Papineau’s support remained strong, though it grew evident that he had little left to offer except noble messages. Like Mackenzie, Papineau was long on words but short on action. The Ninety-Two Resolutions had heightened divisions with many moderate French Canadians and Papineau’s anti-clerical position alienated reformers in the Catholic Church, and made Bishop Jean-Jacques Lartigue into a powerful opponent. [1] News of Russell’s Ten Resolutions took a month to reach Lower Canada and it was not until 10 or 11 April that the Assembly was informed of the rejection of its Resolutions. The reaction was immediate: La Minerve reported events on 13 April, the following day the Vindicator called for ‘Agitation! Agitation!’ while on 20 April La Minerve announced the calling of a popular Assembly in the comté de Richelieu to denounce Russell’s Resolutions. The dialogue between the Assembly and London had come to an abrupt end.
Between April and the beginning of the rebellion in mid-November, although Papineau still pursued a constitutional approach, preparations were made for what many saw as inevitable conflict with the colonial authorities. [2] During April and May 1837, the Patriotes put a dual strategy in place. Papineau thought that boycotting taxed goods would force the British Government to give way. Under his direction, the Comité central et permanent de Montréal, reorganised in May, coordinated Patriote activities throughout the province. Only if these methods proved ineffective, would he then agree to the use of force. The radical wing, dominated by people such as the brothers Wolfred and Robert Nelson, [3] Cyrille-Hector-Octave Côté, [4] Édouard-Amury Girod[5] and Thomas Storrow Brown [6] took a more aggressive stance. This plan was widely known among Patriotes by June and was communicated to republicans in Upper Canada. The Patriote leadership recognised that the mass of the people needed to be carefully mobilised and this had to be accompanied by obtaining arms. Papineau was viewed as the leader of the movement but he struggled to maintain control over the impetus towards confrontation. He may have won the war of words in 1837 but, as events were to demonstrate, he could not win the war itself. [7]
Although he had not called for popular assemblies Papineau recognised their value for putting pressure on government by mobilising popular support. [8] The first phase of popular assemblies lasted from early May until the middle of June 1837 with the first assembly at St-Ours on 7 May, important because it provided a model for subsequent meetings. The Declaration of St-Ours consisted of twelve resolutions that denounced Russell’s Resolutions as a violation of the 1791 Constitution by an oppressive government, and maintained the principle of ‘No taxation without representation’. The Patriotes decided to boycott British imports and not to pay taxes to the Government on other imported goods, and to put further pressure on the government by smuggling goods. The Declaration proclaimed Papineau, who did not attend, as the only true leader of the Patriotes, thanked reformers in Britain and Upper Canada who supported their cause and criticised those Patriotes who had left the movement. [9] These resolutions were an extension of the Ninety-Two Resolutions but with two important differences. First, London was now an adversary not an ally, and secondly, they represented a direct appeal beyond the Assembly to the people. Surprisingly the reaction of the Patriote press was muted with only La Minerve providing detailed coverage while The Vindicator provided only a terse summary of the resolutions. [10]
On 15 May, Papineau spoke at a popular assembly at St-Laurent, north of Montreal against Russell’s Resolutions and repeated calls for a boycott of British imports. The assembly at St-Marc in Verchères called for a constitutional convention. Three days later the Lower Canada banks suspended specie payment until 23 June due to civil unrest. On 23 May, the Comité central et permanent de Montréal passed a resolution demanding free trade with the United States. Rebellious ideas were openly expressed and groups of disaffected French Canadians began organising and drilling in readiness for possible military action. Further assemblies were held during the first half of June at St-Hyacinthe, Longueuil, Quebec and Ste-Rose. Finally, on 15 June, Gosford banned public meetings and the movement toward rebellion intensified.
The second phase lasted between June and August. Ignoring Gosford’s ban, illegal assemblies were held on 18 June at Berthier and St-Francois-du-Lac, a further assembly at St-Hyacinthe on 23 and at Malbaie on 25 June. On 26 June, there was an assembly at St-Thomas in Bellechasse and L’Islet and two days later, the assembly at Montreal demands democratic rights. In July, there were assemblies on 4 July at Stanbridge in Missisquoi to celebrate American independence and demand democratic rights where many American sympathisers attended and on 12 July, Papineau chaired a protest meeting at Napierville with Côté. Four further assemblies were held in July at Deschambault, Yamachiche, in the comté of St-Maurice, l’Assomption, and Vaudreuil. On 6 August assemblies were held at St-Francois-du-Lac on seigneurial tenure and at St-Constant in LaPrairie in the presence of the French ambassador from the United States. Finally, on 22 August the Association des Dames patriotiques was founded and urged the wearing of local clothing to avoid imports. As public meetings continued to be held, radicals openly called for rebellion and social revolution with the ending of the seigneurial system. Papineau was doubtless worried by these radical views, but the acceleration of the revolutionary movement also served his ends.
The authorities were fully aware of the explosive situation and Gosford hoped that a modest reinforcement of British troops during the summer of 1837 would discourage French Canadians from violence. The major concern of James Stephen in London was whether if rebellion broke out in Lower Canada, the Government could count on the support of the other North American colonies. New Brunswick was expected to remain quiet while Upper Canada might be appeased by the recall of its Governor. [11] Whig ministers were more concerned about the situation in Nova Scotia where there had been widespread criticism of its executive since the election of Joseph Howe to the Assembly.[12] Its demands, set out in the Twelve Resolutions of 1837, saw a temporary alignment of the Nova Scotia Assembly with the Canadian legislatures in demands for the surrender of crown revenues, a division of councils, an elective council and a responsible executive. Unlike in the Canadas however, the Colonial Office was prepared to give up crown revenues in return for a civil list, separate the councils and modify the executive on lines that satisfied Nova Scotians. British officials, if not ministers, recognised that the real threat to British North America would come from Lower Canada.
The third phase began in mid-August with the recall of the Assembly to explore possible ways out of the constitutional impasse. It first met on 18 August but its demands for an elected Legislative Council and the creation of a responsible government remained unchanged, there was no vote of supply and on 26 August it was dissolved. [13] September proved quieter largely because of the need to harvest crops. Increasingly, however, there was growing impatience among younger Patriotes with the timidity of their older leaders. On 5 September young Patriotes in Montreal established the Fils de la Liberté, a radical paramilitary organisation based on the American Sons of Liberty. [14] It consisted of two sections: a civil wing led by Papineau, O’Callaghan and Ouimet, and a military wing led by Brown that practised military manoeuvres each week. Further assemblies were held at St-Denis, Napierville and St-Ignace on 10 September and six days later by Patriote women at St-Antoine.
From the middle of 1837, there were concerted efforts to coerce individuals and officials into supporting the Patriotes. In the Richelieu valley, [15] French Canadians were expanding southwards towards the British-American settlements while in the Deux-Montagnes British settlers were thrusting into French Canadian areas of settlement. [16] Papineau’s demands for the boycott of British goods and attacks on the British American Land Company, and the exaggerated languages of the Patriote press were soon translated by habitants into racial overtones exacerbating existing animosities. This often took the form of ‘charivaris’, a long-established, largely rural form of social coercion to intimidate those whose behaviour was unacceptable to the community. [17] Although charivaris were an expression of local grievances, they demonstrated the depth of feeling felt by many habitants about the actions of the colonial government. This enabled Patriotes to mobilised sympathetic opinion into community action and there are clear parallels between this and the ‘Scotch Cattle’ activities in South Wales. [18] Two examples illustrate this issue. First, throughout the summer and autumn of 1837 the Deux-Montagnes was the scene of a large number of charivari characterised largely by intimidation and verbal violence though in the case of Robert Hall they took a more serious form. On the night of 28 June, Robert Hall, a farmer from St-Scholastique, was visited by four men who attacked him for not signing the parish’s Patriote petition.[19] In his deposition, he stated that the door to his house had been forced, one window smashed by stones in a room where one of his young children was sleeping, and part of his fence was pulled down and destroyed leaving his field of wheat open to animals. Hall sought the support of the Attorney-General Charles Ogden and he ordered the arrest of the four men identified by Hall. Attempts to arrest those involved failed on 14 July when the authorities were confronted by angry crowds. Ogden’s further attempts to curb abuses in the Deux-Montagnes were fruitless and the area remained the most disturbed rural area in the province until more serious charivari broke out in the Richelieu valley in September.
Secondly, the area around St-Blaise-sur-Richelieu played a minor part in events in 1837. However, between 27 and 29 October, a charivari took place at the home of Dudley Flowers, a lieutenant in the militia orchestrated by Cyrille-Octave Côté that led to Flowers resigning his commission and leaving with his family. [20] Further charivaris by Patriotes took place at the Protestant mission of Henriette Odin-Feller and at the homes of converts. [21] The arrival of Protestantism in the region was considered by some habitants as further attack on their traditions and the small Protestant community she established became a legitimate Patriote target. Odin-Feller and the families who had converted left St-Blaise for Champlain in the United States. On her return two months later, she distributed food and medicine to local people, stopped further action against those who had burned the converts’ houses, and went to Napierville to speak on their behalf though her actions did not prevent nine properties being destroyed during Loyalist reprisals in November 1838.
Papineau’s conversion to republicanism and the emergence of the St Jean Baptiste Society [22] in 1834 as the social wing of the Parti Patriote led to the formation of four Loyalist societies that came together under the Constitutional Association of Montreal, an umbrella organisation, in early 1835. [23] Opposed to Patriote demands, the Constitutional Association sought to preserve the existing constitution and prevent French Canadian domination of the legislative process. Its manifesto, published in December 1835, attacked the ‘dishonest imputations of the French-Canadian leaders’ and later the seigneurial system, language unlikely to appeal to the silent majority of French Canadians or those disenchanted with Papineau. The result was a hardening of its position by early 1836, a situation helped by publicity from the Morning Courier, edited with determined and partisan vigour by Adam Thom. [24] The perceived need for ‘mutual defence and support’ led to the formation of the British Rifle Corps in December 1835. But Gosford’s response was immediate; it was banned on 15 January 1836. Its more militant members then formed a semi-secret society, the Doric Club that became the paramilitary wing of the Association.
By early September, Gosford had finally come to the belated conclusion that there would be no compromise with Papineau. He had issued a proclamation against sedition and ordered it to be read in all towns and villages by officers of the provincial militia. Most refused and many resigned and many who had not resign were dismissed. This posed a major problem for the authorities since militia officers were the guardians of law and order and there were few French Canadian sheriffs and magistrates whose loyalty could be relied on. An aggressive dialogue between the Tory and Patriote press threatened war in the streets. However, disturbances were still local and there was little sign of trouble in Quebec City and the areas around it where the Patriotes with their one newspaper, Le Libéral, never got beyond a war of words with the Loyalist Constitutional Association and its more militant Loyal Victoria.[25]
There were, nonetheless, three main areas of concern. First, the valley of the Richelieu centred on the towns of St-Denis, the home of the Patriote leader Wolfred Nelson, [26] St-Charles and St-Ours was worrying because of its proximity to the American border. [27] Secondly, to the north of Montreal beyond the Rivière des Prairies lay the substantial but isolated Patriote towns of St-Eustache, St-Benôit and Ste-Scholastique where there were reports of anarchy as early as June 1837 with loyalists living in fear and officials ‘elected by the people’ trying to maintain some semblance of order. An organised boycott of loyal British and French Canadian settlers in the Deux-Montagnes began shortly after a meeting of Patriotes in Ste-Scholastique in June at which Papineau set the tone of the rural agitation:
The British Parliament has stolen your lands and has given them to swindlers and traders…Now they threaten to steal your money…for a squalling pack of corrupt officials.
Finally, Montreal itself was far from secure. Papineau lived there and most of the trouble was centred on fractious and increasingly violent confrontations between the Fils de la Liberté and the Doric Club. Colborne wanted to arrest some of the excited parties but Gosford was still unwilling to act.
Beginning in October 1837, sporadic violence broke out in the countryside. [28] On 1 October, the Comité permanent de les Deux-Montagnes called on its inhabitants to elect magistrates. [29] Two weeks later, it also decided that each parish should establish its own militia. On 4 October, Fils de la Liberté published a manifesto calling for the election of a republican government and on 10 October, military units numbering 500 marched through the streets of Montreal singing revolutionary songs. Events increasing moved beyond Papineau much as Feargus O’Connor was bypassed by radical Chartists in September and October 1839. His progress through the Deux-Montagnes and down the Richelieu was a triumph. His presence inspired his supporters with the strength of his anger but the call to arms was getting louder. There were no arms as Papineau had forbidden attempts to buy them and arms required money and arrangements in the United States but no such plan existed. He returned to Montreal in early October where he found pressure for confrontation growing and the mood darker. The Comité central et permanent met daily hearing leaders and resolutions from the country districts but Papineau kept a discrete distance from plans he could not approve. William Lyon Mackenzie made contact arguing that it would be wise for them to coordinate their risings but though Papineau listened, no plans were made. Papineau condemned the nightly parades and threats of riot in the city but did nothing to stop them even if this was possible. While Papineau hesitated, the Fils de la Liberté marched in his name.
The calling of the Grande Assemblée des Six-Comtés (Richelieu, St-Hyacinthe, Rouville, Chambly, Verchères and L’Acadie) by the river at St-Charles that would call for a national convention, something Papineau had always favoured, marked the inexorable transition from agitation to rebellion. The gathering of chosen leaders speaking to massed Patriotes would lay down the ultimate challenge to the authorities. It would depose the Constitution and take the first tentative steps towards establishing a new state. Papineau would have to attend, even though he said the meeting was not his affair, and arrived at the small village of St-Marc, directly opposite St-Charles across the Richelieu, the evening before. His friends found him uncharacteristically uncommunicative, sombre and hesitant about his plans for the next day.
23 October was wet, cold with a covering of snow on the ground. There were banners everywhere including those symbolising the new republic with an American eagle carrying a maple leaf in its beak. The Pole of Liberty surmounted by a red cap, symbol of freedom and revolution and the inscription ‘To Papineau—his Grateful Compatriots—1837’ around its base stood before the platform. Aside from Papineau, the most important Patriote leaders were there: Wolfred Nelson and his brother Robert, both doctors, always strident in their attacks on the executive. Doctor Cyrille-Hector-Octave Côté of L’Acadie and his aide Lucien Gagnon [30] were powerful advocates of fire and blood; Thomas Storrow Brown, the General of the Fils de la Liberté; Amury Girod, a Swiss radical, loud and confrontational, and Doctor Chenier of St-Eustache, a compulsive talker and local leader. Wolfred Nelson who chaired the Grande Assemblée spoke first calling for the people, arms in hand, to put an end to tyranny. Papineau then rose and delivered a speech that was uncharacteristically moderate and hesitant. He called for people ‘of whatever origin, language or religion’ to organise themselves, and elect their own judges and militia officers in opposition to the British but it was now time to pause and reflect. Much had already been achieved by constitutional means, he maintained, and more could yet be achieved by the same means. This was not the time for a call to arms. At this point Nelson interrupted openly calling for revolt: ‘The time has come to melt our spoons into bullets’. For the next two hours, Papineau sat while speaker after speaker followed Nelson’s lead. They spoke in Papineau’s name binding him into an armed response that he clearly did not want. The delegates had prepared Thirteen Resolutions based on the Rights of Man, and these were approved by acclamation by the increasing excited crowd. These included one to reduce tithes and another to abolish some of the fees of the seigneurial system, designed to persuade the naturally conservative habitants into the Patriote camp. In attacking traditional French Canadian institutions, the Patriotes created an ideological rift in their ranks. What had been a political battle between executive and Patriotes was broadened, as Papineau feared, into a social revolution of habitant against seigneur. Despite Papineau’s call for restraint, this meeting marked a declaration of independence by the six comtés and was certainly interpreted as such by both radicals and the Government. [31]
The Roman Catholic hierarchy threw its weight behind a policy of compromise. [32] Lartigue’s first injunction was dated 24 October 1837, two days after a demonstration by 1,200 Patriotes in front of the Cathedral of St-Jacques protesting against the sermon given by Lartigue on 25 July at the ceremony when Ignace Bourget was consecrated as Lartigue’s coadjutor with the right of succession. [33] Lartigue had reminded the congregation of the Catholic Church’s attitude to rebellion against lawful authorities.[34] The first pastoral letter restated the traditional doctrine of the Church to ‘the obedience due to authority’ casting serious doubt on the wisdom of the radicals’ policy, which he considered imprudent as well as harmful. However, he did not threaten ecclesiastical sanctions against those in his diocese who did not respect his instructions. This letter was not well received by Patriotes. La Minerve on 30 October was particularly critical, as was Étienne Chartier, priest of St-Benoît who challenged the argument on which the pastoral letter was based. [35] According to Gilles Chaussé:
…although the clergy disassociated itself from the views expressed by the curé of St-Benoît, nonetheless a significant section of the clergy entertained serious doubts about the action of their bishop and on his view of the doctrine of unconditional obedience to the Crown and its representatives. [36]
This pastoral letter reminded clergy and laity of their religious responsibilities. [37] In reality, for many Patriotes it meant making a choice between their religious and political conscience. [38]
Papineau returned to Montreal from St-Charles afraid of what he had unleashed but knowing that the Patriotes could not rely on the active support of most French Canadians and the best they could hope for was their neutrality. Despite criticism of colonial government, for most in the province, the existing system of government was not intolerable. Neither did most people believe that the Patriotes could succeed in an armed conflict with the regular army or the loyalist militia. They may have been sympathetic to what Papineau was trying to do, but little more. The British minority could not be neutral but feared armed conflict less than general elections: the first, they were sure to win; the second, they were sure of losing. [39] Papineau still hoped that the British Government would give in before things went too far and this helps explain his timid attitude to rebellion. Despite pushing the constitutional strategy to extremes, he understood, unlike his more radical supporters, that it still offered the best prospect for success in changing the political system. It was already too late.
The disintegration of civil society called for a firm response from the colonial authorities. Nevertheless, Gosford was unwilling to take decisive action and still hoped for compromise with Papineau. He had had some success in increasing the French Canadian membership on the Legislative and Executive Councils and by October 1837, the active members of both bodies were largely French Canadian. For Loyalist militants, Gosford was completely in the hands of the French party. Although most French Canadians on the councils had unimpeachable loyalist credentials, some had been associated with Papineau and may have been leaking information to him. It is not surprising that Colborne did not provide Gosford with information about troop movements and had none of Gosford’s qualms about taking decisive action.
Colborne had already reinforced the garrisons in Montreal and Quebec City bringing their respective strengths to over 1,000 and 1,700 officers and men. This represented a small military force to control 650,000 people of varying degrees of loyalty, as both Colborne and the Patriotes knew. Colborne, however, had an effective intelligence system of loyal French Canadians that kept him well informed of Patriote plans. He had completed his assessment of the situation in the Montreal area by 22 September and decided to deploy additional troops. His decision was, in part, the result of an intensification of charivaris against loyalists in the Richelieu valley, something he had personally experienced at St-Hyacinthe and intelligence that Wolfred Nelson had already called on Patriotes to prepare to take up arms. Colborne’s counter-revolutionary moves in late September involved having two regiments in Montreal ready to march in winter into the Richelieu valley, and troops in barracks at Sorel, Trois-Rivières and Chambly to garrison the area south of the St Lawrence and a company at Bytown to deal with any problems in the Deux-Montagnes. Sir Charles Gore, [40] his quartermaster-general arrived in Montreal to inspect and refit barracks and Lieutenant-Colonel George Wetherall reconnoitred the Richelieu valley from Chambly to St-Denis, where he was leading his troops six weeks later. [41] After the assembly at St-Charles, Colborne moved further troops into the province including the 24th Regiment from Upper Canada where Sir Francis Bond Head was prepared to rely on his militia for protection. John Molson offered his steamboats to bring troops from Quebec to Montreal and the Constitutional Association was secretly organising Loyalists. [42]
By the end of October, in Montreal and its surrounding area, the news was disturbing. Patriote bands roamed the countryside demanding the resignation of militia officers and magistrates: some 116 from the counties bordering the Richelieu River alone. Intelligence sources suggested growing tensions between the Fils de la Liberté and the Doric Club in Montreal but also maintained that in direct conflict the Dorics would win. By early November, there were definite plans in Lower Canada for an uprising in the countryside followed by a move on the garrison towns and Quebec. Finally, Gosford was galvanised into action and urging the magistracy to act against leading Patriotes. He held back from suppressing the Vindicator and La Minerve in Montreal and Le Libéral in Quebec City but it made little difference. Whatever the Government did in the lower province, the move to rebellion remorselessly continued. All that was needed was a single overt act.
That event, when it came, took place in Montreal where tension between Patriotes and Loyalists had smouldered for several months. The Fils de la Liberté announced it intended to hold a mass rally, but on 4 November magistrates banned all parades in Montreal. The following day, Papineau made it clear that he thought the meeting was unwise and that a clash in the streets of Montreal was premature but the Fils de la Liberté stubbornly refused to listen. On 6 November, magistrates tried unsuccessfully to persuade Brown and André Ouimet [43] to call off the meeting. The result was a running battle between the Fils de la Liberté and the members of the Doric Club that ended with the Fils being swept from the streets. Around 2.00 pm the Riot Act was read and troops deployed to restore order. This did not prevent Loyalists from ransacking the offices of The Vindicator or attacking Papineau’s house before order was finally restored. There were few serious injuries though Brown lost of sight of an eye after being hit on the forehead and no deaths. The Patriotes now knew that the British Party would fight if necessary without regular military support and that they were not prepared to concede Montreal to the Patriotes. Although the Fils kept an armed guard at Papineau’s house, the Patriotes had lost any chance of taking Montreal.
At this point, the Government’s reaction began to take shape. The rumour, then the certainty, that the principal leaders would soon be arrested quickened the tempo of events. Colborne’s reaction was immediate. The 24th Regiment was ordered from Kingston to Montreal, two companies of the 83rd Foot moved to the city from Trois-Rivières and two companies of the 66th Regiment arrived at Chambly from Quebec. By 8 November Colborne was recruiting and arming volunteers and the following day set up his headquarters in Montreal. Patriote leaders retreated to their strongholds: St-Benoît [44] and St-Eustache in the Deux-Montagnes or St-Denis and St-Charles in the Richelieu Valley. [45] Events were quickly slipping from Papineau’s grasp and when urged to control Patriote activities in the countryside on 12 November he made it clear that he could not restrain it. On the same day, Colborne wrote to Gosford that:
…revolutionists are running over a large section of the country armed and menacing every individual who hesitates to join them…If…we permit the declared revolutionists to arm quietly, we shall lose the Province. [46]
Colborne also knew from intelligence that St-Hyacinthe would be the headquarters for the rebellion and that Papineau had been invited to go there on November 12 to declare himself and that, should he refuse, Wolfred Nelson would take the lead.
Despite this Gosford still hesitated. Warrants to arrest leading Patriotes were already in the hands of the authorities. This allowed Papineau, accompanied by O’Callaghan, to slip out of Montreal on 13 November and by the evening of 17 November they were in St-Denis. [47] On 13 November, Gosford cancelled the commission of 71 magistrates in Montreal and two days later, five Patriote leaders in Quebec were arrested but released three days later. On 16 November, 26 arrest warrants were issued in the district of Montréal for treason or sedition and by that night, André Ouimet, president of the Fils de la Liberté and five of his lieutenants were imprisoned. Thomas Storrow Brown was warned of his impending arrest and managed to escape from the city.
[1] On this issue see Chaussé, Gilles, ‘L’Église et les Patriotes’, Histoire Québec, Vol. 5, (2), (1999); Chaussé, Gilles, Jean-Jacques Lartigue: Premier eveque De Montreal, (Fides), 1980, and Lemieux, Lucien, L’Etablissement De La Premiere Province Ecclesiastique au Canada 1783-1844, (Fides), 1968, provide contextual material.
[2] Simard, Marc, Papineau et les patriotes de 1837, (Société canadienne du livre), 1983, offers a succinct overview.
[3] Soderstrom, Mary, Robert Nelson, Le Medecin Rebelle, (L’Hexagone), 1999 is the most recent study.
[4] Chabot, Richard, ‘Cyrille-Hector-Octave Côté’, DCB, Vol. 7, 1836-1850, 1988, pp. 208-211.
[5] Bernard, Philippe, Amury Girod: un Suisse chez les Patriotes, (Septentrion), 2000; Bernard, Jean-Paul and Gauthier, Danielle, ‘Amury Girod’, DCB, Vol. 7, 1836-1850, 1988, pp. 344-347.
[6] Brown, T. S., ‘The Rebellion of 1837: my Connection with it’, New Dominion Monthly, Vol. 4, (1), (1869), reprinted, Quebec, 1898, gives his own viewpoint.
[7] Ouellet, Fernand, ‘Papineau dans la Révolution de 1837-1838’, Société historique du Canada: Rapport de l'assemblée annuelle, Vol. 39, (1958), pp. 13-34.
[8] Bernard, Jean-Paul, Assemblées publiques, résolutions et déclarations de 1837-1838, (VLB), 1987, is an extensive analysis of the assemblies held in 1837 and 1838.
[9] Ibid, Bernard, Jean-Paul, Assemblées publiques, pp. 23-28.
[10] The Vindicator, 12 May 1837.
[11] MacNutt, W. S., New Brunswick, a history: 1784-1867, (Macmillan), 1984, is an important study and is especially good on political developments though it does not entirely replace Hannay, James, History of New Brunswick, 2 vols. St John, N. B., 1909.
[12] Beck, Murray, (ed.), Joseph Howe: Voice of Nova Scotia, (McClelland & Stewart), 1964; his five letters to Lord Russell in 1839 are printed in Egerton, H. E. and Grant, W. L., Canadian Constitutional Development, pp. 191-252, passim.
[13] Gallichan, Gilles, ‘La session de 1837, Les Cahiers des Dix, Vol. 50, (1995), pp. 117-208. Kennedy, pp. 436-442, prints Gosford’s address to the legislature and its response.
[14] On the Fils de la Liberté, ibid, Laporte, Gilles, Patriotes et Loyaux, pp. 151-155.
[15] Ibid, .pp. 175-194.
[16] Ibid, pp. 257-290.
[17] Greer, Allan, The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in rural Lower Canada, (University of Toronto Press), 1993, pp. 69-86, 254-255, and Hardy, René, ‘Le charivari dans l’espace québécois’, in Courville, Serge and Séguin, Normand, (eds.), Espace et Culture/Space and Culture, (Presses de l’Université Laval), 1995, pp. 175-186, provide important discussion on this issue. Thompson, E. P., ‘Rough Music’ reprinted in his Customs in Common, (Merlin Press), 1991, pp. 467-538, an extended version of ‘Rough Music: Le Charivari anglais’, Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, Vol. 27, (1972), is also valuable.
[18] Jones, David, ‘The Scotch Cattle and their Black Domain’, in Before Rebecca, pp. 86-112.
[19] Archives Nationales du Québec à Montréal (ANQM): dossier Événements 1837-1838, No. 607, 15 July 1837.
[20] Archives Nationales du Québec, fonds P224, no. 146.
[21] Balmer, Randall, and Randall, Catharine, ‘“Her Duty to Canada”: Henriette Feller and French Protestantism in Quebec’, Church History, Vol. 70, (2001), pp. 49-72, examines her role as a Protestant missionary.
[22] Rumilly, Robert, Histoire de la Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal, des Patriotes au fleurdelysé, 1834-1948, (Éditions de l’Aurore), 1975.
[23] Ibid, Patriotes et Loyaux, pp. 100-156, examines Patriote and Loyalist developments in Montreal in the 1830s.
[24] Bindon, Kathryn M., ‘Adam Thom’, DCB, Vol. 12, 1881-1890, 1990, pp. 874-877.
[25] Ibid, Patriotes et Loyaux, pp. 67-100, explores the situation in Quebec.
[26] Thompson, John, ‘Wolfred Nelson’, DCB, Vol. 9, 1861-1870, 1976, pp. 593-597.
[27] Wood, William C. H., The storied province of Quebec: past and present, 5 vols. Toronto, 1931, Vol. 2, pp. 831-853, and Moore, Arthur, H., The Valley of the Richelieu: an historical study, Quebec, 1929, provide context.
[28] Fortin, Réal, Les Patriotes du Haut-Richelieu et la bataille d`Odelltown, (SNQ Richelieu St-Laurent), 1987.
[29] Boileau, Gilles, 1837 et les patriotes de Deux-Montagnes: les voix de la mémoire, (Éditions du Méridien), 1998.
[30] Chabot, Richard, ‘Lucien Gagnon’, DCB, Vol. 7, 1836-1850, 1988, pp. 333-335.
[31] Ibid, Louis-Joseph Papineau, p. 15.
[32] Correspondance de Mgr Jean-Jacques Lartigue (1836-1840), in Rapport de l’archiviste de la province de Québec, Vol. 25, (1944-1945), pp.173-266; Vol. 26, (1945-1946), pp. 47-134.
[33] Ibid, Chaussé, Gilles, Jean-Jacques Lartigue, p. 199.
[34] Ouellet, Fernand, ‘Le mandements de Mgr Lartigue de 1837 et la réaction libérale’, Bulletin des recherches historiques, Vol. 58, (2), (1952), pp. 97-104.
[35] Chabot, Richard, ‘Etienne Chartier’, DCB, Vol. 8, 1851-1860, 1985, pp. 140-146, and more generally ‘Le rôle du bas clergé face au mouvement insurrectionnel de 1837’, Cahiers de Sainte-Marie, Vol. 5, (1967), pp. 89-98.
[36] Ibid, Jean-Jacques Lartigue, p. 211.
[37] Ibid, p. 200.
[38] Ippersiel, Fernand, Les cousins ennemis: Louis-Joseph Papineau et Jean-Jacques Lartigue, Montreal, 1990, provides a valuable juxtaposition.
[39] Ibid, Redcoats & Patriotes, p. 18.
[40] Spurr, John, ‘Sir Charles Gore’, DCB, Vol. 9, 1861-1870, 1976, pp. 327-329.
[41] Spurr, John, ‘Sir George Augustus Wetherall’, DCB, Vol. 9, 1861-1870, 1976, pp. 826-828.
[42] Dubuc, Alfred, and Tremblay, Robert, ‘John Molson’, DCB, Vol. 8, 1851-1860, 1985, pp. 630-634.
[43] Lorimier, Michel de, ‘André Ouimet’, DCB, Vol. 8, 1851-1860, 1985, pp. 667-668.
[44] Dumouchel, A., ‘Notes d’Alfred Dumouchel sur la rébellion, 1837-38 à St-Benoît ‘, Bulletin des recherches historiques, Vol. 35, (1929), pp. 31-51.
[45] Allaire, J.-B.-A., Histoire de la paroisse de St-Denis-sur-Richelieu, St-Hyacinthe, 1905, is the best general history of St-Denis.
[46] Colborne to Gosford, 12 November 1837, cit, Senior, Elinor Kyte, Redcoats & Patriotes, p. 51.
[47] Verney, Jack, O’Callaghan: The Making and Unmaking of a Rebel, (McGill-Queen’s University Press), 1994.
