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Tuesday, 16 October 2007

Aspects of Chartism: Middle class protest

The emergence of the middle classes was a product of industrialisation and urbanisation and between 1780 and 1850 they established themselves as a challenge of the political hegemony of the landed interest[1]. Middle class radicalism was centred in the professional and manufacturing classes. The growth of new professions outside the traditional areas of the Church, law and medicine was one of the most important aspects of middle class development during the first half of the nineteenth century. These professions were imbued with the Utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and the Mills, father and son, in which value was determined not by tradition but by the ‘greatest happiness to the greatest number’ and which provided an innovative way of critiquing contemporary society and its institutions. Manufacturers like Richard Bright and Henry Ashworth provided an alternative and extremely successful economic focus grounded not in landed but manufacturing wealth.

Ideologically and economically successful though the middle classes were, their transformation of the social and political structure was slow and uneven in the first half of the century. Though they had successes in specific areas they lacked both the power and the will to undermine effectively the political hegemony of the traditional landed interest. There was considerable diversity of economic status among the middle classes which meant that, though historians with some validity have emphasised their homogeneity in contrast to heterogeneity of the working population, they were not as united, or as class conscious or a radical as has frequently been made out. The pre-industrial commercial-financial interest was very conservative in outlook. The new professional classes were concerned with status and upward mobility and were often unsympathetic to radicalism. The northern manufacturing classes, which formed the mainstay of the Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL), proved erratic reformers in the 1850s once their economic grievances had been settled. Middle class radicals in the first half of the nineteenth century did not represent either the ‘nation’ or the middle classes as a whole but simply the ‘vanguard of the bourgeoisie’.

Like the Chartists, middle class radicals detested the ‘aristocratic ideal’ and its social, religious and political domination based on rank, prescription and tradition. They differed from the Chartists in their attack on the aristocracy by expressing that opposition not through the idealised Radical ‘tradition’ of abstract political principles but in terms of specific demands like the abolition of the Corn Laws. It was the ‘practical’ nature of its radicalism which marked the middle classes off from the millenarian working class tradition.

During the 1830s and 1840s the Radicals attempted to attack the aristocracy on two fronts: political and economic. The 1832 Reform Act was, in part, a recognition by the Whig leaders of the economic advances of the middle classes in the previous fifty years and an acceptance of their claim for political ‘respectability’. Grey argued in 1831 that concessions to ‘the rational public’ were essential if republicanism and the destruction of existing institutions were to be avoided. The Whigs aimed to strengthen rather than weaken aristocratic power by underpinning it with middle class support and linked the extended franchise with men of ‘property and intelligence’. This strategy successfully split the alliance between middle class Radicals and popular protest, isolating the working population and leaving them politically impotent.

The 1832 Act fell far short of the aspirations of those middle class Radicals who sought to produce a more democratic and just society by undermining the dominance of the aristocracy. From inside Parliament, they sought, to force Grey and Melbourne to introduce further ‘organic reform’ in government and administration. This objective did not seem remote when the reformed Parliament assembled in 1833. Out of the 500 ‘reformers’ who sat in the House of Commons in that year, the Radicals, including the Irish MPs led by O’Connell, formed a bloc of 100-120 MPs, regarded by the official Whigs as a separate and potentially hostile group. The English group consisted of 60-70 MPs but, though they were all Radicals, they differed widely in temperament, background and ideas and never formed a coherent group[2]. The most important representatives of middle class Radicalism were about twenty ‘Philosophic Radicals’: individuals like George Grote, the advocate of the secret ballot, J.A. Roebuck, who denounced all English shams, and Sir William Molesworth, a country gentleman. John Stuart Mill, the most important of these Radicals, was because of his work at the East India Company debarred from Parliament but provided theoretical focus and enthusiastic support from outside especially in his editorship of the London and Westminster Review. Mill hoped that a leader would emerge among the parliamentary Radicals who could weld the whole body of radical opinion into a coherent whole. He was to be disappointed.

The potential Radical strength of 1833 was quickly dissipated and there was a steady decline in their influence down to the 1835 General Election. The parliamentary events of 1834-5 with the resignation of Melbourne, Peel’s minority Conservative administration and the 1835 election led to a slump in the number of official Whigs but an increase in both Radical and Irish MPs. If all three groups worked together they could defeat the Conservatives and Melbourne would be returned to power. This is what happened in the Lichfield House Compact of March 1835 by which O’Connell, in return for Irish reforms, was prepared to support the Whig government. The real losers of this Compact were the English Radicals who were forced to accept an unpalatable Whig government or see the return of Peel. They had lost their capacity to act as a separate ‘party’ or to impose their ideas on the Whig leadership. It was O’Connell rather than the Radicals who controlled the direction of Whig policies.

Russell’s ‘Finality’ speech in late 1837 ruled out further organic reform, though Whig policies on the poor law, church and municipal reform reflected pressure from middle class and Dissenting interests in the country. The position of the parliamentary Radicals was further weakened by the 1837 General Election. The number of Radicals returned was about fifty and many soon drifted back to mainstream Whiggism. Joseph Hume and Arthur Roebuck lost their seats in Middlesex and Bath respectively to Conservatives. Attwood retired in 1839 and in 1841 Grote gave up his seat for the City of London. This marked the effective end of parliamentary Radicalism.

Why did Radicalism fail to alter the balance of political power or lead to further organic reform in the 1830s?  First, the temperament of individual Radicals, especially their inability to work together as a coherent group with a recognised leader, certainly provides part of the answer.  Secondly, they also underestimated the strength of the Conservative reaction and the unwillingness of the Whigs to push fundamental reform after 1832.  Finally, the Radicals have been called ‘amateurs in politics’ and this provides a third explanation for their failure to achieve anything concrete. As ‘amateurs’ they had no basis of support in the country. Few sat for popular constituencies and they had little knowledge of the people on whose behalf they claimed to speak.  Isolated in Parliament they were soon isolated by the political system they were trying to reform and effectively emasculated. The future of middle class Radicalism lay with the extra-parliamentary Anti-Corn Law League.


[1] Dror Wahrman Imagining the Middle Class. The Political Representation of Class in Britain c.1780-1840, CUP, 1995 is the most recent analysis of the emergence of middle class consciousness.

[2] William Thomas The Philosophic Radicals: Nine Studies in Theory and Practice, 1817-1841, Oxford University Press, 1979 remains the best examination of this amorphous and highly ambiguous political ‘party’. There is also an interesting discussion in Michael J. Turner Independent Radicalism in Early Victorian Britain, Praeger, 2004.

Monday, 15 October 2007

Aspects of Chartism: A short history of the Corn Law

Government regulation of exports and imports of corn was well-established long before the nineteenth-century[1]. The Corn Laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a dual purpose: they sought to prevent “grain from being at any time, either so dear that the poor cannot subsist, or so cheap that the farmer cannot live by growing of it.”[2]

The Napoleonic Wars brought a fundamental change in the history of the Corn Laws. During the war years, agriculturists had enjoyed high grain prices, but with the peace prices fell dramatically[3]. In response, Parliament enacted the Corn Law of 1815, which allowed free entry when the price of corn was above 80s per quarter, and prohibited entry when the price fell below 80s. Some argue that this new legislation, unlike that of the earlier Corn Laws, was “defiantly protective”. “It sought to fasten on a country at peace the protection furnished by a generation of war.” Others maintain, however, that fear of scarcity drove government policy. Rapid population growth and a dependence upon foreign corn are said to have justified a policy of self-sufficiency based on concerns for national security[4]. A third rationale for the move to protection is that the Government hurriedly passed the legislation in order to gain the support of landowners as it scrambled to pay its war debt.

The 1815 law suffered from two basic flaws: it generated no government revenue from protection and it was too rigid. Public petitions of distress which resulted from the 1815 law were directed to a Select Committee of the House of Commons, whose report was drafted by William Huskisson. In the report, Huskisson called for a return to the “practically free” trade that existed before 1815[5]. The Act of 1822 allowed wheat to be imported when the domestic price reached 80s per quarter, but when the price fell to 70s, imports were again prohibited. Between 1822 and 1828, the price never reached 80s, and thus the Act never came into effect. In 1822, the economist David Ricardo proposed that protection should be withdrawn gradually, beginning with a fixed duty of 20s and lowered by annual reductions of 1s, until it reached 10s, at which it would then remain[6].

By 1827, discussion was not of free trade in corn, but rather of the choice between a fixed duty, as Ricardo suggested or a sliding scale, as Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade, proposed. The fixed duty avoided the problem of averaging prices which any sliding scale would face. The Foreign Secretary George Canning and others stressed that a fixed duty would not allow flexibility in times of scarcity, posing the likelihood that the Government would be forced to suspend the duty during such times. Other politicians favoured the sliding scale because it, unlike the fixed duty that was favoured by the “cold-blooded political economists”, was based on “experience” not “theory”. Huskisson’s justification for the sliding scale was that it remedied the worst feature of 1815: rigidity. The agriculturists rejected Huskisson’s 1827 bill, however, on the grounds that his pivot point of 60s (from which the duty of 20s would gradually descend) would afford them inadequate protection. In drafting the 1827 bill, Huskisson and the Duke of Wellington (to become Prime Minister in 1828) became embroiled in a fundamental disagreement: the former sought to move towards freer trade in corn, while the latter sought to consolidate protection for agriculture[7]. In 1828, Huskisson and Wellington agreed upon a sliding scale tariff for corn, so that as the price rose the duty would fall. Fay described the 1828 sliding scale as “Huskisson’s sliding scale spoiled.”[8]

While Huskisson suggested a pivot point of 60s or 62s, the 1828 Act legislated 66s. According to the 1828 Act, when the price of British wheat was 52s per quarter or below, the duty would be 34 s. 8 d.; as the price rose, the duty would fall to 1s when the price hit 73s. The 1828 scale also differed from Huskisson’s in that it introduced large jumps in the scale (a 13s. 8d. duty at 69s, and 1s. at 73s.). Speculators took advantage of the rapid descent of the scale when prices were high, withholding sales until the price rose one or two shillings to avoid the payment of duties. In spite of this defect, the 1828 act continued to operate until Peel introduced a modified sliding scale in 1842. Peel’s sliding scale differed from both the 1827 bill and the 1828 Act in that it abolished the pivot point. Peel also lessened the incentive for speculation by smoothing out the scale at the lower end and reducing the maximum duty to 20s when the price hit 51s or below.

Paralleling the history of Corn Law legislation were major demographic and economic changes that cut against the fabric of protection for food. From 1811 to 1841 the population of Great Britain increased from 12.6 million to 18 million and British farmers were becoming less able to provide sufficient supplies for the home market. This said, while Britain had not been self-sufficient in corn since the early 1760s, British agriculturists “still managed to feed every year on the average all except about 700,000 and as late as 1831-40, all except about 1,050,000 of the population.”[9]

A second factor proved more fatal to the Corn Laws: the growth of British manufacturing industry and export trade, especially in textiles. More particularly, as the industrial prosperity and export boom of the early 1830s began to crack, industrialists became increasingly vocal about “unfair” protection enjoyed by the agriculturists. Beginning in 1836, an economic downturn together with a series of poor harvests sparked the industrialists into action. High food prices and unemployment gave impetus both to the middle and working classes, the former organised as the Anti-Corn Law League and the latter as the Chartist movement.


[1] Donald Grove Barnes A History of The English Corn Laws from 1660-1846, London:George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1930.

[2] C. Smith Tracts on the Corn Trade and Corn Laws, volume II, page 72, as quoted in C.R. Fay The Corn Laws and Social England, Cambridge University Press, 1932, page 34.

[3] In 1814, the average price of wheat was 74 s. 4 d. per quarter, but following the war and with a good harvest in 1815, the price dropped to 52 s. 10 d. William Spence noted in 1815 that “thousands of farmers, who but twelve months ago were living in prosperity, are utterly unable to raise money for their taxes merely, and tens of thousands to discharge them are force to sell their produce at less than one half its prime-cost . . .”

[4] Boyd Hilton Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments 1815-1830, Oxford University Press, 1977, pages 20-26.

[5] C.R. Fay The Corn Laws and Social England, Cambridge University Press, 1932, page 80.

[6] J.R. McCulloch, J.S. Mill and Joseph Hume also supported a fixed duty, although Mill and Hume suggested a lower starting duty.

[7] Boyd Hilton Corn, Cash, Commerce: The Economic Policies of the Tory Governments, 1815-1830, Oxford University Press, 1977, pages 284-286 describes the misunderstanding cum disagreement that emerged in an ambiguous rider that Huskisson proposed to Wellington’s warehousing amendment to the 1827 bill. The keyword in this passage is “thenceforward” that Wellington read as meaning ‘permanent’, whereas Huskisson had meant it as a temporary measure.

[8] C.R. Fay The Corn Laws and Social England, Cambridge University Press, 1932, page 84.

[9] W.H. Chaloner ‘Introduction to the Second Edition,’ in Archibald Prentice History of the Corn Law League, 1853, Frank Cass, 1968, page x.