The Normans in Southern Italy: Urban Life

During the Norman period the growth of the urban areas was modest, in no way comparable to what was going on in northern Italy. This was due, above all, to the fact that the Norman lords preferred to reside in rural castles. This meant that, with regard to both their structure and their administrative forms, towns were often no different from large villages. Also from a legislative standpoint, the Norman domination - with rare exceptions - did not allow the cities to have a significant form of autonomy. One of the most outstanding features of the major cities (Naples, Bari, Salerno, Palermo and Messina) was probably the presence of numerous communities of foreigners that vitalised them, especially from a mercantile point of view.

In the Middle Ages, the term ‘city’ was usually applied to towns with a cathedral. However, in southern Italy the conditions in which the network of bishoprics was formed created an ambiguous situation: on the one hand, small towns, such as Teramo, were the centres of dioceses, on the other, true cities were without a bishop (Barletta, Foggia, etc.). The largest cities in the Norman period were those already existing in antiquity, such as Naples and Palermo, then the Lombard and Byzantine capitals: Salerno, Capua, Benevento and Bari. Otherwise there were only minor urban areas that never grew into anything much more than villages. This was the case not only with Robert Guiscard’s capital at Melfi but also Gaeta and Amalfi, which, for a long period, were independent states. The existence of walls was not in itself a distinguishing feature of urbanisation because they were often found in the rural castra (fortified village). In the 12^th century, many cities expanded and suburbs were constructed

In the course of time the cities of southern Italy, the control of which became increasingly rigorous, lost - with a few rare exceptions - any administrative originality. One of the principal causes of this development - which was not, however, linear - was the weakness of the bishopric. In Byzantine Apulia, there was a strong tendency towards self-government, especially in the case of Bari; many Apulian cities negotiated independently with the Norman leaders without the backing of the imperial authorities. In Muslim Sicily the disintegration of the power of the Kalbite dynasty allowed some cities to become virtually independent, as also happened with the duchies on the Tyrrhenian coast of the mainland (Gaeta, Naples and Amalfi). There were independent political movements in Benevento; then, at the end of the 11^th century, it accepted papal lordship.

In the first place, the Norman conquest tended to favour, in contrast to the pre-existing political power, a certain degree of independence for the cities, for example Bari) but the institution of the monarchy led to the increasing subjection of the urban areas. It was only under King Tancred that, in the last years of the Norman kingdom, concessions were made with regard to independence, for example of Gaeta and Naples, but the model of the commune was only applied in the South in very limited circumstances

Social stratification in the Norman cities was very varied; in them, elements of a pre-feudal urban aristocracy survived. In Naples the patronymics pertaining to the upper levels of the urban society for centuries had crystallised; the same phenomenon existed in the Lombard cities (Benevento, Capua and Salerno) and in the Byzantine ones (Bari, Trani). At the end of the 12^th century this urban upper class sometimes allied with elements of the feudal aristocracy. As far as Palermo was concerned, the complexity of the circles from which the palace personnel was chosen is well known.

Another development in the cities was a class of notables in which knights and those who were not coexisted; what they had in common was the fact that they possessed a certain patrimony, usually landed property, and held positions of responsibility in the feudal pyramid or the royal administrative hierarchy (the so-called baiulatio). The ports began to allow communities of foreigners, mainly merchants (Genoese, Venetians, Pisans), to establish themselves and - in contrast with the surrounding rural areas - the presence of a mercantile class was particularly important in them.

Unlike the other regions of Italy, in the Middle Ages southern Italy was characterised by a notable development of agriculture and a lack of the typically urban activities (industry, commerce), with the exception of maritime trade. This phenomenon was linked to the limited autonomy of the southern cities, especially in the Norman period. Nonetheless, the weakness of industry in southern Italy cannot only be explained in economic terms: the region was rich in raw materials (rock salt and sulphur in Sicily, iron and silver-lead in Calabria, sulphur in Sicily and Campania), and wood and stone were plentiful. The most flourishing sector seems to have been textiles, for which the raw materials were readily available. There was also a notable production of pottery and jewellery, both of which were greatly influenced by the techniques and styles introduced by the Byzantines and Arabs.

Little is known about the structure of industry in the cities of southern Italy during the Middle Ages, especially with regard to the organization of the different trades. It appears that in the 12^th century they were, to a certain extent, distributed in certain areas : for instance, in Naples blacksmiths were concentrated in the quarter surrounding the church of San Pietro ad Ferrarios, and in Troia they seem to have founded a guild; in Amalfi there was a platea calzolariorum (shoemakers’ square).  The social status of the craftsmen varied according to their trade. The most highly regarded were the metalworkers; the least esteemed were the textile and building workers. Some trades were marginalised: this was the case with dyeing, completely farmed out to the Jews and controlled by a monopoly under the authority of the cathedral. Other trades regulated for reasons of hygiene were the slaughtering of animals and the sale of meat. With a few rare exceptions - Naples, for example - the craftsmen’s products were never sold outside the area where they were produced, so the output was limited to local needs. In other words, there was a complete lack of trade over long distances.

Aspects of Chartism: The Final Phase 3

The 1850s pose considerable difficulties for historians. The decade after 1848 saw both the principles and practice of Chartism undermined[1]. Radical protest was stifled by the increasing affluence of the economy, the growing importance of self-improvement among working people, especially the skilled artisan and the ineffectiveness of radical organisations largely because of the growing confidence of the middle classes. The move to liberalism, in this scenario, is seen, Taylor argues, “not as a political development but a retrograde step in class-consciousness”. Chartism in the 1850s was an after-thought. For the historians of Gladstonian Liberalism, radical politics of the 1850s has been largely ignored. John Vincent, for example, focuses on an analysis of the party between 1859 and 1874[2]. Studies of Palmerston’s governments in the 1850s and 1860s[3] see his approach as important because it anticipated Gladstone’s style of leadership. Both Angus Hawkins and E. D. Steele accept that there was a significant degree of discontinuity in British politics in the 1850s. Radicalism declined and liberalism emerged because the Anti-Corn Law League was successful in 1846 and Chartism failed in 1848.

Behind this widespread assumption is the Marxist belief that the fundamental feature of change in capitalist society is class struggle. The issue of working class liberalism is explained away as an interlude between the early socialism of the Chartists and the revival of socialism in the late nineteenth century. There has, however, been an alternative viewpoint stressing the continuity of radical politics across the 1850s. Frances Gillespie’s study of the influence of organised labour on the politics of parliamentary reform between 1850 and 1867 was published in 1927. Simon Maccoby recognises continuities in radicalism between the 1760s and 1914[4]. Historians have neglected both. More recently, however, they have recognised they have underestimated the extent of radical continuity between 1832 and 1867. This has occurred because of two major developments in the historiography of early Victorian politics.

Gareth Stedman Jones argues that there were strong links between Chartism and the older radical critique of the political system that can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth century[5]. The issue, he suggests was not the denial of democratic rights or the exploitation associated with industrialisation, but the corruption associated with uncontrolled executive power. This critique of the ‘Old Corruption’ sought to prevent the executive using its “public position for private gain”[6]. The best way to do this, reformers like John Wilkes and James Mill argued, was to extend popular control over the executive. This, it was maintained, would make it accountable to the electorate. Stedman Jones goes further than this and maintains that the success of Chartism in the 1830s lay in the ability of its leaders to extend this analysis to include the unequal tax burdens shouldered by the working population. This gave their cause considerable breadth and appeal. Peel’s reform of indirect taxation in his 1842 and 1845 budgets and major company and banking reforms led to this radical argument losing its attraction and so “the movement fizzled out”[7]. This conclusion, according to Taylor, has two important implications for an examination of the 1850s. First, it suggests that the success of Chartism and the radical movement in general did not depend on their class composition, or on their ability to express the interests of a single social group. Secondly, Stedman Jones has revived interest in a ‘radical tradition’ that remained largely unchanged between the mid-eighteenth century and the outbreak of war in 1914 despite changes in Britain’s economic and social structure. At the heart of this tradition were popular governance and public accountability and responsibility. Stedman Jones and subsequent historians have restored politics to the radical agenda and weakened some of the focus on class found in earlier work. It does not, however, go far enough in rethinking the chronology of mid-nineteenth century radicalism. Stedman Jones, however, still accepts that a major break occurred in radicalism in the 1840s after the critique of the ‘Old Corruption’[8] lost its relevance unlike historians such as Biagini, Joyce[9] and Vernon[10] who, though in different ways, recognise a unbroken continuity in popular politics across the Victorian period.

This tension, Taylor suggests, may be resolved by looking at a second area of historiographical development, new work on liberalism between 1820 and 1850[11]. This suggests that the modern Liberal party did not emerge overnight in the 1850s but developed gradually in the decades after the Reform Act. The amalgamation of Foxite Whig tradition with Peelite or liberal Toryism brought two important strands to liberalism. The Whigs brought a belief in popular government. Liberal Toryism provided a concern for “efficient, cheap government and moral reform”[12]. The 1832 Reform Act may not have greatly increased the electorate but it certainly increased the power of the House of Commons over the executive. The increase in the number of elections, especially in the 1830s, the growing number of contested constituencies, the expansion of parliamentary petitioning and the emergence of pressure groups like Chartism and the Anti-Corn Law League raised people’s expectations of the reformed parliament. This understanding creates a broader context in which to place radicalism between 1830 and the 1860s. The driving force behind radical politics derived not just the radical critique of the state, as Stedman Jones suggests, but from the growing popularity of parliament and the popular desire to control the executive that through the House of Commons.

These two revisionist developments provide a different framework within which to consider the Chartist movement between the 1830s and the 1850s. It is clear that there were continuities in radical ideology. There was also continuity in personnel. The political activists who dominated the Chartist leadership in 1848 were in their early thirties or forties. Many carried their radical politics into the 1850s and 1860s. Pressure group politics also showed considerable continuity. Pressure groups in the 1850s built on the tactics of organisations like the Anti-Slavery Society and the early experience of many mid-century activists lay in campaigns of the 1830s like those for colonial reform and the repeal of the stamp duty. Where there was not continuity was in political strategy. The mass platform disintegrated in 1848. But this was merely one type of political strategy. Alternative strategies were available and perhaps historians need to address the issue of the continuities in strategy between the 1830s and 1850s. The focus on the mass platform and its vigorous defence by O’Connor, however justifiable, may, in some respects, make the break in 1848 appear far greater than in fact it was.

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[1] For what follows I have relied heavily on M. Taylor The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-1860, Oxford, 1995, pages 2-9.

[2] John Vincent The Formation of the British Liberal Party 1857-1868, London, 1966.

[3] For example, E.D Steele Palmerston and Liberalism 1855-1865, Cambridge, 1991.

[4] S. Maccoby English Radicalism, six volumes, London, 1935-1961 and S. Maccoby (ed.) The Radical Tradition 1763-1914, London, 1952.

[5] Gareth Stedman Jones ‘Rethinking Chartism’ in his Languages of class: Studies in English working class history 1832-1982, Cambridge, 1983.

[6] Taylor The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-1860, page 5.

[7] Taylor The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-1860, page 5.

[8] W.D. Rubenstein ‘The End of the “Old Corruption” in Britain, c.1780-1860’, Past and Present, volume 101, (1983) is a useful survey of the break in the 1840s. It should be supplemented by Philip Harling The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’. The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain 1779-1846, Oxford, 1996.

[9] P. Joyce Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class 1840-1914, Cambridge, 1991 and P. Joyce Democratic subjects: The self and the social in nineteenth-century England, Cambridge, 1994.

[10] J. Vernon Politics and the People: a Study in English Political Culture 1815-1867, Cambridge, 1993 and J. Vernon (ed.) Re-reading the Constitution: New narratives in the political history of England’s long nineteenth century, Cambridge, 1996.

[11] P. Mandler Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform: Whigs and Liberals 1830-1852, Oxford, 1990, J. Parry The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, Yale, 1993 and T.A. Jenkins The Liberal Ascendancy 1830-1886, London, 1994 and Parliament, party and politics in Victorian Britain, Manchester, 1996 are valuable summaries of current thinking.

[12] Taylor The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-1860, page 7.