The Rum Rebellion: Purging Bligh

Those who had taken power were not confined by the effective operation of the rule of law, save insofar as ultimate retribution from London was anticipated.[1] Until a superior officer to Johnston arrived six months after the coup, John Macarthur was effectively in control.  During that period the rudimentary legal system was abused, where not suspended and the courts used as a tool of political revenge.[2] Magistrates loyal to Bligh were dismissed.[3]  Other loyalists were subject to a parody of justice.  Gore and George Crossley[4], the dubious ex-lawyer who had some role in advising Bligh on the rebellion were convicted on bogus charges and transported to the coal mines at Newcastle for seven years.  In March 1809, John Palmer[5], Bligh’s Commissary was charged with sedition for distributing Bligh’s Proclamation that the Corps was it a state of mutiny, denied the competency of the court and refused to plead but was unlawfully gaoled for three months and fined £50.[6] The civil court processes were also abused.[7] However, with the exception of these politically motivated cases, the legal system continued to operate more or less as before. Commerce was adversely affected as it was uncertain whether the negotiable bills payable in sterling that had traditionally been used for transactions with the government, would be honoured in London.[8] No one who lived through these months was in little doubt that the rule of law was severely compromised. 

Atkins was replaced[9] and Johnston initially appointed Charles Grimes[10], the Surveyor-General, as Judge-Advocate and ordered that Macarthur and the six officers be tried; on 2 February, they were found not guilty.[11] By contrast, Bligh supporters were sentenced harshly with Provost-Marshall Gore sentenced to seven years for causing the arrest of Macarthur.[12] On 3 April, Grimes resigned after George Johnston, who was acting as governor, had criticised some extraordinary proceedings in the court over which he presided. Though these were partly due to his ignorance of the law or, as Johnston said, ‘errors of judgment more than of design’, Grimes was regarded as one of the opponents of his administration. Macarthur was then appointed as the so-called ‘Secretary’ and effectively ran the business affairs of the colony.[13] Another prominent opponent of Bligh, Macarthur’s ally Thomas Jamison, was made the colony’s Naval Officer (the equivalent of Collector of Customs and Excise). Jamison was also reinstated as a magistrate, which enabled he and his fellow legal officers to scrutinise Bligh’s personal papers for evidence of wrong-doing by the deposed governor. In June 1809, Jamison sailed to London to bolster his business interests and give evidence against Bligh in any legal prosecutions that might be brought against the mutineers. Jamison died in London at the beginning of 1811 and did not have an opportunity to testify at Johnston’s court martial later in the year. However, the unity of the rebels quickly dissipated. [14] Johnston and Macarthur fell out with Blaxland[15] and Macarthur even managed to alienate the NSW Corps previously his staunchest supporters.[16]

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[1] Johnston did not inform Castlereagh of Bligh’s arrest until 11 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 575-589. For correspondence between Bligh and the rebels see, Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 242-271 and Johnston’s General Orders, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 271-276.

[2] HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 435-453, Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 276-291 print the Colonial Secretary’s Papers of the examination of officers after Bligh’s arrest.

[3] Government and General Order, 27 January 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 453.

[4] Allars, K.G., ‘Crossley, George (1749-1823)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 262-263.

[5] Steven, Margaret, ‘Palmer, John (1760-1833)’, ADB, Vol. 2, pp. 309-311. See also, Palmer to Bligh, 2 March 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 530-531 in which he reaffirmed his support for Bligh.

[6] Palmer was reinstated by Governor Lachlan Macquarie but failed to receive any official compensation for deprivations suffered in the rebellion. Though the secretary of state instructed Macquarie to examine the commissariat accounts and see that the office was placed on a proper footing, he observed that as the complaints against Palmer ‘have been chiefly brought forward since the arrest of Governor Bligh, it is probable they are exaggerated’. Palmer’s examiners at the Comptroller’s Office in London held that the charges ‘seemed to have arisen as much from private pique as from zeal for the public service’ and were too vague to justify a formal inquiry. However, they thought it inexpedient to restore Palmer because of his long tenure in office (since 1791) and recommended the appointment of another commissary. On 25 July 1811, Palmer was demoted to assistant commissary and placed on half-pay and next year the entire commissariat system was reorganised.

[7] Ibid, Kercher, B., Debt, Seduction and Other Disasters:  The Birth of Civil Law in Convict New South Wales, pp. 41-42.

[8] Curry, J.E.B., Reflections on the Colony of New South Wales: George Caley, (Lansdowne), 1966, p. 157.

[9] He was, however, reinstated as Judge-Advocate on 13 December 1808, a decision he accepted despite having played the critical role in the case that precipitated the rebellion. Aitken’s conversion to the rebel cause was motivated largely by financial considerations, the capacity of the Corps to pander to his alcoholic tastes and a free grant of 500 acres in the Minto District.

[10] Dowd, Bernard T., ‘Grimes, Charles (1772-1858)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 487-488 and ‘Charles Grimes: The Second Surveyor-General of New South Wales’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 22, (4), (1936), pp. 247-288.

[11] HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 465-510 and HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 291-352 detail the trial. Johnston then appointed Anthony Fenn Kemp to the post. Aitkens and especially Kemp and Grimes were incompetent but more importantly made judicial decisions unfavourable to Macarthur. Foveaux had little choice but to reinstate Aitkens: Foveaux to Castlereagh, 20 February 1809, HRA, Series I, Vol. 7, p. 2 ‘I had no choice left but to restore Mr. Atkins, or expose the public to the serious inconveniences which must inevitably have followed from leaving so indispensable a department vacated.’

[12] Gore denied the authority of the rebel court that would not give bail and refused to plead; he was kept in gaol without trial for more than two months, and in a letter to Bligh unfavourably compared his treatment by the NSW rebels with that by the Irish rebels ten years before. On 30 May Gore was again brought before a rebel court and again refused to plead. He was sentenced to transportation for seven years and was sent to Coal River (Newcastle) where he laboured with ordinary convicts. See, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 555-563 for a statement of Gore’s refusal to recognise the court, his defence and correspondence with Bligh.

[13] Government and General Order, 12 February 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 519.

[14] Macarthur to Captain Piper, 24 May 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 643-644 indicated that unity was short-lived: ‘...some of our old acquaintances have behaved most scurvily...’

[15] Johnston to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 453-516 provides details for the reasons behind the rift between the Blaxlands and Johnston and Macarthur.

[16] Johnston to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 518-520.

The Rum Rebellion: Bligh’s overthrown

On the morning of 26 January 1808 Bligh ordered Provost-Marshall William Gore[1] to arrest Macarthur and again called for the return of the court papers that were now in the hands of officers of the Corps. At 10 am, the officers responded with a request for a new Judge-Advocate and the release of Macarthur on bail but they had received no reply by 3.00 pm and adjourned the court. In the afternoon, Bligh sent a note to the officers summoning them to Government House at 9 am the following morning, indicating that Atkins had charged them with certain crimes, but not revealing what these were.[2] An hour later, Bligh informed Johnston of his action and additionally told him that the actions of his officers were considered treasonable.[3] As the officers were to appear before Bligh and all the magistrates, this would be a charge under criminal not military law. The charge, if proven, was a capital offence. [4] To make this threat against officers was an intemperate and extreme move. There could be no greater slur on their honour.

Bligh’s charge of treason may have been the turning point. Johnston appears to have felt his relationship with Bligh had broken down so much that there was no point in talking to him. It was unlikely that Bligh would have executed the officers; but very likely they might be sent to gaol pending further advice. If this had happened, there would have only remained, apart from Johnston himself, two other officers in Sydney. One of these, Cadwallader Draffin, was mentally unstable. [5] Johnston later maintained that if the officers had been gaoled, the soldiers would have rioted and perhaps killed Bligh. He arrested Bligh for his own protection. Johnston was not particularly close to Macarthur and had in fact been one of the magistrates who ordered Macarthur arrested over the incident that led to this court case. He was an experienced officer, had been in the Colony since 1788, and was apparently highly regarded by his men. What Macarthur had started, Johnston would finish in a way perhaps Macarthur never imagined, though Macarthur certainly supported it.

At 5.00 pm, Johnston went to the barracks and ordered Macarthur’s release assuming, with no legal authority, the title of Lieutenant-Governor.[6] After discussions with his fellow officers and some wealthy civilians now including Macarthur, decided to depose Bligh. Macarthur then drafted a petition calling for Johnston to arrest Bligh as a tyrant and take charge of the colony.[7] This petition was signed by the officers of the Corps and other prominent citizens but, according to Evatt, most signatures had probably been added only after Bligh was safely under house arrest. Johnston then consulted with the officers and issued an order stating that Bligh was ‘charged by the respectable inhabitants of crimes that render you unfit to exercise the supreme authority another moment in this colony; and in that charge all officers under my command have joined.’ Johnston went on to call for Bligh to resign and submit to arrest.[8]

At 6.00 pm the Corps, with full band and colours, marched to Government House to arrest Bligh. They were hindered by Bligh’s recently widowed daughter and her parasol at the gates but Captain Thomas Laycock finally found Bligh after an extensive search, in full dress uniform, behind his bed where he claimed he was hiding papers. Bligh was painted as a coward for this but Duffy argues that if Bligh was hiding it would have been to escape and thwart the coup.[9] Stephen Dando-Collins suggests that Bligh was attempting to travel to Hawkesbury and lead the garrison there against Johnston. [10] On 27 February, with Bligh confined at Government House, Johnston revoked martial law and dismissed officers of Bligh’s government including Atkins and Provost-Marshall Gore. There were all-night celebrations across Sydney that included drinking and dancing around bonfires, burning of effigies, satirical posters, oil-lamp transparencies in windows and ‘Bligh under the bed’ cartoon displayed in soldiers’ homes. During 1808, Bligh was confined to Government House. He refused to leave for England until lawfully relieved of his duty.[11]

Johnston had no prospect of material advancement from dismissing Bligh; in fact, he was putting his future income as an army officer at grave risk. He was in no way Macarthur’s tool. This has been obscured by the enthusiasm of both Macarthur’s supporters and his detractors to place him more fully in the centre of the rebellion than his actions deserve. Johnston was a competent and independent official, whose motive in removing Bligh was to resolve a crisis in the colony’s administration and preserve public order.[12] This was not a rebellion in the sense of people grabbing power and possessions for themselves. A mutiny is much more restricted with the aim of removing a bad leader. There was a strongly held belief in the early nineteenth century that gentlemen had the right to overthrow leaders who abused their power. In this context, George Johnston’s action becomes much more principled and this was acknowledged during his court martial in 1811 when the leniency of his sentence was justified by reference to Bligh’s ‘impropriety and oppression’ when he was governor.

There is some debate over the nature of the ‘rebellion’ and the degree to which it was planned. Some historians argue that had Johnston been sufficiently well to meet Bligh on 25 January 1808 that the rebellion the following day would perhaps not have occurred. Had he already decided that Bligh would have to be removed and used his illness as an excuse to bring matters to a head? The same question could be asked of Macarthur’s actions on his trial. The problem is that, while both Johnston and Macarthur had grave doubts about Bligh’s method of ruling, there is no evidence to suggest that they colluded in precipitating rebellion, something that would anyway have proved difficult as Macarthur was under arrest for much of 25 and 26 January. The meeting with some of the wealthier citizens of Sydney on 26 January has been suggested as indicating the existence of some sort of conspiracy. However, Sydney was still a small community and calling important citizens together for an emergency meeting would not have proved difficult. The meeting’s importance lay in giving a degree of civilian legitimacy to the actions of the military. In fact, the rebellion did not require a great deal of planning and the NSW Corps was willing to support Johnston’s order to arrest Bligh. For the rebellion to succeed all that was necessary was to apprehend Bligh. [13]

In the days following the 1808 insurrection, Daniel McKay, a gaoler dismissed by Bligh as too brutal, then a pub owner, erected a sign outside his public house. It showed on one side a Highland officer thrusting his sword through a snake while a female figure of liberty presents him with a cap; on the other side, written in large type, was the phrase ‘The Ever Memorable 26th January 1808’.[14]

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[1] King, Hazel, ‘Gore, William (1765-1845)’, ADB, Vol. 1, pp. 459-460.

[2] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433.

[3] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 236.

[4] Ibid, McMahon, John, ‘Not a Rum Rebellion but a military insurrection’, p. 135.

[5] Duffy, Michael, Man of honour: John Macarthur, duellist, rebel, founding father, (Macmillan), 2003, p. 295.

[6] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 433.

[7] HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 240. Apart from Macarthur and the Blaxland brothers, the petition was signed by James Mileham, James Badgery, Nicholas Bayly and by S. (Simeon) Lord.

[8] Johnston proclaimed martial law, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 240-241 and sent Bligh a letter calling on him to resign, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 434, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, p. 241.

[9] Ibid, Duffy, Michael, Man of honour: John Macarthur, duellist, rebel, founding father, pp. 297-298.

[10] Dando-Collins, Stephen, Captain Bligh’s Other Mutiny: the true story of the military coup that turned Australia into a two-year rebel republic, (Random House), 2007.

[11] Alan Atkinson, ‘The British Whigs and the Rum Rebellion’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, Vol. 66, (2), (1980), pp. 73-90.

[12] Johnston to Castlereagh, 11 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 208-221 provides Johnston’s justification for rebellion.

[13] Gore to Castlereagh, 26 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 602-606 gives an accout of Bligh’s arrest by a supporter. Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, pp. 607-629 gives his first account of the rebellion.

[14]For Bligh’s account of the rebellion, 30 June 1808, HRNSW, Vol. 6, p. 670. See also, Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, HRA, Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 420-440.