim soon followed by 150-200 from neighbouring villages. However, in early December, the number in the camp fluctuated between 700 and 1,500 men.
The problems at Saint-Eustache were only part of the difficulties facing Girod. There were growing tensions at St-Benôit between Girouard and Chartier. Girouard was having reservations about armed resistance and Chartier accused him of cowardice, and there were also rumours that other leaders were prepared to negotiate with the government to secure their property and lives. The Patriote leaders at Saint-Anne-des-Plaines admitted that proclamations of Montreal magistrates and an increase in troops in Saint-Martin saw support for rebellion dwindle. Three days earlier, they had offered Girod a thousand men, now they said their men could not be relied on. Girod also faced a problem of disorder within Patriote ranks that he could not control. There had been problems at Oka and in Saint-Eustache loyalist homes were now looted. He did finally succeed in having the Porteous Bridge near Saint-Rose demolished to stop the approach of regular troops but at a price. It led to confrontation between forty armed men from Saint-Rose and a small force Girod had sent to the village to recruit for the camp and Girod’s men had little choice but to retire. Girod was planning to attack the regular troops at Saint-Martin completely unaware of Colborne’s preparations in Montreal suggesting a major gap in the Patriote intelligence system.
In early December, Colborne had been concerned by Patriote activities on the United States border and had these raids continued his attack on the north might have been delayed. Notwithstanding, the actions of the Missisquoi Volunteers at Moore’s Corner ended any immediate prospect of further raids. By 7 December, the Richelieu valley had subdued and partially disarmed and had been reinforced with troops from Quebec. Colborne had already garrisoned Saint-Martin on 4 December to prevent rebels destroying the Lachapelle Bridge over the Rivière des Prairies and four days later a detachment of the Royal Montreal Cavalry was also sent to reconnoitre the Deux-Montagnes to ascertain Patriote and Loyalist strength and disposition before advancing with his main force. Colborne was also concerned that bad weather would delay troops in the south and that this would prevent them joining the expedition to the north but the weather was unusually mild until mid-December.
On 13 December, Colborne left Montreal with his main army of 1,280 regulars and 220 volunteers for Saint-Eustache and Saint-Benôit leaving four companies of the 24th Regiment and large numbers of Montreal Volunteers to protect the city. Unlike in the Richelieu, there were important centres of loyalist support close to the Deux-Montagnes and north of Lacute Orangemen and to the south the Highland Scots of Glengarry were keen to march. Moreover, at Carillon, the meeting place of the Ottawa and the Lac des Deux-Montagnes, there was a detachment of regular troops under Major Townshend originally part of the force brought down from Upper Canada. The operations against Saint-Eustache were to be undertaken by two brigades commanded by Colonel John Maitland and George Wetherall, supported by the Royal Montreal Cavalry, the Montreal Rifles and the largely French Canadian Saint-Eustache Loyal Volunteers commanded by Captain Maximilien Globensky. His brigades followed separate routes for the twelve miles to Saint-Martin avoiding the direct road to Saint-Eustache that the rebels expected them to take. On 14 December, the army crossed the Rivière-des-Mille-Îles about six miles east of the village while Globensky took a more direct route arriving opposite Saint-Eustache at 11.15 am. [33]
Girod concluded that Globensky was leading a small advance force and sent Chénier with 300 men across the ice to intercept them. While they were crossing the ice, Colborne arrived on the north bank of the river to within a mile of the village and immediately ordered his artillery to sweep the Patriotes with grapeshot. This threw Chénier’s detachment into confusion and they quickly retreated towards the church. There were around 900 men in the village that morning, around half with muskets but as Colborne’s force came closer, Chénier and Girod were dismayed to see 500 of their force withdraw, many of them carrying arms. The two leaders tried to restore order but only persuaded 200 to 250 men to take up defensive positions in the convent, church, manor house as well as positioning small squads in Scott’s house on the main street near the church and in other nearby houses. It was soon clear to that Colborne intended to encircle the village: Maitland’s brigade was already marching to the rear of the village while Wetherall’s troops were beginning to cover the north-eastern area. The Patriote leaders concluded that resistance was futile and one by one galloped away to Saint-Benôit. Girod tried to halt the rout at the rear of the village but then decided to ride to Saint-Benôit for reinforcements. His reception from Girouard and the other leaders in Saint-Benôit was not surprising; they accused him of deserting his men and of being a coward. It was too much for Girod who grabbed a carriage and made off on the northern road towards Saint-Thérèse, something he could have done earlier had his intention been simply to flee. The end came on 17 December when, under imminent threat of arrest, Girod blew his brains out at Rivière des Prairies.
By noon, troop manoeuvres had been completed and the rebels were surrounded. Only Chénier and a hard core of determined fighters remained; their position desperate but they refused to parley. Colborne ordered his artillery to fire on the Patriote stronghold but with little effect. He then moved infantry forward to clear Scott’s house and the other fortified houses on the main street. This allowed the Royal Artillery to move one of its howitzers into the main street to face the church in an attempt to batter down its doors. At the same time, a second battery opened up from the fields about three hundred yards north-east of the church but after an hour of little had been achieved. Yet, a small detachment of the Royals sent to reconnoitre the church managed to set fire to the presbytery and the ensuing smokescreen gave the opportunity for frontal attack. Chénier and his men were stationed in the gallery of the church and tried to get clear of the burning church through the windows. There was little sympathy for the Patriotes: it was only six days since many of the troops had attended Lieutenant George Weir’s military funeral in Montreal. The fifty-eight who had followed Chénier were killed almost to a man. Father Paquin witnessed the last moments of the battle
Realising that all hope was lost, Dr. Chénier saw that he could no longer defend himself from inside the church, for it had completely succumbed to the flames. He gathered up several of his men and jumped out of the windows with them, on the convent side. He was trying to escape, but he could not get out of the cemetery, and was soon struck by a bullet and collapsed. He died almost immediately.[34]
He stated that:
Dr Chénier’s body was found around 6 o’clock...the doctors opened it up to determine the cause of death, but it is untrue that his heart was torn out and made an object of curiosity. [35]
Many of the rebels in the presbytery, convent and manor house had escaped before they were surrounded and the buildings fired but they fled across the ice straight into the muskets of Globensky’s Volunteers and the Royal Montreal Rifles. The assault on the church ended the four-hour battle.
By 4.30 pm, the armed camp at Saint-Eustache was in flames, 70 Patriotes lay dead, 15 wounded and 118 captured. The British and volunteer losses were negligible: one killed and eight wounded, of whom two later died. The wounded, both regulars and Patriotes, were taken to the Black Bull Tavern that had been converted into a temporary hospital. Army surgeons cared for all the wounded with equal care, reciprocating the treatment given by Patriote doctors at Saint-Denis. That night the lootings and burnings of Saint-Denis and Saint-Charles were repeated, but on a larger scale. The troops, especially from the 32nd were bent on avenging the death of Weir, and the volunteers had scores to settle with the Patriotes. Chénier’s and Scott’s homes were burnt by command but later that night some 60 other houses and barns were destroyed. Although later accounts of the battle attribute the burning and looting to volunteers, whose own houses had been looted in previous weeks, the military authorities were not averse to an exemplary display of severity to warn other Patriotes in the area that rebellion came at a price.
In the days that followed, soldiers and volunteers terrorised the area. Colborne did not know how many rebels were in the Deux-Montagnes or how well they were prepared for resistance. Loyalists in Saint-Eustache were convinced that Saint-Benôit was well fortified and that the camp contained several thousand men. That was not the case. Girouard and Girod had made no effort to establish a fortified armed camp other than some barricades on the roads leading out of the village. Girouard’s main concern was not an attack from Saint-Martin but from the loyalist communities at Carillon and St-Andrews and when he heard of the debacle at Saint-Eustache he advised habitants to hide their arms and stay quietly at home. He then escaped to Coteau-du-Lac where he surrendered to his friend Lieutenant-Colonel John Simpson a few days later. The other Patriotes leaders in Saint- Benôit also fled but they too were soon apprehended. The Montreal leaders who had fled to Saint-Benôit, including De Lorimier and curé Etienne Chartier successfully made their way to the United States.
Colborne did not know this when he left at the head of his two brigades on the morning of 15 December. He had not gone very far when he was met by fourteen men carrying a white flag who offered to surrender to him on behalf of the habitants of Saint-Benôit, Saint-Hermas and Saint-Scholastique. Colborne agreed on condition that the habitants should give up their arms. Colborne’s troops advanced on the village arriving at roughly the same time as Major Townshend with his troops and volunteers from the Carillon-St Andrews area. The following day, Colborne ordered that the houses of the three main leaders in the village should be burned but 89 other building including the church were torched largely by volunteers. Colborne’s use of volunteer troops was a deliberate calculation since they struck fear into the rebels and being local remained in the area after the regular troops had gone.
Colborne left Saint-Benôit to return to Montreal in the morning of 16 December arriving later that afternoon. Before he left, he ordered Colonel Maitland and his troops to tour the neighbouring villages to disarm habitants. Maitland arrived in Saint-Scholastique around one o’clock having burned two leaders’ houses in Saint-Joachim. Some 300 inhabitants surrendered 50 stands of arms and Maitland left the village around eight o’clock on 17 December after burning three or four houses belonging to Patriote leaders reaching Saint-Thérèse early in the afternoon. The troops remained in the north until 19 December disarming habitants and assisting the Montreal magistrates who had been sent to receive the oath of allegiance from the inhabitants of the district. The Deux-Montagnes was severely punished during the Rebellion. During the battle of Saint-Eustache on 14 December 1837, the church was burned and the following day Saint-Benoît was ransacked and many houses destroyed despite having surrendered. After the Rebellion, the comté saw a decline in its population as many young settlers moved to the United States or Montreal while those who remained practised subsistence farming. [36]
[1] Ibid, Courville, Serge, dir., Paroisse et municipalité de la région de Montréal au XIXe siècle (1825-1861), Répertoire documentaire et cartographique, p. 55. See also, ibid, Laporte, Gilles, Patriotes et Loyaux, pp. 257-290.
[2] Ibid, Bouchette, Joseph, Description topographique du Canada 1815, pp. 102-104.
[3] Ibid, Bouchette, Joseph, Description topographique du Canada 1815, p. 487.
[4] Ibid, Bouchette, Joseph, Description topographique du Canada 1815, p. 107.
[5] The use of the term ‘canton’ in Canada is the French Canadian equivalent of the English word ‘township’.
[6] Ibid, Laurin, Serge, Les régions du Québec: Les Laurentides, p. 31.
[7] Ibid, Bouchette, Joseph, Description topographique du Canada 1815, p. 108.
[8] Ibid, Giroux, André and Chapdelaine, Claude, Histoire du territoire de la municipalité régionale de comté de Deux-Montagnes, p. 19.
[9] Ibid, Laurin, Serge, Les régions du Québec: Les Laurentides, p. 34.
[10] Ibid, Dubois, Abbé Émile, Le feu de la Rivière-du-Chêne, Étude historique sur le mouvement insurrectionnel de 1837 au nord de Montréal, p. 50
[11] Ibid, Globensky, Maximilien, La Rébellion de 1837 à Saint-Eustache, 1883, pp. 224-225, provided a brief, slanted biography. ‘William Henry Scott’, DCB, Vol. 8, 1851-1860, pp. 791-792, is more balanced.
[12] ‘Jacques Labrie’, DCB, Vol. 6, pp. 381-382. See, Lemire, Jonathan, (ed.), Jacques Labrie: Écrits et correspondances, (Septentrion), 2009.
[13] ‘Jean-Joseph Girouard’, DCB, Vol. 8, 1851-1860, 1985, pp. 330-334, provides a good biographical study; see also, Messier, pp. 213-214.
[14] ‘Jean-Baptiste Dumouchel’, DCB, Vol. 7, pp. 258-259.
[15] Lemire, Maurice, ‘Les Irlandais et la rébellion de 1837-1838’, British Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 10, (1995), pp. 1-9.
[16] [J.-J. Girouard] Relation historique des événements de l’élection du comté du lac des Deux Montagnes en 1834; épisode propre à faire connaître l’esprit public dans le Bas-Canada, Montreal, 1835; reprinted, Quebec, 1968, give a decidedly Patriote view of this event.
[17] Ibid, Dubois, Abbé Émile, Le feu de la Rivière-du-Chêne, Étude historique sur le mouvement insurrectionnel de 1837 au nord de Montréal, p. 66.
[18] Ibid, Dubois, Abbé Émile, Le feu de la Rivière-du-Chêne, Étude historique sur le mouvement insurrectionnel de 1837 au nord de Montréal, p. 79.
[19] Ibid, Bernard, Jean-Paul, Assemblées publiques, résolutions et déclarations de 1837-1838, pp. 47-56.
[20] Ibid, Dubois, Émile, Le feu de la Rivière-du-Chêne, pp. 101-106, considers the issue. La Minerve, 20 October 1837, lists a total of 22 magistrates elected for St-Eustache, St-Herman, St-Benôit and Ste-Scholastique. See also Boileau, Gilles, (ed.), 1837 et les patriotes de Deux-Montagnes: les voix de la mémoire, (Éditions du Méridien), 1999. See also, ibid, Bernard, Jean-Paul, Assemblées publiques, résolutions et déclarations de 1837-1838, pp. 207-213.
[21] Laurin, Clément, ‘Administration parallèle du comté de Deux-Montagnes par les Patriotes, en 1837’, Cahiers d’histoire de Deux-Montagnes, Vol. 5, (2), (1982), pp. 25-28.
[22] Prévost, Robert, Chénier, l’opiniâtre, Montreal, 1940 is a short biography but see also Globensky, Maximilien, La Rébellion de 1837 à Saint-Eustache, pp. 220-224, passim. ‘Jean-Olivier Chénier’, DCB, Vol. 7, 1836-1850, pp. 171-174, is more recent. See also Laurin, Clément, ‘Bibliographie de Jean-Olivier Chénier’, Cahiers d’histoire de Deux-Montagnes, Vol. 5, (2), (1982), pp. 58-66.
[23] Séguin, R. L., ‘Biographie d`un patriote de 1837: Dr. Luc Hyacinthe Masson (1811-1880)’, Revue d`histoire de l`Amérique française, Vol. 3, (1949), pp. 349-366, Désilets, Andreé, ‘Luc Hyacinthe Masson’, DCB, Vol. 10, 1871-1880, pp. 499-500 and Messier, p. 328.
[24] ‘Francois-Marie-Thomas, Chevalier de Lorimier’, DCB, Vol. 7, 1836-1850, pp. 512-516; Messier, pp. 308-309.
[25] Ibid, Bernard, Philippe, Amury Girod, pp. 157-164, considers the decision at Varennes.
[26] Ibid, pp.179-213, explores Girod’s role in the Deux-Montagnes.
[27] Audet, F. J., ‘L’abbé Étienne Chartier’, Les Cahiers des Dix, Vol. 6, (1941), pp. 211-223, is a useful biography; see also Messier, pp. 105-106.
[28] On this issue, see Chabot, Richard, ‘Le Rôle du bas clergé face au mouvement insurrectionnel de 1837’, Cahiers de Sainte-Marie, Vol. 5, (1967), pp. 89-98. Ibid, Amury Girod, p. 181, details the attitude of clergy in the Deux-Montagnes.
[29] Sossoyan, Mathieu, The Iroquois and the Lower-Canadian Rebellions, 1837-1838, McGill University Press, 1999, considers this issue in detail.
[30] His diary for the period 15 November-8 December 1837 has been published as ‘Journal kept by the late Amury Girod, translated from the German and the Italian’, Report of the Public Archives, Ottawa, 1923, pp. 370-80, see pp. 377-378 for the Oka raid.
[31] Voluntary examination of François Bertrand, Archives Nationales du Quebec ‘Documents relatifs aux événements de 1837-1838’, No. 736, cit, Aubin, Georges and Martin-Verenka, Nicole, Insurrection: Examens voluntaire, (Lux), 2004, pp. 24-25
[32] Scott had little choice but to flee but on 19 December, he was captured and imprisoned in Montreal, charged with treason and released only on 10 July 1838.
[33] Journal historique des événements arrivés à Saint-Eustache, pendant la rébellion du comté du lac des Deux-Montagnes depuis les soulèvements…, Montréal, John Jones, 1838, cit, Globensky, Maximilien, La Rébellion de 1837 à Saint-Eustache, pp. 41-80. Walter, Johnson, Pastor Ivictus: or, Rebellion in St. Eustache, (Quality Press Ltd.), 1931, is a later idiosyncratic history. Paiement, Raymond, La bataille de St-Eustache, (Editions Saint-Martin), 1975, is the most recent detailed account. Laurin, Clément, ‘Bibliographie de la bataille de Saint-Eustache’, Cahiers d’histoire de Deux-Montagnes, Vol. 5, (2), (1982), pp. 10-14.
[34] Ibid, Journal historique des événements arrivés à Saint-Eustache, pendant la rébellion du comté du lac des Deux-Montagnes depuis les soulèvements…, p. 64.
[35] There is some question whether the victorious British army treated Chénier’s body with respect: Dufebvre, Bernard, ‘Le coeur de Chénier’, La Revue de l'Université Laval, Vol. 6, (10), (1952), pp. 839-843, and Seguin,Robert-Lionel, ‘À propos du coeur de Chénier’, Revue de l’Université Laval, Vol. 7, (8), (1953), pp. 724-729. ‘Daniel Arnoldi’, DCB, Vol. 7, pp. 25-27, considers his role in the autopsy.
[36] Ibid, Giroux, André and Chapdelaine, Claude, Histoire du territoire de la municipalité régionale de comté de Deux-Montagnes, p. 21.
