Women get the vote: The political impact of war

Some historians have described Britain’s experience in the First World War as its first taste of ‘total war’ (war in which entire societies are mobilised against each other, with the home front becoming just as important as the fighting front). Around six million British people had direct experience of trench warfare while most of the remaining population became involved in the war effort in some way. This meant change and upheaval in some way. There is, however, a debate about the nature and extent of the change produced by the war. This centres on whether the war is seen as the cause of fundamental change or whether, alternatively, it can be seen as a catalyst that accelerated existing political, social and economic trends[1].

There is one particular problem historians face when trying to assess the significance of wartime experience for the women’s cause. This relates to one’s view of the stage reached by 1914 and is further complicated by the need to distinguish the direct from the indirect effects of the war. By 1913, there was a clear suffragist majority in parliament and this, combined with the emergence of a politically realistic proposal to enfranchise women in 1913, meant that the immediate effect of the war was negative. It ended the suffrage campaign and pushed the issue off the political agenda.

What was the political impact of the war?

The outbreak of war in August 1914 led to a wave of patriotism and anti-German feeling and all-party support for the Liberal government’s declaration of war. Until May 1915, Asquith attempted to conduct the war through existing structures of party government. Then, on 14^th May 1915, the so-called ‘Shell Scandal’ broke when an article was published in The Times claiming that British soldiers were unable to make headway because they were being left short of shells to fire at the enemy. This precipitated a political crisis that led to the creation of a coalition government under Asquith[2].

Conservatives took up senior positions in the government with Bonar Law as Colonial Secretary and Arthur Balfour as First Lord of the Admiralty (replacing Winston Churchill, whose handling of the Gallipoli campaign made him expendable). Lloyd George took over as head of the new Ministry of Munitions and his position was strengthened in July 1916 when he took over as Minister for War (following Lord Kitchener’s death on a mission on Russia).  Lloyd George was popular in the Liberal Party at large, but he had too many personal enemies in the Cabinet. This made it unlikely that he would every succeed Asquith as Liberal leader. The creation of the coalition government changed this and increasingly Lloyd George promoted himself as an alternative War leader. He focused on two issues – the need for conscription (compulsory military service) and the creation of a smaller War Cabinet that, he claimed, would be more efficient and effective. Both brought him into conflict with Asquith.

Conscription was a sensitive issue in the Liberal Party and Asquith tried to reconcile his party’s historical commitment to individual freedom with the demands of total war. His response to Lloyd George’s demand for full conscription was the ‘Derby Scheme’ of October 1915. This compromise allowed the adult male population to be classified by age, marital status and occupation as the first step on the road to conscription. This ended in failure. By December 1915, recruitment had fallen to 55,000 per month (compared in the 450,000 men who had joined in September 1914). Despite Asquith’s continued reluctance, conscription was introduced in January 1916 though John Simon, the Home Secretary resigned over the issue.  Lloyd George’s call for a small War Cabinet intensified when he succeeded Lord Kitchener at the War Office. This issue triggered the end of the Asquith coalition and Lloyd George’s promotion to the position of Prime Minister. On 1^st December 1916, Lloyd George suggested the formation of a small War Cabinet with himself in the chair and Bonar Law and Edward Carson as members. Asquith would remain prime minister but would not be a member. Asquith was, at first, hostile but agreed to the plan on 3^rd December once Conservative resignations had been threatened. Asquith then changed his mind and rejected the plan the following day following the publication of an article in The Times that discussed the plan in terms that put Asquith in a very bad light. This led to the resignation of first, Lloyd George, second, Conservative ministers and finally, on 5^th December, Asquith. The following day, a conference of party leaders at Buckingham Palace took place. The king offered the position of prime minister to Bonar Law who said that he would only accept if Asquith agreed to serve under him. Asquith refused to do this. It then emerged that Conservative ministers were prepared to serve under Lloyd George. On 7^th December 1916, the king reluctantly invited him to become prime minister. The other Liberal ministers resigned with Asquith. Lloyd George secured the support of the Conservative, Labour and about 100 Liberal MPs. The other Liberal MPs remained loyal to Asquith. The split within the Liberal Party was clearly drawn.

The war did not harm the long-term prospects of the Labour Party though initially it served to emphasise divisions within the party.  When the war broke out, Ramsay MacDonald resigned as chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. He was joined in opposition to the war by Philip Snowden and a small group of largely Independent Labour Party MPs. The majority of party members, however, supported the war and MacDonald and his supporters became a target of abuse from many trade unions and the popular press. MacDonald was replaced as chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party by Arthur Henderson. Henderson did not attempt to expel those Labour members who were against the war. This avoided the harmful split that severely damaged the Liberal Party.

The Labour Party managed to avoid the lasting splits that occurred in parallel socialist groups in France and Germany. First, those who opposed the war, for the most part did not campaign against it. Instead, they campaigned for measures to prevent future wars and almost all parties could agree with the ideas they suggested. Secondly, all members of the Labour Party were united in demanding that the economic welfare of the working class should be protected even during a national emergency. Both those opposed to the war and those supporting it worked together amicably on bodies like the Emergency Workers’ National Committee, created to press for adequate government protection for soldiers’ families, the restraint of food prices and rent control. Third, even those who supported the war effort were sometimes critical of the ways in which the government conducted it.  Though the Parliamentary Labour Party was represented in government in May 1915 and in the Cabinet after Lloyd George came to power in December 1916, it was never wholly at ease with the coalition. In August 1917, Arthur Henderson resigned from the Cabinet when Labour leaders were refused permission to attend an international socialist conference to discuss peace conditions. This gave Henderson and other leaders in the party the opportunity to encourage party unity to take advantage of Labour’s rising electoral prospects. There was a big growth in party membership during the war and the Representation of the People’s Act of February 1918 trebled the electorate.

The coalition formed by Lloyd George in December 1916 has been described by some historians as a turning point in modern British politics because it led to a four-year post-war experiment in non-party government. Others are more cynical in their views holding that the motive behind continued co-operation between Lloyd George Liberals and the Conservatives was to neutralise the growing threat from Labour. What really happened in the ‘Coupon Election’ of December 1918 was a decisive victory for the Conservatives, the full extent of which was disguised by Lloyd George continuing as prime minister.  From December 1916, Lloyd George organised the war effort through a small War Cabinet. Most historians accept that this arrangement increased the efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making. However, in May 1918, Lloyd George was criticised in the press by the recently retired Director of Military Operations, General Sir Frederick D. Maurice, for misleading the House of Commons about the number of troops in France. The result was a select committee into Lloyd George’s conduct. Ninety-eight Liberals voted against the prime minister and with Asquith. Two separate Liberal organisations now emerged, first at Westminster with their own whips and then in the constituencies. The Maurice debate showed just how dependent Lloyd George was on his Conservative supporters.

It was in the immediate aftermath of the Maurice debate and the growing threat of Communist revolution in Europe that Lloyd George discussed the possibility of co-operating after the war in a ‘Progressive Centre Alliance’. By October 1918, these discussions had formed the basis of the ‘coupon’ arrangement for the forthcoming general election. Lloyd George and Bonar Law approved Liberal and Conservative candidates. Candidates who gained their approval became ‘coalition’ candidates and received a ‘coupon’ signed by both leaders confirming this. Those ‘couponed’ would not be opposed by a Conservative or Lloyd George Liberal. While 150 Liberals were couponed, the number of Conservatives was 300.

The result of the Coupon Election was a triumph for the coalition. It took 473 seats, with Labour 57, Asquith Liberals 36, Irish Nationalists 7, Sinn Fein 73 and others 61[3]. There was some support for making the alliance between Lloyd George Liberals and Conservatives in 1920 but the attempt failed. The coalition finally collapsed in October 1922 when the Conservatives withdrew their support for Lloyd George. The Coupon Election proved not to be a mandate for any fundamental realignment of party politics, but for peace, reconstruction and reform[4].

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[1] There are several valuable books on the ways in which the war affected Britain. John Bourne Britain and the Great War 1914-18, Edward Arnold, 1989 and Stephen Constantine, Maurice W. Kirby and Mary B. Rose (eds.) The First World War in British History, Edward Arnold, 1995 provide an excellent introduction. Arthur Marwick The Deluge: British Society and the First World War, 2^nd ed., Macmillan, 1991 was the first study to really examine the impact of ‘total war’.

[2] John Turner British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict, 1915-1918, Yale University Press, 1992 is a classic study.

[3] None of the 73 Sinn Fein elected took up their seats in Westminster. The high number of ‘others’ included 50 Conservatives who were elected even though they did not have the ‘coupon’.

[4] K. O. Morgan Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition 1918-22, Oxford University Press, 1979 is the most detailed study available.

How did different social groups respond to women's suffrage?

British society was as divided over women’s suffrage as the major political parties.  Broadly, society fell into three categories. There were those who supported the call for women’s suffrage. There were those who opposed it. Finally, there was what has been called, ‘the silent majority’, those for whom women’s suffrage was not an issue often because it was not relevant to their needs.  However, women’s suffrage was a fluid issue on which people’s attitudes changed over time. The supporters and opponents of the campaign changed between 1865 and 1918. It is important to recognise this.

 

Social classes	Attitudes to women’s suffrage cut across social classes. They did not depend on class or, more precisely, were not necessarily determined by class. In very broad terms, within the three social classes, attitudes to women’s suffrage fell into one of three categories. There were those who were in favour of women’s suffrage and may have been active in the women’s movement. There were those who were opposed to women’s suffrage in relation to parliamentary elections (though not necessarily elections to local government) and who may have been active in the anti-suffragist activities. There was the ‘silent majority’. This included those for whom women’s suffrage was a largely irrelevant issue or who were undecided one way or the other. This position was especially important for the working classes, especially working class women whose lives were more concerned with economic than political issues. In many respects, the Fabian women with their focus on the economics of marriage were more relevant to their interests and needs than the suffrage movement. Brian Harrison provides evidence suggesting that there was a great deal of anti-suffragist feeling among the working class. The failure of George Lansbury to defeat an anti-suffragist Conservative candidate at the by-election in late 1912 in a largely working class constituency provides some support for this position. However, Jane Liddington and Ann Norris have shown that, in some parts of the country especially in the north-west, there is substantial evidence of pro-suffragist working class feeling.
Gender	The same point can be made about gender. There were female members of the Anti-Suffrage League and, conversely, male organisations were set up to campaign for women’s suffrage. Some supporters of women’s suffrage were totally opposed to the idea that initially only certain categories of women should be given the vote. They formed the Adult Suffrage Society and its chairperson was Margaret Bondfield. Members of the organisation believed that a limited franchise would disadvantage the working class and feared that it might act as a barrier against the granting of adult suffrage. Some women, especially members of the middle class, saw limited suffrage as an important step in the struggle to win the vote. The main supporters of the organisation were women trade unionists and members of the Independent Labour Party. Members of the Adult Suffrage Society included Margaret Macmillan, Mary Macarthur, Ottoline Morrell, Emily Hobhouse, Lucy Hammond, Leonard Hobhouse, Arthur Ponsonby and Fred Jowett. Although the majority of men opposed the idea of women voting in parliamentary elections, some leading male politicians supported universal suffrage. This included several leaders of the Labour Party, including James Keir Hardie, George Lansbury and Philip Snowdon. Frederick Pethick-Lawrence helped to fund Votes for Women and provided bail for nearly a thousand members of the WSPU who were arrested for breaking the law. Robert Cecil, one of the main figures in the Conservative Party was also a supporter but most Conservative MPs were opposed to the idea of votes for women. Several members of the Liberal administration, such as David Lloyd George, also favoured women being given the vote. The first male-only organisation, the Men’s Suffrage League for Women’s Suffrage was established in 1907 by two left-wing journalists, Henry Nevinson and Henry Brailsford and numbered among its members men from all shades of political opinion. Three years later, the Men’s Federation for Women’s Enfranchisement was established, adopting WSPU tactics. At a by-election in Wimbledon in 1907 Bertrand Russell, stood as the Suffragist candidate. As with class, reactions to the suffrage campaigns were not necessarily determined by gender.
Trade unions	Trade unions were, in general, hostile to women’s suffrage. This occurred because of ‘pride and fear’. This was the pride of men for whom the franchise was one element of their improved status that they could not easily share. There fear was the fear of the skilled worker. Women as unskilled labour, they believed, held down wages and inhibited union agreements in an overstocked labour market. Nevertheless, in 1913, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) followed the Labour Party and made its support for any government-supported Adult Suffrage Bill dependent on the inclusion of women. There were women trade unionists[1].  Women’s trade unions tended to have their most marked successes in recruiting in periods when male union activity was riding high. In 1832, 1500 women card-setters at Peep Green Yorkshire came out on strike for equal pay. The Lancashire cotton mill women were active in trade unions. In 1859, the North East Lancashire Amalgamated Society was formed for both men and women and in 1884 the Northern Counties Amalgamated Association of Weavers was established for male and female workers. However, the most significant development was the emergence of separate women’s unions. Thus, the Women’s Protective and Provident League (WPPL) was established in 1874 at a time when men’s unions were enjoying some success, both in membership terms and in establishing their legality. Similarly, it was in the brief period of ‘new unionism’ in the late 1880s and early 1890s when unskilled labour became politicised that the Women’s Industrial Council (WIC) and a score of women’s unions were established. The late nineteenth century saw considerable industrial action by women: the famous Bryant and May’s match-girls’ strike of 1888 but also the Dewsbury textile workers in 1875, the Aberdeen jute workers in 1884, Dundee jute workers in 1885 and Bristol confectionery workers. Women’s unions, under the inspiration of the League, campaigned for better wages and working conditions. It is a reflection of this era of separate female unions that in 1906 there were 167,000 members of all unions and that by 1914 this had risen to nearly 358,000. The 1890s saw both a growth of women’s trade union membership and the creation of several new women’s organisations. The Women’s Trade Union Association (WTUA) was founded in 1889 by women dissatisfied with the stance of the WTUL, amongst them Clementina Black, Amie Hicks, Clara James and Florence Balgarnie. Its aims differed little from the parent body and it was to be a short-lived venture merging in 1897 with the Women’s Industrial Council then three years old.  In 1870, some 58,000 women were members of trade unions but by 1896 that has risen to 118,000, a figure representing some 7.8 per cent of all union members. Unionism was strong in the textile and especially cotton industry where women often outnumbered male operatives. Women had since the 1850s been incorporated in mixed unions. In 1886, Clementina Black and Eleanor Marx, both became active in the Women’s Trade Union League. For the next, few years they travelled the country making speeches trying to persuade women to join trade unions and to campaign for “equal pay for equal work”. In 1889, Clementina Black helped form the Women’s Trade Union Association. Five years later, she merged this organisation with the Women’s Industrial Council. Clementina became president of the council and for the next twenty years, she was involved in collecting and publicizing information on women’s work. Most members of Women’s Industrial Council were also active in the suffrage movement. Organizations such as the NUWSS and the Women’s Freedom League worked closely with the council and other groups campaigning for better pay and conditions for women workers. By 1910, women made up almost one third of the workforce. Work was often on a part-time or temporary basis. It was argued that if women had the vote Parliament would be forced to pass legislation that would protect women workers. The Women’s Industrial Council concentrated on acquiring information about the problem and by 1914, the organisation had investigated one hundred and seventeen trades. In 1915, Clementina Black and her fellow investigators published their book Married Women’s Work. This information was then used to persuade Parliament to take action against the exploitation of women in the workplace.
Newspapers	Most national and regional newspapers, especially The Times were hostile to the women’s suffrage campaign especially after militant action began. On the other hand, militancy did encourage newspapers to print stories about the suffragettes, providing them with the ‘oxygen’ of publicity.  The suffrage movement produced its own newspapers: Common Cause (NUWSS), Vote (Women’s Franchise League) and Votes for Women (WSPU).
Religious groups	The WSPU condemned the Church of England because it did not speak out in favour of women’s suffrage and because its bishops in the House of Lords did not oppose the Cat and Mouse Act[2]. However, some individual clergymen did speak out in favour of the vote and a large number spoke out against forcible feeding. As might be expected, the traditional links between nonconformity and radicalism, there was greater support for women suffrage campaigns from the nonconformist churches. Within the Anglican Church, support for the parliamentary suffrage was part of a broader campaign by Anglican women for a greater role in the governing of the Church.  There were many ardent Anglicans in suffragist ranks including Maude Royden and Louise Creighton (who helped align the National Council of Women behind women’s suffrage). Many of these women belonged to the Church League for Women’s Suffrage[3], founded in 1909 by the Revd Claude Hinscliff. Its primary aim was to secure the parliamentary vote for women on the same terms as men and to do so by non-militant means[4]. It also sought to draw out what its founder called “the deep religious significance of the women’s movement” and there were, on occasions, special services for suffragists; for example, Percy Dearmer’s at St Mary the Virgin, Primrose Hill in 1912. In August 1912, the CLWS had more than 3,000 members and by April 1914, this had increased to over 5,000 churchmen and women.  Archbishop Randall Davidson, who was privately a passive suffragist, had considerable difficulty in maintaining his non-committal public stance as the militant campaign intensified. Between 1908 and 1914, militants put considerable pressure on him, particularly between January and September 1914, in connection with the effects of forcible feeding. One group that took a particularly harsh line with Davidson was the Suffragist Churchwomen’s Protest Committee, whose secretary Mrs Alice Kidd, condemned the “servile attitude of the Heads of the Church towards an unjust and irresponsible government”.

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[1] Barbara Drake Women in Trade Unions, London, 1921 reprinted by Virago, 1984 is the classic starting-point on this subject. See also: Norbert C. Soldon Women in British Trade Unions 1874-1976, Gill & Macmillan, 1978, Eleanor Gordon Women and the Labour Movement in Scotland 1850-1914, Oxford University Press, 1991 which focuses on the jute industry in Dundee and Judy Lown With Free and Graceful Step? Women and industrialisation in nineteenth century England, Polity, 1987. Anne Taylor Annie Besant: A biography, Oxford University Press, 1992 is now the standard work on a critical figure in the development of women’s trade union rights, birth control and women’s rights generally.

[2] Brian Heeney The Women’s Movement in the Church of England 1850-1930, Oxford University Press, 1988, especially pages 105-108 examines the part played by Anglican women in the suffrage movement.

[3] The League existed from 1909 until 1919, when it became the League of the Church Militant (LCM). The end for the LCM came in 1928 with a public announcement, “the general idea is that one major aim of the LCM – equal franchise – is achieved and that advance is made towards the other, the ordination of women”.

[4] Interestingly, given its non-partisan commitment and its belief in non-militancy, on 25^th September 1913 the Standard remarked that “[since] no fewer than six members of the elected committee, including the chairman, are subscribers to the Women’s Social and Political Union, a grave doubt must arise as to the real character of this outwardly respectable society”.